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In the wake of the KURSK tragedy, world navies have brought their full attention to the 
submarine rescue problem. While many rescue systems exist, none have been able to sufficiently 
address the gamut of scenarios that place submariners in peril. One rescue strategy utilizes a 
submarine escape capsule commonly referred to as a Surfacing Rescue Container (SRC). 
Although SRCs have been employed in several submarine designs over the last four decades, the 
United States has never adopted the underlying strategy. This paper recognizes the SRC concept 
as the most reliable means of rescue, and proposes a modular SRC concept design (LSRC) which 
utilizes a modified Trident II D-5 missile tube as its host. The design is intended for use on the 
U.S. Navy's next generation ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) but may be back-fitted on 
current U.S. Navy Ohio class and U.K. Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarines with significant 
alteration. Technical analyses include a minimum weight design approach for internally stiffened 
right circular cylinders exposed to external hydrostatic pressure, an analytical and numerical 
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LCDR Joshua LaPenna, an Engineering Duty Officer enrolled in the Naval Construction and 
Engineering Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), critiques the U.S. Navy’s 
submarine Search and Rescue (SAR) strategy, and disputes the SRDRS’s (Submarine Rescue Diving and 
Recompression System) role as the primary means of submarine rescue. Alternatively, a Surfacing 
Rescue Container (SRC) concept design is proposed with hopes of being considered onboard the next 
generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Submarine “escape capsules”, like the SRC, have 
been employed in several submarine designs over the last four decades; however, the United States has 
never adopted the underlying strategy. In the light of recent U.S. submarine collisions, this paper re-
examines their use. 
 
A comparative analysis of rescue capabilities and relevant historical data is used to make a case for 
rescue strategies employing SRCs as the cornerstone of submarine SAR. This analysis claims that group-
assisted rescue methods, such as the SRDRS and Submarine Rescue Chamber, are too slow to be used as 
a primary means of rescue. By implementing SRCs onboard U.S. submarines, Time-To-First-Rescue 
(TTFR) can be significantly reduced (SRDRS: 36+ hours, SRC: 1+ hours). The LaPenna Surfacing 
Rescue Container (LSRC) concept incorporates many of the lessons learned from the ill-fated Russian 
submarine KURSK, and introduces the idea of modularity as it applies to rescue systems of this kind. The 
LSRC will use a modified Trident II D-5 missile tube as its host, and can be used to bring 70 survivors to 
the surface in the event a submarine is disabled. Once on the surface, the capsule serves as both a life raft 
and decompression chamber until help arrives. The LSRC shares the same dimensions as a D-5 missile, 
displaces 43 long-tons and has a positive submerged buoyancy of 3,516 lbm. To fully implement this 
concept as the U.S. Navy’s primary means of rescue, 145 capsules are required to outfit a submarine fleet 
of 71 boats. 
 
As part of the structural analysis, a scantling optimization routine was written to optimize the LSRC’s 
pressure hull with respect to weight. This program was used to test millions of scantling arrangements 
based on classical shell failure formulations and elastic buckling equations. The optimal designs were 
then compared with results obtained using the UK MoD optimization algorithm (MNSTRL) and a FEA 
was performed. Once the structure was modeled, various imperfections were introduced to assess the 
structure’s resistance to out-of-fairness (OOF). The results were then compared to those obtained by the 
Naval Sea Systems Command office of Survivability and Structural Integrity (NAVSEA 05P). The final 
pressure hull design has two compartments and is uniformly stiffened by small T-frames. The pressure 
hull is rated for operations as deep as 1,666 feet and has a collapse depth in excess of 2,500 feet. 
Although the pressure hull was designed to fail by axisymmetric shell yield, results suggest that the 
pressure hull is susceptible to multi-wave failure modes. Thus, additional analysis will be necessary 
should the concept be developed further. Mass distribution calculations indicate that the LSRC will 
exhibit poor stability characteristics due to small values of  ܤܩതതതത (31.6 inches). Having a freeboard of only 
1.8 feet, there is little room for additional ballast. For this reason, reductions in load will be necessary to 
improve ܤܩതതതത. These calculations include a weight margin of 10%, evenly applied to all weight groups. 
 
Although a detailed cost analysis was not performed, a comparative analysis with the SRDRS 
program requires that each LSRC be produced at a cost no greater than $1.2M. This figure assumes that 
missile tube modifications and support systems can be rolled into new ship construction costs. In 
conclusion, the LSRC is an example of what could be done to improve the U.S. Navy’s submarine SAR 
program. Contrary to this thesis’s title, the LSRC concept should not be interpreted as a niche solution, 
applicable only to Trident submarines. Rather, it is the concept of a modular SRC which is housed in a 
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The concept of group escape from a distressed submarine via a capsule housed within a 
watertight enclosure, such as a missile tube, first came to me while serving onboard the USS 
WYOMING (SSBN 742). After researching this topic, I realized that this idea is not entirely 
original. However, a detailed study as it applies to the Trident II D-5 missile system has never 
been done. This thesis was written to more fully explore how this concept could be implemented 
onboard U.S. submarines. 
 
I truly believe in this concept. The U.S. submarine force is second to none; however, her 
rescue strategy for distressed submarines (DISSUB) is largely incomplete and would benefit 
from using group rescue systems such as the surfacing rescue containers (SRC)1 used abroad. 
The basis for this conclusion is discussed more fully in chapter 1. It is my opinion that the “best 
case” Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) response time is 
unacceptable. I salute the engineers who have developed the SRDRS, and applaud them for their 
success in developing a system that can overcome the hurdles associated with deploying a rescue 
capability anywhere in the world with a time to first rescue (TTFR) of only 3+ days. Given the 
hurdles at hand; mainly, DISSUB notification, DISSUB localization, Submarine Rescue Vehicle 
(SRV) deployment, DISSUB hatch mating and crew decompression, the SRDRS performance is 
impressive.  However, we are not victims of these hurdles. On the contrary, our submarine SAR 
strategy created them. These hurdles exist because of a flawed rescue strategy that places the 
entire burden of submarine rescue upon a single fly-away system. If the rescue strategy relied on 
SRCs, with the SRDRS and Submarine Escape and Immersion Equipment (SEIE) suit as 
backups, every hurdle listed above would no longer apply. When utilizing SRCs, TTFR is 
spoken on the order of hours rather than days, and crew survival becomes a tangible expectation. 
 
It is my expectation that few people within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
organization will take this paper seriously. This is unfortunate. Ideas such as this will never be 
popular; they do not improve the submarine’s stealth or lethality, they do not fit neatly into 
overarching guidance such as Seapower 21 or the new Maritime Strategy, and more importantly, 
they costs money. In addition, the SRC will add weight to an already weight limited platform and 
will require precious real estate. Resistance will also come as a result of the strong design 
paradigm that exists within U.S. submarine development organizations. Finally, the idea is 
different; it will force designers to rethink survivability and the way we design submarines, and 
may even require that we adopt practices used by our former adversaries. 
 
It is recognized that this thesis does not meet all the requirements of a true “concept design” 
as is accustomed to those within NAVSEA. Academically, this work is sound. A great deal of 
effort was made to ensure that the results were accurate and not misleading. However, I am in no 
way infallible and encourage others to critique my work. In the spirit of MIT, an effort was made 
to explore this problem with classical, if not fundamental, equations and techniques. For 
example, rather than simply use published design codes for developing the LSRC pressure hull, 
more traditional equations were used to demonstrate a more thorough understanding of the topic. 
In addition, an effort was made to experiment with and utilize newly developed software. 
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On August 12th, 2000 the Russian attack submarine KURSK (K-141) suffered a fantastic 
casualty that killed all but 23 of her crewmembers. When I first heard of the casualty, I 
remember first being amazed that an Oscar class submarine could sustain so much damage. I was 
worried for the sailors onboard, but was relieved when I heard that the boat had sunk in just 350 
feet of water. In terms of submarine operating depths, this is very shallow. Especially 
considering the KURSK itself was more than 500 feet in length. As a submariner and deep-sea 
diver, I was convinced that these men could be saved. Instead, all 23 men died while waiting to 
be rescued. 
 
The events leading to her demise are not nearly as important as the lessons to be learned, and 
there are many. It has been ascertained that a poorly maintained 65-76 torpedo exploded inside 
the pressure hull. After a much larger secondary explosion, the first four compartments of the 
KURSK were flooded. Contemplating escape or rescue, survivors occupying the four intact 
compartments gathered in the ninth compartment underneath the escape trunk. Russian naval 
pathologists believe that all 23 men died of carbon monoxide poisoning. Evidence resulting from 
the KURSK’s salvage suggests that a flash-fire occurred in the ninth compartment due to high 
partial pressures of oxygen and the heat generated from a seawater reaction with the superoxide 
chemical cartridges being used to generate oxygen. Within minutes of this fire the crew most 
likely died from the now toxic submarine atmosphere. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing 
exactly how long the survivors lived. Notes written by the crew prove that all 23 men were alive 
for at least 6 hours and 17 minutes. It was also observed that no attempt was made acoustically 
(i.e. hull tapping) to signal the Russian SRV PRIZ when it attempted to mate with the aft escape 
trunk just 32 hours after the first explosion2. 
 
When focusing on the details of the KURSK tragedy it is easy to miss the big picture. The 
fact that these men died from a flash-fire is almost irrelevant. They could just as easily have died 
from hypothermia, carbon dioxide poisoning, or drowning as a result of seawater leaks. The 
biggest lesson from the KURSK tragedy is time. Time killed these men. Notes written by the 
crew suggest that all 23 men were uninjured following the second explosion. If these men were 
to survive at all, they needed to get off the submarine within the first few hours. Had these men 
attempted escape on their own using individual SEIE suits3 some may have survived; however, 
the submarine’s depth and the risk of hypothermia most likely swayed the crew’s decision to 
await rescue. Unfortunately, this decision cannot always be reversed. If exposed to elevated 
pressures (due to seawater or air leaks) equivalent to just 60 feet of seawater for more than an 
hour, the entire crew will no longer have the option to escape without risking decompression 
sickness4. For this reason, solely relying on a rescue strategy that forces men to await rescue is 
                                                 
2 Widely unappreciated by western media, this response time was deemed slow and uncoordinated. Given that the 
published SRDRS response time is 72 hours, this sentiment is not without its own hypocrisy. 
3 Known to the Russian navy as ISP-60s (Individualnoe Sredstvo Podvodnika) 
4 “In the ninth compartment, there are 23 sailors. We feel bad, weakened by carbon dioxide….Pressure is increasing 
in the compartment. If we head for the surface we won’t survive the decompression. We won’t last more than a day.” 
– Captain Lieutenant Sergei Sadilenko, KURSK [37]. 
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ill-posed; It prevents men from acting quickly at intermediate depths, and after a short time, puts 
them in a situation where individual escape is no longer an option. 
 
This lesson should have been learned following the tragic sinking of the Peruvian submarine 
BAP PACOCHA (SS-48) (formerly USS ATULE) in 1988. While transiting on the surface off the 
coast of Peru, the PACOCHA suffered a collision with a Japanese trawler. In less than five 
minutes the PACOCHA was on the bottom some 140 feet below the surface. Twenty-two men 
were trapped inside the submarine contemplating the same questions (i.e. escape or rescue) as 
those onboard the KURSK. Communication with rescuers above revealed that the U.S. Navy had 
activated its emergency McCann rescue team, and that the survivors were to remain calm and 
await their rescue. However, due to delays in deploying the rescue chamber, and the slowly 
worsening atmospheric conditions within the submarine, it was finally decided that all men 
should escape using Steinke hoods5. At 140 feet this method of escape proved successful, and all 
twenty-two men exited the submarine via the forward escape trunk, the last leaving some twenty-
three hours after the collision. Unfortunately, many of the men had incurred decompression 
obligations and developed decompression sickness within minutes of reaching the surface. While 
transporting the men to decompression chambers, one man died and another was severely brain 
damaged. 
 
All things considered, the escape was successful. However, the submariners should have 
performed a hooded assent immediately after reaching the bottom (or at least after learning that 
rescue teams had formed on the surface). Once again, time killed/injured these men. These two 
tragedies are excellent examples of why group-assisted rescue methods, when solely relied upon, 
are inadequate and unconstructive.  In the first few hours following the casualty these men made 
the decision to await rescue based on the atmospheric conditions at that time. Only time revealed 
that their lithium hydroxide canisters were inefficiently removing CO2, that leaks in the pressure 
hull were causing the submarine atmosphere to become hyperbaric, and that the seawater 
entering the battery well was creating toxic chlorine gas. 
 
It is the objective of this thesis to investigate the use of modular escape capsules onboard 
U.S. submarines. Such devices solve the “time problem” and may be used at considerable 
depths6. Historically, the “escape capsule” concept has taken many forms (e.g. SRCs, RRGs, 
SRGs and SCs); however, the SRC has emerged as the most promising design. Access to a well 
designed SRC could have saved the lives of those mentioned above. The problem associated 
with outfitting submarines with SRCs is not engineering in nature; rather, it is political, and will 
only be deemed feasible when it is made a priority. Many may argue that there just isn’t enough 
room onboard a submarine for such a device. Somehow however, designers found room onboard 
a Project 705 (NATO classification: Alfa) SSN, and a Type 209 SSK; they just made it a 
priority. Thus was the motivation for this thesis. If a SRC cannot be realized onboard a Trident 
submarine, then it will never find its way into the United States Navy. 
 
  
                                                 
5 All but three escaped using Steinke hoods. The last three survivors escaped utilizing SCUBA bottles which were 
placed in the escape trunk by rescue divers. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.3 A CASE FOR SRCS 
 
The decision to develop SRCs should not be based ROW examples alone. Thus, this section 
will examine the U.S. Navy’s submarine escape doctrine, and will build a case for SRCs based 
on fundamental search and rescue (SAR) objectives and historical data. COMNAVSUBFOR 
OPLAN 2137 [6], published by the commander of submarine forces, defines the submarine SAR 
mission as follows: 
 
“The specific mission of submarine search and rescue in the U.S. Navy is to deliver 
survivors from a bottomed, disabled submarine to the surface in a medically viable 
condition, anywhere in the world.” 
 
This mission is currently fulfilled by three rescue systems, (1) the Mk 10 SEIE suit, (2) the 
submarine rescue chamber, and (3) the SRDRS, the latter two of which may be characterized as a 
group-assisted rescue capability. The Submarine Rescue Chamber is rated to 850 feet and can 
rescue up to six survivors every 1-3 hours. Like the SRDRS however, the Submarine Rescue 
Chamber’s initial response time will vary with SUBMISS declaration and DISSUB location. The 
SEIE suit is immediately available to the crew for escape and may be used at any depth less than 
600 feet. Proficient use of the escape trunks should allow for eight individual escapes per hour. 
The SRDRS is rated at 2,000 feet and can rescue 16 survivors per sortie. Each sortie has a 
nominal cycle time of about five hours. The initial response time (objective) for the SRDRS is 72 
hours after SUBMISS has been declared. Within the U.S. Navy, the SRDRS is considered to be 
the primary means of submarine rescue, and the Submarine Rescue Chamber and SEIE suit are 
maintained as reliable back-ups. These three systems span two of the three rescue methods (i.e. 
individual-escape and group-assisted rescue). The third (i.e. group-independent escape), is not a 
part of the U.S. Navy’s submarine SAR strategy. If SRCs were to be used, they would become 
the primary means of rescue and the SRDRS would only be relied upon as a contingency. 
 
 
1.3.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
 
As previously discussed, the SRDRS is not in competition with the SRC concept. Rather, 
both systems, as well as individual escape techniques, should be used in a single strategy, each 
complementing the other. However, because the group-assisted rescue strategy has become the 
dominant rationale within the U.S. Navy, the SRDRS program will be used for purposes of 
comparison. Because both systems were developed to address the same problem, it is worthwhile 
to compare their overall effectiveness in relation to each other. To begin, a comparative list of 





 SRC ADVANTAGES SRDRS ADVANTAGES 
• SUBSUNK notification not necessary 
• DISSUB localization does not apply 
• Rescue systems are maintained off submarine 
• Can be used to assist foreign governments 
• SRV deployment does not apply • SDS provides more room for treatment 
• AUWS not required of survivors 
• Hatch mating not required SRDRS DISADVANTAGES • SRC acts as a dry lifeboat on surface 
• Reduced chance of decompression obligation • Requires SUBSUNK notification* 
• TUP not required (decompress inside SRC) • Requires DISSUB localization* 
• Improved TTFR • Requires deployment to DISSUB* 
• Requires 1 person to deploy • Requires multiple rescue sorties* 
• Simplicity of concept • Requires TUP for decompression* 
(low probability of delay or failure) • Requires hundreds of people to deploy* 
• Cost ? • Response subject to VOO and aircraft  
SRC DISADVANTAGES transport availability* • Requires hatch mating 
• SRC is subject to damage • TTFR > 3 days 
(i.e. same as submarine) • Complexity of concept 
• One or more is required on each submarine (high probability of delay or failure) 
• Weight and space burden • Inoperable in high sea states 
• Increased ship cost (SCN) 
• Cannot be used to assist foreign governments 
• Cost? 
 
Table 1. SRC and SRDRS advantages and disadvantages 
 
Perhaps more important that identifying the pros and cons of each system, the table above 
highlights just how different these two systems are. The two greatest advantages that the SRC 
has over the SRDRS are simplicity and TTFR. However, TTFR by itself is sufficient to warrant 
serious consideration. TTFR is widely recognized as the most significant factor in increasing the 
probability of crew survival. OPLAN 2137 fully embraces this fact and has made it part of the 
U.S. Navy’s submarine SAR mission statement: 
 
“Survivability on a disabled submarine is limited based on CO2 production and 
removal, cold, oxygen consumption, and the possibility of a pressurized environment or 
toxic gases. As a consequence, submarine rescue is a race against time.” 
 
However, the rescue systems being funded within the U.S. Navy do not fully support this 
sentiment. The SRDRS’s slow TTFR is a direct result of the disadvantages asterisked above. 
Again, these disadvantages are unavoidable consequences of the group-assisted strategy. 
 
 
1.3.2 RESPONSE TIME 
 
A “best case” timeline for SRDRS deployment is depicted in Figure 6. This timeline 
represents the U.S. Navy’s response, per plan, in the event that a U.S. attack submarine fails to 
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The first and greatest hurdle to overcome is DISSUB notification and localization. Per 
OPLAN 2137, a submarine’s failure to transmit an accountability report will result in the 
declaration of SUBLOOK. Event SUBLOOK is a check on possible communication failure and 
is initiated by the Submarine Operational Authority (SUBOPAUTH); no rescue action is taken. 
By instruction, anywhere between 1 and 72 hours may elapse before SUBLOOK is initiated due 
to overdue accountability reports. Once declared, attempts will be made to contact the 
submarine. When deemed appropriate by the SUBOPAUTH, but no later than 20 hours after 
declaring SUBLOOK, event SUBMISS is declared. Event SUBMISS acknowledges that the 
submarine is overdue and submarine SAR efforts may begin. Finally, event SUBSUNK is 
declared when the submarine is known or presumed to be disabled and unable to surface. Due to 
the group-assisted rescue strategy, rescue efforts are delayed until the submarine is declared 
overdue. Using this strategy, it is possible that the entire crew will perish before SUBMISS is 
declared. The best case scenario for DISSUB alert will come from a distressed Ohio class SSBN. 
Because these submarines are equipped with the AN/BST-1 Submarine Emergency 
Communications Transmitter (SECT) Buoy, shore based facilities will learn of her sinking 
within minutes of reaching the bottom. Unfortunately, this automated system does not exist 
onboard U.S. attack submarines7. 
 
Specifics of the SRDRS response immediately following event SUBMISS are listed in Figure 
6. The times required to complete each task were taken directly from OPLAN 2137 and the 
SRDRS Concept of Operations, Revision 6. This “best case” scenario results in a TTFR of 108 
hours (4.5 days), with the last survivor beginning decompression at T=153 hours (~6.4 days). 
Quite generously, this scenario assumes that the SRDRS response time is only 64 hours. Had the 
“worst case” scenario been considered, SUBMISS would not have been declared until T=92 
hours (IAW OPLAN 2137). In addition, SRDRS speakers at the American Society of Naval 
Engineers (ASNE) Tug & Salvage Technology Symposium in 2009 admitted that meeting the 72 
hour response objective has been difficult, and more realistic timelines place the SRDRS 
response at 96 hours. Using these numbers, the “worst case” SRDRS TTFR is 188 hours (~7.8 
days) with the last man beginning decompression at 233 hours (~9.7 days). 
 
A similar timeline for a typical SRC escape can be seen in Figure 7. Again, conservative 
values were used for each task. This timeline places TTFR at 1.75 hours. The incredible gains 
that can be realized using SRCs results from the group-independent escape strategy. This 
strategy removes the “hurdles” confronted by group-assisted rescue methods, thereby 




                                                 
7 It is unfortunate that a similar system has not yet been designed for attack submarines. SRDRS engineers and 
program managers have made great efforts to reduce TTFR; in many cases trimming only minutes or hours off the 
response time. Had SECT buoys been installed onboard SSNs the SRDRS’s TTFR would have been improved by 
hours or even days. Having just designed the Virginia class SSN, this was a wasted opportunity that could have 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































U.S. Navy systems; blue for SEIE and green for SRDRS. Because the SRDRS possesses similar 
capabilities as the Submarine Rescue Chamber, and to prevent the figure from appearing too 
cluttered, the Submarine Rescue Chamber’s capability coverage is not shown. From Figure 8 the 
following observations are made: 
 
(1) A capability gap exists for scenarios at depths deeper than 600 feet and with 
submarine environments that become deadly within three days of the casualty (i.e. 
white area). This capability gap could be filled by SRCs.  
 
(2) All individual escapes occurred within 13 hours of the casualty, with more than half 
occurring within the first hour. 
 
(3) No submarine atmospheres have been able to sustain life for longer than 57 hours. 
 
(4) Only on two occasions were free/buoyant ascents deeper than 300 feet successful. 
 
 
More detailed information for each of the data points is given in Appendix II. Unfortunately, 
many of the distressed submarines plotted in Figure 8 are not representative of “modern” 
designs. All but four data points used in this analysis pertain to submarines designed prior to 
19509. However, it is all the data that is available, and arguably, the only data that is relevant. 
Once again, the KURSK, being a modern third-generation SSN, is an important data point. No 
other country in the world designs submarines more survivable than Russia. While it is hard to 
imagine a wartime scenario more devastating than that suffered by the KURSK, this modern 
submarine could not keep her crew alive long enough to support rescue. Comparing U.S. 
submarine designs with that of the KURSK, having nine watertight compartments and a double 
pressure hull with 5 feet separation; the outer hull being made of three and a quarter inch thick 
elastic high-nickel steel and the inner pressure hull being covered with eight inches of rubber, it 
is difficult to believe that a submarine with a single pressure hull and only two compartments 
(i.e. Los Angeles class SSN) would fare any better when confronted with the kinds of casualties 
that put a boat on the bottom. 
 
Additional submarine escape/rescue data is available from the British Admiralty Submarine 
Escape Committee (BASEC). This committee has compiled information and statistics on every 
known instance of past submarine escapes/rescues. This research was subsequently published in 
the Submarine War Damage Report No. 58 by the U.S. Hydrographic Office in 1949. Although 
the BASEC results are somewhat outdated, they still account for over 90% of all present day 
submarine escape/rescue scenarios (as of 2009). For convenience, the BASEC results as 
presented in reference [10] are summarized below: 
 
  
                                                 
9 Rumors exist of two separate submarine escapes (free/buoyant ascents through the torpedo tubes) occurring 
onboard Chinese submarines; one in 1959 (hull number 418) and another in 1987. If the rumors are true the total 




The escape problem on submarines can be considered in three phases as follows: 
 
Phase 1: Survival within the submarine after damage up to the 
time personnel actually exist from the hull 
Phase 2: Survival during the ascent to the surface 
 
Phase 3: Survival after reaching the surface until rescued.  
 
Section 22-6 
According to British records, of all the personnel who have been carried to the bottom in 
known cases of sunken submarines, a total of about 500 men are believed to have 
survived both the initial accident or damage causing the sinking and the subsequent 
primary flooding. Of these 500 men, a total of 32 were rescued from three submarines of 
such small size that the boats were lifted bodily by cranes; 33 were saved by rescue 
chamber; and 46 were taken off a submarine sunk in shallow landlocked waters where 
raising the bow of the ship was comparatively simple and expeditious. Of the remaining 
390 men who survived the initial accident, approximately 250 or 60% perished inside 
their respective submarines. It is probable that the principal cause of the majority of 
these deaths was CO2 poisoning, in some cases due to delaying the escape attempt too 
long, and in others to the accelerated poisoning effect of CO2 when present in 
atmosphere under high pressure. This latter condition occurs when flooding a 
compartment to equalize internal pressure with sea pressure to permit a skirted-trunk 
escape. Other known causes were drowning due to further uncontrollable or inadvertent 
flooding, drowning as a result of deliberately flooding a compartment to equalize 
internal pressure with sea pressure to permit skirted-trunk escapes with an air-lock type 
escape trunk. Of the 142 men who are known to have left their submarines on attempted 
individual escapes, 106 men or 75% reached the surface alive and survived until rescued. 
This represents only 27% survivors of the possible original 390. Of the 36 who left their 
ships on attempted escapes but did not survive, some are known to have reached the 
surface alive but subsequently died by drowning, exhaustion, or by prolonged immersion 
in cold water. The others died from various causes, among them being air embolism, 
asphyxiation, ruptured lung tissue due to failure to exhale during ascent, and drowning 
due to inhalation of water during ascent. 
 
Section 22-7 
The statistics for these escapes, although not based on enough instances to be conclusive 
indicate the following interesting and pertinent points:  
 
(a) It appears that with present equipment and techniques the chance of 
survival by using the individual escape method decreases about 10% for 
every 30-foot increase in depth, until a 250 feet and beyond, the chance of 




(b) The phase between the initial accident and the actual escape attempts is by 
far the most critical. Eighty-eight per cent of all subsequent deaths among 
personnel who survived the initial accident occurred during this period. 
 
(c) The advantage of rapid flooding over slow flooding when sea water must be 
admitted to a compartment to equalize internal air pressure with external 
sea pressure to permit escape through a skirted-trunk, is demonstrated by 
the fact that there were only 21% survivors after slow flooding whereas 
66% survived when flooding was rapid. As would be expected, the figures 
also show that as the depth increases, a higher percentage of survivors 
results when the escape compartments are flooded rapidly rather than 
slowly. This is particularly marked at depths greater than 100 feet.  
 
(d) The hazard of the ascent itself, particularly when made by well trained 
personnel, is relatively minor for depths up to about 200 feet. Of all the men 
who left their submarines on individual escape attempts, either with or 
without an apparatus, probably less than 10% perished during the actual 
ascent. 
 
(e) Well over half of the survivors made "free" ascents, either entirely without 
breathing apparatus or with such apparatus but using it as a buoyancy bag 
only due to mal-operation or defective parts.  
 
 
Perhaps the most important take-away from Figure 8 is an understanding of the predicament 
that confronts submariners immediately after the casualty. The senior survivor must make the 
decision of whether or not the crew should escape by their own means or by awaiting rescue. 
However, in most cases an informed decision is not possible in the first few hours following the 
casualty. To make this decision properly, the senior survivor must understand what the 
submarine environment (i.e. temperature, atmosphere, etc.) will look like two or three days into 
the future. That is, he must know the locations of the vertical dotted lines in Figure 8. Each of 
these lines represents a point of no turning back or death. As was the case of the PACOCHA, the 
senior survivor believed that the crew could hold out for 48 hours; however, he was proven 
wrong as more information became available. Senior survivors are likely to prolong this decision 
in hope of more information. It is also human nature to defer decisions so long as the present 
condition is comfortable. In a good scenario, this may very well be the case as the submarine will 
still be relatively warm and the air will be of the finest quality in the first hour. Moreover, 
knowing that the SRDRS system exists, and that it is the most favorable option, will further 
delay critical reasoning. If the decision to escape via individual means is deferred too long, the 
crew may incur decompression obligations, thereby removing individual escape as an option. 
 
To aid in this decision the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory (NSMRL) has 
developed a decision making tool commonly referred to as the Senior Survivor Guidance 
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“Guardbook”10. This book contains step by step procedures which are aimed at estimating the 
locations of the dotted lines in Figure 8. 
 
However, due to the dynamic environment of a distressed submarine, atmospheric estimates 
made within the first few hours may be misleading. At this stage of survival (i.e. Phase 1), ill-
informed decisions will have dire consequences (e.g. 100% of the crew dies11 awaiting more 
information (or rescue) vice 30% dying while attempting escape). Therefore, it is logical to 
pursue escape immediately following the casualty. Both historical data (above) and experimental 
results obtained by NSMRL support this rationale. Two experiments simulating “best case” 
DISSUB scenarios were conducted in 2003 and 2004 on Los Angeles class SSNs. These 
exercises, known as SURVIVEX 2003 and SURVIVEX 2004, were designed to measure the 
atmospheric degradation in the forward compartment over a seven day period while some 90+ 
crewmembers practiced survival techniques. Even in these controlled experiments, where the 
submarine’s status was known, scientists observed atmospheric conditions that, at the time, were 
not fully understood. In fact, temperature and humidity within the forward compartment rose so 
high during SURVIVEX 2004 that the exercise was terminated early; these results were not 
predicted. The senior survivor’s ability to predict the atmosphere of a deranged submarine two 
days into the future will be no better. Based on this reasoning, world navies should develop 
submarine SAR strategies that are centered on individual or group-independent escape methods. 
Presently, the SEIE suit is the only capability (within the U.S. Navy) that can support a “prompt” 
escape. Unfortunately, ascents using the SEIE suit are very dangerous in nature, and require a 
great deal of situational awareness and proficiency. Because this method of escape also requires 
open-ocean survival (i.e. Phase 3), it should not be relied upon as the submariners’ primary 





In conclusion, the highest percentage of crew survival will occur when the submariners 
escape “promptly” using dry group-independent escape methods such as the SRC. Group-
assisted rescue methods such as the SRDRS are too slow to be used as a primary means of 
rescue, and should be maintained only for the purpose of contingency. 
  
                                                 
10 Currently, the Los Angeles class SSN Guardbook is complete, but the Ohio class SSBN, Seawolf class SSN, and 
Virginia class SSN Guardbooks are still in development. In addition to the senior survivor guidance Guardbook, 
chapter 13 of the atmosphere control manual may be used. Because the survivors’ reasoning may be impaired, 
NSMRL is developing an automated version of the Guradbook called SEAREX which may be loaded onto a PDA.  
11 See Appendix II, HMS Untamed (P-58), 1943. 




2 LSRC DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 DESIGN OVERVIEW 
 
2.1.1 LSRC CONCEPT 
 
A good SRC design will have minimal impact on the ship’s war fighting capability, require 
few auxiliary systems, and be placed in a location that does not disrupt routine operations. The 
most efficient designs will have multiple functions, allowing the space occupied by the SRC to 
have alternate uses. Double functionality can be found on most Russian and older Soviet 
submarine designs where the SRC “doubles” as a submarine access trunk (See Figure 9). 
Therefore, an optimal design will not result unless the SRC is considered at the earliest stages of 
submarine design. Ultimately, the size, shape and placement of the SRC must minimize its 
likelihood of being damaged during a casualty, maximize crew accessibility, and support reliable 





Figure 9. Double functionality. Alfa class SSN SRC [1] 
 
The logical solution to implementing a SRC capability onboard a U.S. submarine is to imitate 
the design of SRCs currently in service. However, SRCs are almost entirely unique to the 
Russian Navy, and their designs are difficult to replicate onboard a U.S. submarine. With the 
exception of the Typhoon class SSBNs, Russian designs place a single SRC13 in the submarine’s 
sail. Locating a SRC in the sail of a submarine precludes interference with arrangements inside 
the pressure hull and minimizes the likelihood of SRC fouling near the ocean floor. 
Unfortunately, due to fundamental design differences placing a SRC in the sail is not a feasible 
                                                 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































place one or more MMTs in a central compartment with an access tunnel connecting each 
compartment. This narrow crawl space would remain closed during normal operations, and 
would be accessed only in the case of emergency. Again, the tunnel and MMTs are placed on the 
centerline of the ship to enhance survivability. A schematic of each arrangement can be seen in 














Figure 11. LSRC accessibility arrangements. (a) MMTs at bulkheads, (b) MMTs with access tunnel 
 
If this concept is to be fully exploited, the MMT should also be designed to accommodate a 
wide range of other payloads, including D-5 nuclear ballistic missiles (if desired). This versatility 
offers the added benefit of modularity to the LSRC concept; a characteristic unique among 
SRCs. While the LSRC is expected to be a permanent payload, modularity will give authorities 
the option to remove the LSRC should the operational environment change or if special missions 
take precedence. Although specifically designed to accommodate the LSRC, it is envisioned that 
the MMT could also be used to deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), special operations forces (SOF) equipment or future weapon systems.  
 
The general characteristics of the LSRC will be similar to that of the Trident II D-5 missile, 
having a length of 44 feet (13.41 meters) and a diameter of 83 inches (2.11 meters). Because the 
LSRC must be positively buoyant when manned, its weight in the full load condition will be 
lighter than a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (Trident II D-5: 130,000 lbm (58,500 
kg)). For this reason, should the MMT be designed to accommodate a SLBM, the LSRC is 
ensured to be within the missile compensation system limits. 
 
 
2.1.2 DESIGN PROCESS 
 
Due to the geometry of the LSRC, it is expected that the capsule will be ܭܩതതതത limited. To 
ensure that the LSRC remains vertical during the accent phase (and is stable upon reaching the 
surface), it is desirable to design the capsule with a relatively large ܤܩതതതത. This will provide 
inherent stability while the capsule is submerged and will produce sufficient righting moments at 
the surface.   Therefore, it will be important to keep the capsule as light as possible such that 
sufficient fixed ballast may be placed at the keel, thereby increasing ܤܩതതതത. Because the LSRC’s 





design process will begin with optimizing the LSRC’s pressure hull based on weight (i.e. as 
opposed to cost). The non-dominated solutions resulting from this analysis will then serve as a 
starting point for the rest of the design. Because the number of sailors onboard the LSRC at the 
time of use unknown, a good understanding of the weight distribution will be critical to 
developing a safe and robust design. For this reason, computer aided design tools should be 
utilized to accurately calculate the weights of each component and their centers of gravity. The 
software used in this analysis is SolidWorks17. After the systems, payloads and furnishings are 
accurately modeled in the computer, fixed ballast can be added and the structure’s overall mass 
properties can be determined. The results obtained from SolidWorks can then be used in the 
intact stability and seakeeping analysis to determine the LSRC’s performance in a regular 
seaway at various sea states. At this point, the fixed ballast can be adjusted and changes can be 
made to the overall design to improve stability characteristics.  
 
The technical analyses covered in this paper focus on the LSRC’s structural integrity and 
surface stability. No consideration was given to the capsule’s ejection and accent phase, and thus 
remains an open area for future research. Only one pass in the design spiral was made. 
 
 
2.2 SYSTEMS AND PAYLOADS 
 
2.2.1 MMT operation and ejection control 
 
Above all, a SRC must be reliable. For this reason the systems designed to operate the MMT 
muzzle door and jettison the capsule should rely upon the most basic scientific principles and 
physical laws. To ensure proper operation in the most degraded conditions, many systems 
onboard submarines already employ this design strategy (e.g. emergency main ballast tank blow 
system, emergency flood control system, and numerous reactor control systems). It is envisioned 
that the systems used to flood the MMT, rotate the locking ring and open the muzzle door be 
identical to those already in place for the missile tubes. These systems would need to be 
modified so that control valves could be operated remotely from within the LSRC, and should be 
certified as shock grade A items. In addition, dedicated air and hydraulic accumulators should be 
used to ensure MMT operation when all other ship systems are down, and remotely operated 
solenoid valves should be powered from the LSRC battery. Remote operation of these systems 
from within the escape capsule will require a break-away connection between the LSRC and the 
MMT18. 
 
The ejection system would provide two functions. First, it must hold the LSRC in place while 
the MMT muzzle door is being operated, and secondly, it must be able to eject the capsule from 
the tube over a large range of angles (i.e. heel and trim) and adverse bottom currents. It is 
recommended that the LSRC ejection system utilize an inflatable boot or bag that would extend 
the length of the MMT. This method would eject the capsule based on the principle of positive 
displacement (i.e. vice positive pressure - such as that produced by a gas generator) and contains 
                                                 
17 SolidWorks Education Edition, Version 2006 SP4.1 
18 By design and procedure, the crew should have the ability to float a Submarine Emergency Position Indicating 
Radio Beacon (SEPIRB) prior to flooding the MMT. In the event that the ejection is unsuccessful, the crew will be 


















































































2.2.2 Communications and Navigation 
 
Upon reaching the surface, the crew will need to contact the appropriate Submarine 
Operational Authority (SUBOPAUTH) as soon as possible. While any communications suite 
could be placed onboard the LSRC, it is recommended that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
equipment be used. Recent growth in the maritime industry has created a large need for reliable 
offshore communications. As a result, a wide variety of inexpensive satellite communication 
(SATCOM) options are commercially available. An Iridium system, for example, could be 
directly installed onboard the LSRC with little to no modification. Iridium SATCOM systems 
can be configured for secure voice communications, and can even be programmed to transmit 
GPS data at regular intervals. These systems are light weight, and have very low power and 
space requirements. Companies like Inmarsat have also been developing broadband services19 
that allow users to make and receive voice calls and send and receive text and other data. It is 
envisioned that such systems could be coupled with onboard monitoring systems that, in addition 
to the relaying capsule’s GPS location, could transmit a standard report containing important 
information such as the atmospheric conditions (air quality and temperature) within the LSRC, 
and a “dive profile” tabulating the duration of time that the crew has been exposed to elevated 
pressures both inside the stricken submarine and within the LSRC. This type of information can 
be used to inform the crew of their decompression obligation and will give undersea medical 
officers (UMO) on land the information they need to treat the crew upon arrival. 
 
Because the LSRC is not under power, onboard navigation will be limited to reporting its 
location to various shore stations and displaying some form of navigation aid to prevent collision 
at sea. Again, commercial standards and COTS equipment should be exploited. A recent 
amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) requires 
that all mobile offshore drilling units, cargo ships over 300 gross tons and passenger ships 
carrying more than 12 passengers be LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) compliant. 
Although the LSRC will not be classified as a SOLAS ship, it can take advantage of the tracking 
systems being developed to meet this requirement. Inmarsat C, for example, complies with the 
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) mandated by the SOLAS treaty, and has 
been chosen as the main onboard LRIT data provider by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). Such a system could be used for reliable data messaging, and will most likely be 
supported well into the future. The LSRC design presented in this paper is equipped with an IC 
system allowing for communications between the inner and outer chambers, an external phone 
connection for direct topside communications once the capsule has been located, UHF 
SATCOM, VHF (DSC) radio, and GPS systems. Navigation aids include a single submarine ID 
beacon or strobe, water dyes and signal flares. 
 
 
2.2.3 Electrical Power and Lighting 
 
For simplicity, a single battery may be used to supply electrical power, and all loads should 
be designed/chosen to accept direct current. The battery will be expected to supply sufficient 
power for internal lighting, the submarine ID beacon, communication and navigation, the 
ventilation fan, the dewatering pump, atmosphere monitoring equipment, and remotely operated 
                                                 
19 Inmarsat Fleet Broadband 
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valves within the submarine for MMT operation and ejection control. Should the crew find the 
need to initiate decompression on their own, the battery should have sufficient longevity to 
sustain independent operations for the worst case (i.e. longest) treatment table. As an added 
measure, the LSRC could be equipped with external connections to receive power from the 
aiding vessel. By design, the LSRC is a hyperbaric system suitable for manned decompression. 
Thus, all internal components, including the battery, must satisfy the U.S. Navy Diving and 
Manned Hyperbaric Systems Safety Certification Manual (SS521-AA-MAN-010). 
 
 
2.2.4 Decompression System 
 
If the atmosphere within submarine is hyperbaric at the time crew shuts the Submarine-
LSRC access hatch, decompression will be necessary. The preferred means of decompression 
will be by assisted means. Thus, the LSRC should be designed to receive and exhaust air 
supplied from dive systems onboard the Rescue Gear Ship (RGS). This feature will allow 
qualified members of the Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team (SMERAT) to have 
full control of the decompression evolution. These connections, in conjunction with an un-
gagged pressure relief valve, can also be used in a ventilation procedure20 to remove carbon 
dioxide from the LSRC. In the event that the crew must initiate decompression on their own, 
valves within the capsule can be operated to equalize pressure with the outside atmosphere. To 
ensure that this evolution is conducted safely, procedure/warning plates can be installed above 
each valve and decompression tables/manuals should be onboard. Although not necessary, the 





In the perfect scenario the crew will escape without any decompression obligation. Upon 
reaching the surface, the upper access hatch can be opened and the crew can enjoy fresh air until 
help arrives. However, adverse weather conditions (or less than expected freeboard21) may make 
it unsafe to ventilate in this fashion. Ventilation can then be accomplished by opening isolation 
valves on two vent pipes22. Both the suction and exhaust lines should drain into a seawater sump 
in the event that waves submerge the ventilation intake/exhaust openings. A ventilation fan can 
then take a suction on the sump (intake) and force fresh air to the occupants at the bottom of the 
capsule. Exhausted air can then exit the capsule via a similar vent line located in the upper 
chamber. If the crew knows that the RGS is delayed or if the battery runs low on power, the 
ventilation fan can be operated by a manual hand-crank on the fan casing. Although not shown in 
the present design, a simple snorkel device having a check valve may be used to minimize the 
intake of seawater. 
 
 
                                                 
20 U.S. Navy Diving Manual (SS521-AG-PRO-010) chapter 22-5 
21 This condition may occur if the LSRC is overmanned. 
22 Although the design presented in this paper depicts two ventilation lines, this system could be incorporated into a 
single hull penetration. 
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2.2.6 Atmosphere Monitoring and Control 
 
When the LSRC is fully manned, more than half the crew may be onboard. Given the size of 
the LSRC, the survivors will place a significant load on the available oxygen and produce 
significant levels of carbon dioxide. In addition, any contaminants produced onboard the 
submarine during the casualty will most like accompany the men. To ensure that the crew is fully 
aware of their situation, and to adequately treat them upon reaching the surface, accurate 
measurements of the LSRC atmosphere should be made. Like the communication and GPS 
systems, atmospheric monitoring is an excellent candidate for COTS equipment23. Due to recent 
activity in the offshore oil industry, saturation diving and other manned hyperbaric systems have 
created the need for confined space atmosphere monitoring and control. Many such systems are 
commercially available and should be investigated for placement onboard the LSRC. 
 
To monitor the atmosphere within the LSRC, simple Dräger kits may be used at very little 
cost. Dräger offers both electronic hand-held monitoring systems as well as small portable kits 
containing Dräger tubes. Dräger offers over 200 tubes for accurately measuring over 500 
different gases. If the atmospheric constituent data is to be sent to shore stations via the 
communication system, a battery powered digital system should be used as well. Analox Sensor 
Technology, for example, sells portable gas analyzers that are specifically designed for use 
onboard saturation diving systems. This company has been in the business of designing gas 
analyzers for DISSUB applications for years, and their equipment is currently onboard many 
U.S. and British submarines, as well as the SRDRS, and previously, the Deep Submergence 
Rescue Vehicle (DSRV). Either a fixed system such as the Analox Sub MKIIF or a portable unit 
such as the Analox Sub MKIIP and Analox Sub MKIIP-S24 could be used with little to no 
modification. Geotech, for example, offers a fully compensated (pressure) portable oxygen (O2) 
and carbon dioxide (CO2) gas analyzer that is already approved by the U.S. Navy for submarines 
and decompression chambers. Additional features of the Geotech analyzer include ambient 
pressure measurement and automatic data acquisition capability. While these products are not 
necessarily recommended for use onboard the LSRC, it does exemplify the feasibility of such 
commercial products. Pictures of Dräger tubes and both the portable and fixed gas analyzer just 
discussed can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
In addition to atmospheric monitoring equipment, the LSRC should be equipped with 
atmosphere control systems. Due to restrictions on space and power, and the short durations in 
which the crew is expected to occupy the capsule, the regenerative systems employed onboard 
nuclear submarines are not practical. Instead, non-regenerative passive (or low power) devices 
should be used. Further, the scope of contaminants typically removed from submarine 
atmospheres need not be duplicated onboard the LSRC. Because contaminants such as hydrogen, 
carbon monoxide, FREON, AEROSOL and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) will most 
                                                 
23 Although COTS equipment should be used as much as possible, experience from the ASDS program showed that 
many of the materials used in COTS components was often difficult justify in accordance with the U.S. Navy 
Diving and Manned Hyperbaric Systems Safety Certification Manual. These lessons should be carefully examined 
and used as a guide in selecting COTS solutions. Other onboard items that may be designated as “toxic and 
flammable materials” include: signal flares, hull insulation, synthetic seat cushions, electrical components and 
wiring, and the lubricants used in the ventilation and dewatering equipment. 
24 Pending approval from the Naval Experimental Diving Unit (NEDU). 
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likely be present in small quantities, providing the means for removal of CO2 alone may be 
sufficient. 
 
Figure 13. COTS atmosphere monitoring equipment. (a) Dräger tubes, (b) Geotech HB1.2 (c) Analox Sub MkIIF 
 
The removal of CO2 from submarine atmospheres has largely been dominated by systems 
utilizing soda lime and lithium hydroxide absorbents. These compounds continue to be the most 
reliable means of CO2 removal; although, recent innovations have made them more effective. 
The simplest method of removing CO2 from the LSRC is to use the lithium hydroxide curtains 
currently employed onboard the U.S. submarine fleet. The curtains, manufactured by Battelle, 
are made from a polypropylene material that freely passes air and prevents the lithium hydroxide 
crystals from becoming airborne. They are inexpensive, lightweight, and small enough to be 
suspended between the LSRC pressure hull frames. An innovative variation of this product, 
manufactured by Micropore, encapsulates lithium hydroxide in a flexible polymer matrix which 
may be placed inside a lithium hydroxide “hopper”, or hung like a curtain. The Micropore 
curtain, known as ExtendAirTM, comes in canisters approximately 7.5 inches tall with a diameter 
of 4.25 inches, each weighing about ten pounds. Roughly 25 cans per day would be needed to 
support a crew of 70. Yet another CO2 removal system which could be used onboard the LSRC 
is the Carbon Dioxide Self-Powered Absorber (CASPA) developed by Molecular Products Ltd. 
The CASPA is a self-contained battery powered Soda Lime Carbon Dioxide Absorption Unit 
(SLCDAU). A variation of this product, also developed by Molecular Products Ltd., is the 
Portable Atmosphere Control Unit (PACU). This system couples the CASPA with a Self 
Contained Oxygen Generator (SCOG) providing a safe breathable atmosphere for up to 24 hours 
(for four people). Although the PACU is equipped with an emergency battery, it is designed to 
receive external power and could be wired to the LSRC battery. The systems described above 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2.9 Payloads and Adjustments 
 
The LSRC is designed to support a crew of 70 men for three days; however, modifications to 
the manning and payloads could be made to extend the duration. In this analysis, each man was 
assumed to weigh 185 pounds with a torso no longer than 42 inches. To sustain the crew for 
three days, calculations were made to ensure the LSRC contained sufficient CO2 absorbents, 
oxygen, drinking water and food. The following assumptions were made: 
 
(1) Each man will drink 85 ounces (2.5 liters) of water per day. Thus, 139 gallons (525 
liters) is required to sustain the crew. In this analysis, 210 canteens were distributed 
evenly throughout the capsule; one canteen per man for each of the three days. 
 
(2) Each man will consume approximately 30 ounces (0.84 kilograms) of O2 per day. 
This consumption rate assumes that the crew is at rest and breathing normally. Thus, 
389 pounds (176 kilograms) of LOX is required. 
 
(3) The required weight for CO2 removal was calculated based on data provided from 
Micropore Inc. when using ExtendAir CO2 absorbents. A total of 74 canisters of 
Micropore curtains weighing 10.2 pounds (4.6 kilograms) per can are necessary to 
sustain the crew for three days. Thus, 750 (340.2 kilograms) pounds of CO2 
absorbents are required. 
 
(4) Prepackaged “group” meals similar to the U.S. Army’s MREs were estimated at 40 
pounds (18.1 kilograms) per day. Thus, a total of 120 pounds (54.4 kilograms) is 
required to sustain the crew for the LSRC’s duration. 
 
Finally, 300 pounds (136 kilograms) was allotted for ten wool blankets and six first aid kits.  
Structural and individual system weights were based on commercial products and actual 
component weight as calculated by computer aided design tools. At the concept design stage, a 
weight margin of 10% is considered reasonable and was used in this analysis. With the exception 
of ballast and manning, this margin was applied to all systems and payloads. A detailed summary 
of all weights can be found on the following page.  
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SWBS Component Weight (lbm)
   
Hull Structure 66,293
100 Fixed Ballast** 18,388
110 Plating and Stiffeners 43,459




320 Power Cables and Panels 40
330 Lighting Distribution and Fixtures 64
  
Command and Surveillance 237
410 Satellite Communications 56
420 GPS and Navigation lights 68
430 Internal Communications 50
440 Radio System 63
  
Auxiliary Systems 2,301
510 Ventilation System 470
 Atmosphere Monitoring 51
 CO2 Scrubbers 750
 Oxygen Supply (LOX)** 450
520 Drainage and Dewatering System 505
590 Decompression System 75
  
Outfit and Furnishings 2,588
630 Hull Insulation** 1,216
640 Seat Structure and Ladder 1,172
 Wool Blankets 200
  
Armament 66
720 MMT and Ejection System Control 36
760 Signal Flares 30
  
Light Ship (100-700) 72,389
 
M00 Margins (10%)* 5,538
  
Light Ship with Margins 77,927
  
F00 Full Loads 14,329
F10 Crew (70 persons) 12,950
F30 Medical Kits and MREs 220
F50 Potable water 1,159
   
Full Load Condition 92,256
 
*     M00 includes a 10% margin applied to F30 and F50 to account for mounting fixtures 
       (Note: margin not applied to fixed ballast) 





2.3.1 LSRC Structure, Bulkheads and Hatches 
 
In an effort to maximize internal volume, the cylindrical section of LSRC was made as long 
as possible, and the pressure hull was designed with internal stiffeners and torispherical end-
caps. While the LSRC could be designed for stability in the horizontal direction, it was assumed 
that the dynamic stability in the vertical position would be the most favorable during the ascent 
phase and while floating at the surface. For this reason, the LSRC was arranged vertically with 
fixed ballast at the bottom and an exit hatch at the upper end-cap (See Figures 16 and 17). 
 
Although the capsule could be arranged with a single compartment, it was decided to add a 
watertight bulkhead at the upper end of the LSRC. This bulkhead serves three functions; First 
and most importantly, the bulkhead provides a watertight barrier between the ocean and the crew 
seating (i.e. the largest compartment). As previously discussed, seawater must not be allowed to 
enter the capsule in large quantities unchecked. By procedure, the inner chamber hatch can be 
closed whenever the upper access hatch is open, thereby reducing the risk of taking on water. 
Secondly, if the bulkhead is made strong enough to withstand high differential pressures, the 
LSRC may be used as a double-lock decompression chamber. This arrangement allows for 
multiple decompression scenarios. Depending on the treatment table, the entire crew could be 
decompressed all at once within the LSRC; or, the most severely injured crewmen could be 
moved to the outer chamber and be extracted for subsequent surface decompression. This feature 
would also allow UMOs to enter the capsule to treat crewmembers experiencing abnormal 
symptoms. Finally, the presence of a bulkhead reduces the effective length of the pressure hull 
allowing for smaller scantlings within the inner chamber. 
 
To ensure access in the event that the intact compartment is partially flooded, the submarine 
access hatch was placed as high as possible along the side of the escape capsule (See Figure 18). 
In a similar fashion, all MMT cross-connects and control valves should be located high in the 
submarine. This arrangement will allow survivors to enter and operate the LSRC even though the 
MMT is partially submerged in water26.  
 
 
2.3.2 OUTER “COMMAND” CHAMBER 
 
The LSRC design places nearly all control functions in the outer chamber. This arrangement 
will give the senior survivor complete control of the capsule from a single location (See Figure 
19). Although the “command chamber” has only one row of seating, it may accommodate up to 
seven men. Located beneath the seats are signal flares (water dyes, smoke grenades etc.), first aid 
kits, water, food rations, ventilation sumps and blankets. Located in the outboards between 
stiffeners are the liquid oxygen tanks, atmosphere monitoring equipment, communications 
handsets (i.e. IC, SATCOM and radio), the MMT and ejection control panel, the dewatering, 
ventilation and lighting control panel, ventilation and decompression control valves, depth and 
pressure gauges, and system operating manuals and/or plates. The only control valves not 
                                                 




accessible to crewmembers in the command chamber are the drain and dewatering system 
isolation valves which are located in the inner chamber just below the bulkhead and in the LSRC 
bilge. For this reason a direct communication line (e.g. sound powered phone) exists between the 
command chamber and the last row of seating. The inner hatch is equipped with a small window 
to allow for visual communication between compartments, and both hatches are within reach of 
the senior survivor. Unlike most decompression chambers, the LSRC inner hatch is outward 
opening. While this arrangement is not ideal for lock-in/lock-out operations it is preferred in the 
flooding scenario. Seawater entering the outer chamber through the upper hatch is directed to the 
bilge via a drain located at the deck. 
 
 
2.3.3 Inner Chamber 
 
Inside the inner chamber are the crew seating, submarine access hatch, battery, ventilation 
fan, dewatering pump, and all electronic equipment for communications and navigation. As 
previously discussed, the submarine access hatch was placed high in the capsule for reasons of 
accessibility. This arrangement also places the hatch close to the command chamber and in view 
of the senior survivor. It is expected that the submarine access hatch will be one of the most 
challenging components of the LSRC design. While an outward opening hatch is desired, MMT 
configuration may require that the hatch be opened inward. For this reason the LSRC design 
provides additional space in the second row of seating27 (See Figure 18). In addition, the area just 
below the bulkhead houses all the electrical equipment (i.e. communications and navigation gear, 
the battery and ventilation fan). This “Dry Zone” (See Figure 20) is sheltered from water by the 
bulkhead above and will ensure that the most vital equipment remains dry even if large quantities 
of water enter the capsule. As an added measure, water splashing from the side can be deflected 
by a simple shroud extending downward from the inner hatch perimeter.  
 
Crew seating is comprised of ten circular benches located approximately three feet apart, 
vertically (See Figure 22). Including the command chamber, this arrangement provides seating 
for 70 men. A single ladder provides access to each level, and railings extending from the 
overhead are provided for safety. The seating will not be comfortable, and may require that many 
sailors lean forward in the “fetal” position placing their feet on either side of the crewmember 
seated below. The author recognizes that this seating arrangement is quite aggressive and may 
limit the crew’s ability to carry out simple tasks. However, in the event of an actual disaster, 
operational requirements (i.e. manning restrictions) may be overlooked or deliberately exceeded. 
For this reason, the maximum manning scenario should serve as the basis for the design (to be 
discussed more later). Seating in this fashion is actually on par with that of other SRC designs. 
Figure 23 shows an overhead picture that was taken inside an Indian Navy Type 209/1500 rescue 
sphere (SRC). This seating arrangement, as well as that of a Russian SRC (Project 949, NATO 
classification: Oscar) can be seen in Figure 24. When designing the LSRC, an all-standing 
arrangement was also considered. However, the risks of injury during the ascent phase and 
surface breaking, as well as delays that may occur during the crew’s treatment and recovery, 
discouraged this concept.  
 
                                                 
27 LSRC seating is numbered 1-10, top to bottom. 
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Like the command chamber, inner chamber payloads are located in the outboards. These 
items include, atmosphere monitoring equipment, drinking water, MREs, first aid kits, blankets, 
and CO2 curtains.  In addition to the systems located in the dry zone, the inner chamber also 
contains a single IC handset and the dewatering pump. With the exception of those 
crewmembers in the last row of seating, inner chamber occupants will play no role in the 
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2.4.1 PRESSURE HULL ANALYSIS 
 
Before the LSRC interior could be configured, it was necessary to develop an efficient structural 
design for the pressure hull. The dimensions of the Trident II D-5 missile tube dictate that the 
LSRC should take the shape of a cylinder, thus maximizing the escape volume. The structural 
analysis of this shape then becomes the classical analysis of a ring stiffened closed-end cylinder 
exposed to external hydrostatic pressure. The analysis presented in this paper will examine this 
problem both numerically and analytically. It will be assumed that the pressure hull has near 
perfect geometry with no penetrations, and that the external pressure is uniform. A simplified 








Figure 25. Simplified LSRC structural design 
 
The integrity of the pressure vessel will be assessed based on its resistance to the following 
failure modes: 
 
• Shell Yield (Axisymmetric Yield between adjacent ring stiffeners) 
• Shell Lobar Buckling (Asymmetric Buckling between adjacent ring stiffeners) 
• Elastic General Instability 
• Frame Yielding 
• Frame Instability 
 
After the analytical solutions are presented, a parametric analysis will be done on the 
pressure hull to determine the most efficient scantlings and arrangement. This analysis will 
attempt to minimize the weight to buoyancy ratio, while meeting the necessary strength 
requirements for a given operating depth. Once these scantlings have been determined, a finite 
element analysis will be done and the final pressure vessel design will be presented. 
 
2.4.2 MODES OF FAILURE 
 
When the distance between bulkheads is about one or two diameters in length, thin walled 
cylindrical shells without stiffeners have been observed to buckle under hydrostatic pressure. 
This overall body collapse is commonly referred to as failure by general-instability and is 
sometimes called “global buckling”. General instability can be prevented by placing ringed 
stiffeners or “frames” along the length of the cylinder. If the frames are made strong enough to 
prevent failure by general instability, the unsupported length of shell between the frames now 
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becomes susceptible to local buckling. This mechanism of failure is commonly referred to as 
lobar or “asymmetric” buckling. If the cylinder is further strengthened by increasing shell plate 
thickness, lobar buckling will not occur, and the cylinder will remain intact until compressive 
hoop stresses within the plating cause the shell to fail by yield. Ideally, a submarine pressure hull 
would be designed to fail by all three mechanisms simultaneously. However, material and 
geometry imperfections make it difficult to predict buckling pressures accurately. For this 
reason, many submarine pressure hulls are designed to fail by yield, and frame scantlings are 




   
 
Figure 26. Modes of failure. (a) General instability, (b) Lobar buckling, (c) Shell yield. (PNA, 1967) 
 
 
2.4.2.1 SHELL YIELD 
 
When the frames are sufficiently close, preventing the premature buckling of the unsupported 
plate, the plate will fail by yield. This type of failure usually occurs as an “accordion pleat” (See 
Figure 26c) [12]. The pressure at which shell yielding occurs depends only on the yield strength 
of the material and the thickness to diameter ratio ሺݐ/ܦ௢ሻ. Von Sanden and Günther [13] 
proposed that this yielding condition would develop first on the inside of the shell closest to the 
frame, and on the outside of the shell at mid-bay. Pulos and Salerno [14] expanded on this 
concept, and provided the following analytical solution reformulated by Jackson. The 
circumferential hoop stress ሺߪఏఏሻ and the longitudinal (axial) stress ሺߪ௫௫ሻ at the outer shell mid-










ሾ0.5 ൅ ܽሺܨସሻሿ                                                        ሺ2ሻ 
                          




Where ߥ is Poisson’s Ratio (ߥ = 0.3 for steel), ݌ is the external pressure given by ݌ ൌ
ߩ݃ܦ௪ܵܨௌ௒, ߩ is the density of salt water, ݃ is gravity, ܦ௪ is the design collapse depth, and ܵܨௌ௒ 
is an applied safety factor to ensure protection against shell yield in the presence of calculation 
and fabrication error. Accepting the recommendation by Jackson [15], a safety factor of 1.5 is 
applied to shell yield calculations. The circumferential hoop stress ሺߪఏఏሻ and the longitudinal 
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and ܨଵ , ܨଶ,  ܨଷ & ܨସ are the transcendental functions that define bending effects on the shell due 





























































ߠ is the slenderness parameter, 
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1
2
ඥ1 ൅ ߛ                                          ሺ12ሻ 
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Having solved for the circumferential and longitudinal stresses at the locations of interest (i.e. 
near-frame & mid-bay), an effective stress at each location can be resolved with the following 
equations: 










The larger of these two stresses can then be compared to the material’s yield strength to assess 
the structure’s susceptibility to shell yielding. This is known as the Hencky-Huber-Von Mises 
yield criterion. Although theory indicates that yielding of the shell at the frame might develop 
first, experiments show that this is not as critical as yielding of the shell at mid-bay [12]. 
Alternatively, the critical pressure for yielding ሺ݌௖௒ሻ can then be calculated from the following 
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and ߙ and ߚ are the ratio of effective frame area to shell area, and the ratio of faying width to 













A solution to equation (16) can now be found through an iterative method, in which a value for ߛ 
is initially assumed (typically zero) and the critical pressure for yielding is calculated28. The 
resulting pressure is then substituted into equation (13), and ݌௖௒ is recalculated. Experience shows 
that convergence is achieved in just a few iterations. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 SHELL LOBAR BUCKLING 
 
Asymmetric buckling (lobar buckling) can occur when the shell is relatively thin, and the 
frames are widely spaced. This mode of buckling is easily identifiable due to the periodic waves 
or “lobes” that are formed circumferentially between frames. By assuming sinusoidal 
displacements in the axial and circumferential directions, it can be shown that the following 
equation gives the critical pressure for lobar buckling of non-reinforced cylinders under 
hydrostatic pressure [16]: 
 
݌௖௅஻ ൌ
ሺ ഥ݉ଶ ൅ ݊ଶሻସ ቀ ܦܴଶቁ ൅ ഥ݉
ସሺ1 െ ߥଶሻܥ






                                                 
28 These equations differ from those of Sanden and Günther in that they take into account the “beam-column” effect 
created by end-cap loading (i.e. ߛ ് 0). However, it should be mentioned that the equations by Sanden and Günther 
could have been used for the LSRC design. Assuming ߛ ൌ 0 is considered valid for most submarine structural 
configurations where the shell plating is designed to yield first and not to buckle [12]. 
65 
 












ܧ is Young’s Modulus, ݉ is the number of half sine waves in the axial direction, ݊ is the number 
of complete sine waves in the circumferential direction, and ഥ݉  is the dimensionless wave 
number along the axis of the cylinder. Equation (22) is solved for all positive integers of  ݊ (e.g. 
typically ݊ ൌ 1…5). The value of ݊ at which the buckling pressure is lowest will be the mode of 
failure at which buckling occurs. For cylindrical shells without bias, it has been shown that 








where ܮ ൌ ܮ௙ െ ݐ௪ (clear length enclosed by stiffeners). As it applies to this problem, the inter-
frame segments of a ring stiffened cylinder can be modeled as a cylindrical shell. Although 
equation (22) was derived for a cylindrical shell with simply supported ends (i.e. not clamped), 
experiments show that it can be used to approximate the critical pressure for lobar buckling of 
ring stiffened cylinders with reasonable accuracy29. A safety factor of 2.25 is applied to failure 
by lobar buckling. 
 
 
2.4.2.3 ELASTIC GENERAL INSTABILITY 
 
General instability is characterized by large “dished-in” defections along the length of the 
cylinder, wherein both the frame and shell deform together. This mode of failure can occur in 
either the elastic or inelastic stress regions, and is often the most difficult to predict. Compared to 
other failure modes, general instability is the most susceptible to initial deformation and defects. 
Available literature suggests that designing pressure vessels protected against elastic general 
instability is often sufficient (i.e. safe), so long as an appropriate safety factor is used to account 
for uncertainties in fabrication. Again, accepting the recommendation by Jackson [15], a safety 
factor of 3.75 is used for general instability calculations. In this report, the solution offered by 
Bryant in 1954 [12] is used to calculate the critical pressure for elastic general instability. His 
equation can be found below: 
 
 
                                                 
29 For the purposes of design, the simply supported assumption errs on the side of conservatism. Coincidently, this 


















where ഥ݉  is equation (24) with ܮ ൌ ܮ௕ (length between bulkheads), and ܴ ൌ ܴ௦. ܫ௘௙௙ is the 
moment of inertia of a single frame including an “effective” length (ܮ௘௙௙) of shell plating about 
the neutral axis. Although ܮ௙ was originally suggested as the appropriate length for calculating 
the moment of inertia, many people have suggested more accurate formulations. This report will 












where, ߠ is defined by equation (11). Like the solution to equation (22), equation (25) is solved 
by setting ݉ ൌ 1, and calculating the critical pressure over a range of ݊. The value of ݊ at which 
the buckling pressure is lowest will be the mode of failure at which buckling occurs. 
 
 
2.4.2.4 FRAME YIELDING 
 
Like the shell plating, the frames must also be checked for their susceptibility to failure, both 
by yielding and instability. If a frame should fail by either of these two methods, shell circularity 
will be compromised and the pressure vessel will most likely fail by general instability. The 
yielding condition is checked by comparing the total stress (ߪ்) on the frame to the materials 
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The direct hoop stress experienced by a frame can be found from the expression below, which is 










where ݍ is the total radial load acting on a ring frame per inch of circumference. Pulos and 
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where ݁ is the eccentricity from a true circle, and ݌௖ீூ &  ݊௖ீூ are the critical values for general 
instability. Historically, out of roundness (݁) for submarine hulls has been limited to one-half 
shell thickness (e.g. typically ½ inch). As the shell diameter decreases, or shell thickness 
increases, this limit becomes easier to obtain in manufacturing, and ݁ may be reduced. 
 
 
2.4.2.5 FRAME INSTABILITY 
 
Frame instability under a radial load is analogous to a column under axial compression. 
When the slenderness ratio is large, the column is more likely to fail by buckling (i.e. instability) 
vice yield. Likewise, the circular frame will collapse in a two-lobe manner when the cylinder’s 
slenderness ratio is large and it is incapable of maintaining circularity. This instability results 
from local buckling of either the flange or web. In practice however, it is the web that is most 
susceptible. In addition, local buckling of the web is greatly exacerbated when eccentricities 
exist in the frame’s circularity (See Figure 27(a)). Buckling of the flange can often be prevented 
by adhering to simple scantling guidelines such as F 2 in Table 2. For this analysis, the classical 











where, ܫ is the moment of inertia of a single frame including a length (ܮ௙) of shell plating, equal 
to the frame spacing, about the neutral axis. ܴே஺ is the radius to the neutral axis of the shell-
frame composite. 
 
Another form of frame instability that should be addressed is torsional buckling. This mode 
of buckling is often referred to as “frame tripping” and can occur without the loss of circularity. 
Frames become susceptible to this type of failure when shell bending stresses create 
displacements and rotations about the web’s toe, or when the web buckles in radial compression. 
Again, the instability is exacerbated in the presence of web eccentricities ሺ݁௪ሻ and any initial 
“tilt” during fabrication (See Figure 27(b)). For interior stiffeners, tests show that an initial tilt of 
only three degrees can be detrimental [18]. It is fortunate, however, that the frame’s resistance to 
premature tripping failure can be greatly improved by simply increasing the web thickness or 











Figure 27. Ring stiffener eccentricities. (a) Out-of-Roundness (OOR), (b) Web eccentricity 
 
The strain energy method has been found to provide an acceptable solution to the frame 
tripping problem. This method equates the total energy available due to external pressure to the 
energy required to displace the structure. The total potential energy of the buckled stiffener is 
then a non-linear function of the total displacements and their derivatives. For this analysis, the 
strain energy procedure used by SSP74 will be used30. 
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Where ܫ௓ ൌ ݄௪ݐ௪ଷ ൅ ݄௙௟
ଷݐ௪/12 and ܣכ is a moment correction factor (not defined in this paper). 
 
Table 2. Frame stability guidelines 
                                                 






2.4.3 KING FRAMES 
 
For very long pressure hulls (i.e. large ܮ௕), failure by general instability is of greater concern. 
For this reason, among others, internal bulkheads are often used in submarine design. The use of 
internal bulkheads effectively reduces ܮ௕, and the scantlings of inter-bulkhead stiffeners can 
thereby be reduced. Where internal bulkheads are not necessary, or undesired, it is common 
practice to use king frames (also known as deep-frames) in their place. King frames are thus 
sized to provide the strength and rigidity of a bulkhead at a much lower weight. In U.S. 
submarine design, bulkheads were traditionally spaced at intervals of about 1.5 the hull diameter. 
This spacing was chosen such that the ballast tanks could provide sufficient buoyancy in the 
event that an entire compartment was flooded. Although positioning the bulkheads in this 
manner was largely based on survivability rather than structural optimization, it was also in 
agreement with the expected mode of failure in general instability (i.e. setting ܮ ൌ 1.5 ܦ௢ in 
equation (24) gives ഥ݉ ൎ ݉ ൌ 1).  As a result, pressure hull segments longer than about 1.5 the 
hull diameter are considered “long”, and the use of king frames is generally recommended. In 
designing the LSRC, the use of king frames was given particular attention. Calculations using the 
methods described above showed that the LSRC could be safely designed without the use of king 
frames (ܮ/ܦ௢ ൎ 6). Although outside of traditional guidance, such designs are often favored for 














Figure 28. King frame scantling dimensions and definitions 
 
As a first approximation, the area of the king frame should be about three times the area of a 
small frame. Likewise, the frame’s moment of inertia about its neutral axis should be about ten 
times that of a small frame. Alternatively, equation (33) offers a more formal method of sizing 
king frames by approximating the required moment of inertia (ܫ௥௘௤௄ி ). To use this equation, the 
critical elastic buckling pressures for general instability must first be calculated for two separate 
designs. The first, ௖ܲீூכ, is calculated using equation (25) with ܮ ൌ ܮ௕௘௙௙ (i.e. assumes king 
frames are present) in equation (24). For ݊௖ீூ ൑ 3, this effective length (ܮ௕௘௙௙) should be between 
1.05ܮ஽ and 1.10ܮ஽, where ܮ஽ is the largest spacing between an adjacent bulkhead and a deep 

























with ܮ ൌ ܮ௕ (i.e. assumes no king frames) in equation (24). The calculation of ௖ܲீூ is done using 










ሺ ௖ܲீூכ െ ௖ܲீூሻ                                            ሺ33ሻ 
 
 
The strength of the king frames can be found in the same manner as for the normal frames. 
However, open literature on king frame design often uses frame yield equations slightly different 
from those previously presented. The method presented below, suggested by Jackson [15], is 
based on the earlier work of von Sander and Günther. Similar to the small frames, the total stress 
in the king frame is checked against the yield strength of the frame material (See equation (27)). 


























ܨ ൌ ݐ௪௄ி ቎

























                                                 
31 For example: The LSRC main compartment is 36 feet in length. Two king frames evenly spaced 12 feet apart are 
being considered. Thus, ܮ஻ ൌ 36 & ܮ஽ ൌ 12. Using ܮ௕௘௙௙ ൌ 1.075ܮ஽, ܮ௕௘௙௙ ൌ 12.9. The small frames are then 
sized for a bulkhead spacing of 12.9 feet. ௖ܲீூכ is then calculated using the small frame scantlings and ܮ ൌ 12.9 in 
equation (24). ௖ܲீூ is calculated using the same scantlings with ܮ ൌ 36. The king frame scantlings are then chosen 




where  ݐ௜ ൌ ݐ௦ ൅ ݐ௜௡ ,  and all other variables are as previously defined with the superscript “KF” 




When king frames are used in a design, it is also necessary to re-evaluate the failure by 
elastic general instability. The three-term Bryant equation [20], equation (39), must now be used 
in place of equation (25). The first term of this equation addresses shell failure, while the second 
and third terms address the failure of the small frames and king frames, respectively. In this 


























                                                 
32 Due to the rigidity of the king frames, it is common practice to place a shaped insert at the base of the web to 
mitigate additional bending stresses and reduce the deflection at either side. 
33 The effective length of shell plating calculated using equation (26) for the small frame analysis was used to 
calculate both ܫ௘௙௙௄ி  and ܫ௘௙௙. Intuitively, one might think that the effective length applied to a king frame should 
differ significantly from that of the small frames. However, calculating the effective lengths for each using BS5500 
and ECCS methods show that these values differ only slightly (e.g. Design B: small frame: 9.3 inches, king frame: 
8.7 inches).  
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Figure 29. End-cap designs. (a) Disk, (b) Dish, (c) Elliptical, (d) Hemispherical 
 
Before designing the pressure vessel shell, an appropriate end-cap design must be chosen. 
Since the Trident II D-5 missile tube was designed to accommodate an object 44 feet in length, 
the dimensions of the end-cap will then dictate the length over which the cylindrical shell must 
span. Figure 29 depicts some common options used for pressure vessel designs. While the disk 
and dish designs allow for greater enclosed volumes, the elliptical and hemispherical designs can 
be used at much greater pressures. In submarine design, the disk and dish designs are seldom 
used. The sharp edges where the shell meets the end-cap are difficult to model, and are typically 
the location of highest stress. Since the elliptical end-cap exhibits good characteristics for both 
volume and strength, it is the most attractive design for the LSRC and will thus be used. 
 
In solid mechanics, end-caps such as the elliptical dome are often classified as shells in the 
form of surfaces of revolution. The analytical solution of such shapes can be very complicated, 
particularly near the cylinder-dome boundary. However, if the conditions of the shell are such 
that the effects of bending stress can be neglected, the problem of stress analysis can be greatly 
simplified [21]. For the case of the elliptical dome, it can be assumed that the bending effect due 
to the built-in edges are of a local character, and that the middle surface of the shell plate at some 
distance away from the edge undergoes uniform strain without bending. For plate thicknesses 
that are small relative to the dome diameter, the compressive stresses are said to be uniformly 
distributed across the shell thickness. Neglecting the effects of bending stresses in this manner is 
called membrane theory34. The membrane forces ఏܰ(circumferential force) and ఝܰ(meridional 
force) can be found from applying Newton’s second law to a finite area of the revolved surface 
in directions both tangential and normal to the surface. The equations of equilibrium in these two 
directions can be expressed as equations (40) and (41), respectfully [21]. 
 
2ߨݎ଴ ఝܰ sinሺ߮ሻ ൌ െߨ݌ݎ଴ଶ                                                          ሺ40ሻ 
 
ఝܰݎ଴ ൅ ఏܰݎଵ sinሺ߮ሻ ൌ ݌ݎଵݎ଴                                                      ሺ41ሻ        
 
where ݎ଴ is the radius from the axis of revolution to the parallel circle, and  ݎଵ & ݎଶ are the 
principle radii of curvature at a point on the dome surface (See Figure 30). From geometry, these 
radii can be written as equations (42) for the case of an ellipse. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Although not previously discussed, membrane theory was also used to derive many of the equations for 
cylindrical shells. While membrane theory is sufficient for the initial selection of geometries and thicknesses, design 
techniques using shell theory must be used to develop the final design for submersible construction.  

















Figure 30. Dome geometry. (a) Elliptical Dome, (b) Torispherical Dome 
 

















Combining equation (40) through (42), the membrane stresses within an elliptical dome subject 




















where ݐ௦௘ is the end-cap shell thickness and positive values of ߪ indicate tension. A plot of 
membrane stresses as a function of the meridional angle (߮) can be seen in Figure 31. Two 
conclusions can be made from this plot. (1) The maximum normal stresses occur at the dome’s 
pole (߮ ൌ 0°) and equator (߮ ൌ 90°), and (2) the meridional stress is always in compression, 























Figure 31. Elliptical dome membrane stresses 
 
When designing for failure by yield, we can then focus our analysis on the critical regions alone. 
At the pole, ݎଵ =  ݎଶ = ܽଶ ܾ⁄ ; hence 
ߪఝ ൌ ߪఏ ൌ
݌ܽଶ
2ܾݐ௦௘
                                                                 ሺ45ሻ 
 














ቇ                                                              ሺ46ܾሻ 
 
 
Due to various reasons, including ease of fabrication, the elliptical end-cap is often replaced 
by the torispherical dome. The torispherical dome is the surface obtained from the intersection of 
a spherical cap with a tangent torus. This shape very closely follows the contour of the elliptical 
dome, but can be defined using only two radii of curvature. The radius forming the spherical cap 
is often referred to as the crown radius (ܴ௖), and that at the equator is called the knuckle radius 
(ܴ௞). Using this shape, the critical yield and buckling pressures for a torispherical end-cap can be 
approximated using the solution obtained for a perfect sphere with similar radii of curvature. For 
a sphere, ݎଵ =  ݎଶ = ܽ ൌ ܾ ൌ ܴை (outer radius). Equations (45) and (46) then become, 
 
ߪఝ ൌ ߪఏ ൌ
݌ܴை
2ݐ௦௘
                                                                  ሺ47ሻ 
 











Like the cylindrical shell, the torispherical end-cap must also be checked for instability. Again, 
the critical buckling pressure for the torispherical end-cap is approximated using the solution for 
a perfect sphere under uniform external pressure. This pressure can be calculated using the 















For engineering purposes, this solution by itself is never used to predict the critical buckling 
pressure of a submersible. Like equation (48), this equation was developed using membrane 
theory and nonlinearities in the pre-buckling analysis were neglected. In addition, it does not 
satisfy the boundary conditions at the edge of the spherical cap (clamped) and is thus limited to 
buckle-pattern wavelengths that are small compared to ܴ௖. For these reasons, equation (49) can 
only be used to approximate the critical pressure for a torispherical end-cap if the solution is 
corrected by experimental data. Such correction factors are offered by many engineering 
societies, and take into account the many assumptions made during the equation’s derivation. In 
addition, spherical caps are notorious for being susceptible to initial imperfections. Research has 
shown that there exists forms of equilibrium slightly deviated from the spherical shape [21]. 
These equilibrium conditions require pressures much smaller than those calculated using 
equation (49). As a result, the spherical dome deforms slightly and the collapse of the buckled 
shell occurs suddenly. It is for this reason that the circularity of the end-caps, as well as the 
cylindrical shell, are of such great importance in submarine construction. For practical 
applications, Timoshenko [23] suggests using the empirical formula below35 (equation 50) for 
spheres when 400 ൑ ܴ௖/ݐ௦௘ ൑ 2,000 and 20° ൑ ߮ ൑ 60°. 
 
 
݌෤௖஻௘ ൌ ቈ1 െ 0.175 ቆ
߮° െ 20°
20°











Four of the most commonly used design curves36, along with the equations presented above, 
can be seen in Figure 32. For domes with perfect geometry (and ݐ௦௘ ൌ 1.0 inch), shell yield is 
                                                 
35 See Der Stahlbau. Klöppel, K and Jungbluth, O. 1953, Vol. 22, pp. 121. 
36 (1) Britannic Majesty’s Government, Sea Systems Publication No. 74 (SSP74). (2) European Recommendations 
for Steel Construction (ECCS). (3) British Standards Institution, Pressure Vessel Code (BS5500). (4) American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, Pressure Vessel Code (ASME). Although not considered in this paper, there are 
many shipbuilding certification societies that maintain reliable pressure hull design codes.  The American Bureau of 
Shipbuilding (ABS) and Germanischer Lloyd, for example, offer guidelines that are revised regularly, and are 
continuously validated by in-service designs.  
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expected to occur before buckling when ܾ ൒ ܽ ڄ ሺ~0.19ሻ. However, imperfections due to 
fabrication make buckling the dominant mode of failure. In general, the critical buckling 
pressure decreases as the radii of curvature increases. For this reason, the crown radius is used 
(i.e. instead of the knuckle radius) to calculate the collapse pressure of the dome. In Figure 32, 
the critical buckling pressure for each design code is depicted as a line. Geometry and pressure 
combinations falling above these lines are expected to fail. When designing the LSRC it was 
decided that the dome thickness should be close to, but not less than, that of the cylindrical shell, 
and be within the limitations of modern fabrication techniques. An upper limit of one inch was 
chosen, and the various design codes were used to find a suitable shape. Due to geometry 
requirements imposed by the design codes, only portions of each line in Figure 32(a) can be 
used. For example, SSP74 requires that  0.7 ൐ ܴ௞ ܴ௖⁄ ൐ 0.4. Given the outer diameter of the 
LSRC (83 inches), SSP74 guidelines can only be used for domes geometries with  ܾ ൒ ܽ ڄ
ሺ~0.7ሻ. Using the SSP74 guidelines, Figure 32(b) shows that ݐ௦௘ ذ 0.7 are all suitable shell 





Figure 32. Torispherical dome design curves. (a) Dome Shape, (b) Dome Thickness 
 
 
It was decided that SSP74 guidance would be used to design the LSRC end-caps. This 
decision was based on three major factors: (1) SSP74 guidance was developed specifically for 
submarine design, (2) The BS5500 and ASME design codes were developed primarily for 
industrial use, and are comparatively over-conservative, and (3) Curves developed by the ECCS 
and Timoshenko are based on older data which has not been revised in recent decades. The final 





2.4.5 LSRC HULL DESIGN 
 
This paper will attempt to optimize two basic pressure hull designs. The first design (Design 
A) will be stiffened by internal frames of uniform scantlings, where as the second design (Design 
B) will utilize two king frames in an effort to reduce the number of typical (small) frames. Both 
designs subdivide the pressure hull into two compartments. Diagrams of each design can be seen 
















Figure 34. Design B 
 
Clearly, the design space is not limited to the above two arrangements, and therefore, this 
paper does not claim to have produced the lightest design possible. Rather, it demonstrates the 
most direct approach to minimize the weight of a ring stiffened cylinder. To arrive at the lightest 
structure, it would be necessary to consider a variety of king frame arrangements and various 
combinations of small frames with non-uniform scantlings. 
 
The bulkhead was placed at the upper end of the capsule to ensure that sea water does not 
enter the main compartment while personnel exit. The absence of such a partition could condemn 
the crew should excessive water enter the capsule unchecked. In addition, this arrangement 
provides for a space that could be used as a lock-out chamber for subsequent surface 
decompression. Internal vice external frames were chosen in order to maximize the internal 
volume, and to provide a smooth outer surface for the ejection phase and ascent. The spacing of 
king frames in Design B was set at 12 feet to meet the minimum bulkhead spacing requirement 
recommended by Jackson [15] (i.e.  ܮ௕ ൌ ሾ1.5~2.0ሿ ܦ௢). 
 
As mentioned earlier, shell plating in the vicinity of the bulkhead, king frames, and end-caps 
will be subject to additional bending stresses. To help mitigate the effects of such discontinuities, 














 Shaped inserts will be used at the base of each king frame such that ݐ௜ ൌ
ሺ1.3ሻݐ௦ and ݄௜௡ ൌ ሺܮଵ ൅ ܮଶሻ 8⁄ , where L1 and L2 are the distances between the 
king frame and the adjacent small frames.  
 
 At each side of the bulkhead, and extending no less than a 25% into the 
adjacent frame bays, the shell thickness will be increased by a factor of 1.3. 
 
 The frame spacing for the first frame bay at either side of the discontinuity 
(i.e. king frame or bulkhead) will be reduced to about 80% of the value 
required remote from the discontinuity. 
 
 The distance between the dome-cylinder junction and the first frame on the 
cylinder will not exceed half the frame spacing along the cylinder. 
 
 The cylinder length ሺܮ௕ሻ will be taken to extend into the end-cap (dome) by 
100% of the dome’s depth (b). Note: ParamarineTM uses 40% of the dome’s 
depth. 
 
The design collapse depth chosen for the LSRC is 2,500 feet (seawater). Pressure hull 
integrity to this depth is expected to exceed the most optimistic estimates of a Trident 
submarine’s survivability, and will provide an additional margin to failure should the LSRC be 
damaged during loading and off-loading. NAVSEA document SS800-AG-MAN-010/P-929037 
requires that a safety factor of 1.5 be applied for operations. Thus, a pressure hull designed for a 
collapse depth of 2,500 feet will be suitable for operations as deep as 1,666 feet. For the purposes 
of this analysis, it will be assumed that all structural components are fabricated out of HY-80 
high strength steel (See Appendix III). No allowance is made for shell corrosion. 
                                                 
37 System Certification Procedures and Criteria Manual for Deep Submergence Systems 
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2.4.5.1 ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
To arrive at the lightest structure, a parametric analysis was performed on the structural 
dimensions that most directly impact the pressure hull’s integrity. These dimensions include, 
shell thickness, frame spacing, web height, web thickness, flange breadth and flange thickness. 
By varying each of these parameters, the fundamental failure modes can be manipulated and the 
most efficient structures can be resolved. 
 
Optimization of the ring-stiffened right-circular cylinder is a topic that has been well studied. 
Over the years, many computer aided methods have been developed to assist with pressure hull 
design. Although somewhat outdated, some of the more well known optimization programs 
include, ARE Program SD009A38 and EXPRESS39. More recently, programs like MNSTRL (UK 
MoD Minimum Structural Weight), POWERPAC (NAVSEA 05), and DASH (Electric Boat) 
have been used for submarine design within the United States and the United Kingdom.  
 
The parametric analysis used in this report is a straight forward application of the analytical 
solution outlined in sections 2.4.1 through 2.4.4. While the calculations are rather long and 
tedious, computers can be used to automate the process. The computer program used in this 
analysis, FFSOR (Full Factorial Scantling Optimization Routine)40, calculates the critical 
pressures for each of the failure modes over a range of scantling parameters input by the user. 
The program then retains the best solutions (i.e. lowest structural weight), and plots them on an 
optimization graph for comparison (See Figure 37). The optimal design will be that which gives 
the highest margin to yield, at the lowest weight. This solution can be easily identified on the 
optimization graph as the point lying closest to the origin (i.e. lower left hand corner). However, 
since all the solutions retained in this analysis will not fail prematurely, preference will be given 
to the design with the lowest weight. 
 
In an effort to limit the solution space to those designs that are best suited for submarine 
applications, the FFSOR was programmed to apply various design guidelines. The most 
fundamental of these filters is the mode of failure. During WWII, many pressure hulls were 
designed to fail first by lobar buckling. It was reasoned that early signs of hull deformation (or 
the sound of hull “popping”) between the frames would alert the crew in the event of exceeding 
normal operating depths. As pressure hulls were designed more efficiently, it was decided that 
shell yield should be the preferred mode of first failure. This decision was based on the accuracy 
in which shell yield could be predicted, and the fact that the buckling modes were far more 
susceptible to imperfections. It has only been recently that submarine designers are again 
accepting buckling modes as the first mode of failure. This change in philosophy is a direct result 
of the computer aided tools that have become available to designers, in addition to the tighter 
tolerances that can be held during fabrication. Because of confidentiality, the equations and test 
data used by the U.S. Navy to accurately predict buckling modes could not be utilized in this 
                                                 
38 Admiralty Research Establishment. Program SD009A: Design of Externally Pressurized Stiffened Cylinders 
and Cones. 
39 British Standards Institution. EXPRESS: A computer Aid to the Design of Externally Pressurized Stiffened 
Cylinders (PD 6486), London, 1978 
40 See Appendix IV. The FFSOR was developed for the purposes of this paper (academics), and should not be relied 
upon for actual pressure hull design. 
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analysis. For this reason, the FFSOR was programmed to only accept solutions in which shell 
yield is the first mode of failure.  
 
In addition, applicable guidelines have been programmed into the FFSOR for frame design. 
While not completely justified by theory, these guidelines have been shown to be reasonably 
valid in practice.  Table 3 lists some of the additional guidelines considered in this analysis. 
 
 
JACKSON [15] McGRATTAN & PETEROS [22] 
ݐ௦ ؆  ݌ܴ ߪ௬⁄  ݐ௦ ؆  ߚଵ݌ܴ ߪ௬⁄  ሺ0.7 ൑ ߚଵ ൑ 0.9ሻ 
݄௪ ݐ௪⁄  ൏ 18 ݄௪ ݐ௪⁄  15 ‐ 20 
ܣ௙ ܮ௙ݐ௦⁄  ؆ 0. 3ത ܣ௙ ܮ௙ݐ௦⁄  ߚଶ            ሺ0.3 ൑ ߚଶ ൑ 0.6ሻ 
ܮ௙ 2ܴ⁄  0.07 – 0.10 ܮ௙ 2ܴ⁄  ؆ 0.083ത 
ݐ௙௟ ݐ௦⁄  0.75 – 1.0 ݐ௙௟ ݐ௦⁄  ؆  1 
݄௙௟ ݄௪⁄  0.7 – 0.8 ݄௙௟ ؆ 0.75൫݄௪ െ ݐ௙௟൯ 
ܣ௙ ܫ௙⁄ * ؆ ܧ ߪ௬ ௙ܴଶ⁄  ݄௪ ൅ ݐ௙௟ 5% െ 10% ݋݂ ܴ 
ܮ௕ 2ܴ⁄  1.5 – 2.0 * ܫ௙  = moment of inertia of frame area about frame NA 
 
Table 3. Scantling design guidelines 
 
Because equation (22) requires multiple calculations (i.e. over a range of ݊) for a single set of 
pressure hull dimensions, it does not lend itself well to programming. Therefore, the Windenburg 
approximation will be used in place of equation (22). This approximation uses an expression that 
is independent of ݊41, and produces results that differ from equation (22) by no more than 4%. 
Once an efficient design is determined, equation (22) can be used to verify the results. The 


















                                         ሺ51ሻ 
 
 
In summary, the analytical analysis presented in this paper (i.e. FFSOR) strives to produce 
the optimum pressure hull design (i.e. minimum weight) that will cause the shell to fail first by 





                                                 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the RIKS method uses the load magnitude as an additional unknown; it solves simultaneously for 
loads and displacements. This approach provides solutions regardless of whether the response is 
stable or unstable [24]. In this way, the maximum load that a structure can endure can be 
determined by monitoring the displacements of critical members. The RIKS method also allows 
the user to introduce initial imperfections into the perfect geometry. In this analysis, the 
*IMPERFECTION feature of the RIKS method will be used to introduce out-of-fairness (OOF) 
eccentricities into the model.  
 
A mesh density sensitivity analysis was not performed. The number of elements chosen for 
each design was sufficient enough to meet selective SSP74 guidelines, but low enough to be 
compiled on a PC within a reasonable amount of time. The material properties were modeled 
with NAVSEA HY-80 material test data (See Appendix III). While this data is expected to 
contain some residual stresses from fabrication, material discontinuities due to welding were not 
considered. The level of detail in the model is moderate, but is consistent with that used in the 
FFSOR. Although hatches and piping penetrations were not included in the model, the bulkhead 
thickness was sized at two inches to simulate the stiffness that would result from local 
reinforcement of the penetrations. Principle and secondary fabrication tolerances as well as 
internal and external secondary structure were not included. 
 
 
2.4.5.3 MODELING IMPERFECTIONS 
 
 A thorough analysis of all credible imperfections must be performed to ensure that the 
pressure hull design will not fail prematurely.  In U.S. submarine design, a very formal method is 
used to assess the pressure hull’s strength in the presence of OOR and OOF eccentricities. In 
general, an OOR condition is placed at various locations about the frames’ circumference and the 
peak stresses are calculated. This analysis, along with others including OOF conditions, are used 
to determine the margins of safety for each of the failure modes. Because the details of this 
method are classified, a comprehensive imperfection analysis was not done. At the concept 
design phase, forgoing this analysis is not considered unreasonable. However, because the 
*STATIC, RIKS method requires that imperfections be introduced into the perfect geometry, a 
minor effort was made at evaluating the effects of OOF.44 
 
The two factors that most significantly alter the buckling behavior of a structure are the 
imperfection size, and the imperfection shape. In the case of submarine construction where 
fabrication tolerances are defined by the technical authority, only the allowable magnitude of an 
imperfection may be known at the time of the initial design. In such cases, assuming that the 
imperfections are linear combinations of the eigenvectors of the linear buckling problem is a 
reasonable way to estimate the imperfect geometry. In this way, the buckling load’s sensitivity to 
imperfections can be assessed. It is also reasonable to introduce initial imperfections in the shape 
of the static response to submerged pressure. In this analysis, OOF eccentricities were introduced 
                                                 
44 Although OOR effects were not modeled in the numerical analysis, the effects of frame eccentricities were 
considered when designing the pressure hull (Recall that an OOR of ݁ ൌ 0.5 inches was used in the FFSOR (and 
ParamarineTM) when developing Designs A & B). For this reason, the critical loads for both frame yield and frame 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.5.4.1 ANALYTICAL RESULTS (FFSOR) 
 
 The FFSOR was successfully run on both Design A & B (See results in Appendices V, VI 
and VII). The optimization graphs for each design can be seen below (Figure 37)46, where P is 
the external pressure at 2,500 feet X 1.5 (i.e. safety factor for shell yield) and ௖ܲ is the critical 
pressure for failure. Since the only solutions retained in this analysis are those that fail first by 
shell yield, ௖ܲ ൌ ௖ܲ௒. Although the most desirable designs are those closest to the origin, it is not 





Figure 37. FFSOR solutions. (a) Design A, (b) Design B 
 
The optimum scantlings and failure modes for each design are summarized in Table 4. Cross 
sections of the final frame designs can be seen in Figure 38. As expected, the safety factors for 
shell yield are just above the desired value. This indicates that the pressure hulls will fail first by 
shell yield at a depth slightly greater than 2,500 feet. Using the optimum scantlings, the results 
also show that both designs are almost equally likely to fail by frame yield. However, the two 
designs differ significantly in their ability to resist failure by lobar buckling, general instability 
and frame instability. The lobar buckling safety factor for Design B is only slightly larger than 
that required, indicating yet another possible mode of failure. On the contrary, the smaller frame 
spacing in Design A precludes lobar buckling from being a primary mode of failure. General 
instability and frame instability were not found to be critical modes of failure for either design.  
 
A very similar analysis was performed to size the king frames used in Design B. For this 
analysis, the FFSOR was modified with equations (33) through (39), and takes into account the 
additional cross-sectional area provided by the king frame inserts. The results from this analysis 
                                                 
46 Figure 37 is not a plot of all solutions. The points in each graph were selected at random to give a representative 




show that the king frames will fail by frame yield at a depth slightly deeper than the 3,750 feet 
(i.e. design collapse depth X 1.5). The results of the king frame analysis can be found in 







Shell Thickness ሺݐ௦ሻ  0.75 0.75  N/A 
Frame Spacing ሺܮ௙ሻ  14 23 N/A 
Web Height ሺ݄௪ሻ  6 6 10
Web Thickness ሺݐ௪ሻ  0.34375 ሺ11/32ሻ 0.34375 ሺ11/32ሻ  0.59375 ሺ19/32ሻ
Flange Breadth ሺ݄௙௟ሻ  4.75 4.25  8
Flange Thickness ሺݐ௙௟ሻ  0.65625 ሺ21/32ሻ 0.75  0.96875 ሺ31/32ሻ
Insert Breadth ሺ݄௜௡ሻ  N/A N/A 9.2
Insert Thickness ሺݐ௜௡ሻ  N/A N/A 0.225
Buoyancy Ratio ሺBuoyancy/Weightሻ  2.58 2.92  N/A 
Slenderness Ratio ሺߣሻ  0.73 0.93  N/A 
Shell Yield Safety Factor ሺDesired: 1.5ሻ  1.51 1.51  N/A 
Lobar Buckling Safety Factor ሺDesired: 2.25ሻ 4.33 2.32  N/A 
General Instability Safety Factor ሺDesired: 3.75ሻ 8.79 8.44  11.74
Frame Yield Safety Factor ሺDesired: 1.5ሻ  1.51 1.51  1.50
Frame Instability Safety Factor ሺDesired: 1.8/2.25ሻ 11.70 7.93  6.80
Frame Tripping Safety Factor48  5.37 5.34  N/A
 
Table 4. FFSOR optimization result 
 
 
Figure 38. Frame cross-sections (drawn to scale), (a) Design A, (b) Design B small frame, (c) Design B king frame 
                                                 
47 In general, the flange thickness should be slightly smaller than that of the shell. Because the FFSOR selected these 
parameters with equal values (i.e. ݐ௦ ൌ ݐ௙௟), the scantlings used in the numerical analysis of Design B were modified 
as follows: ݄௙௟ ൌ 4.75,  ݐ௙௟ ൌ 0.6875. This change makes the scantlings for each design nearly identical, making ܮ௙ 
and ܮ௕ the primary differentiators. 
 
48 ParamarineTM results (Based on AMTE programs N9C & N9E). Note: Because the shell elements used in the 
finite element model do not have thickness, the numerical model was built using centerline dimensions. For most 
analyses this approximation is of no consequence. However, the frame tripping results in the numerical analyses are 
significantly affected due to over-sizing the web height (e.g. Design A: ݄௪ = 6.70 vice 6.00 inches). For purposes of 
comparison, the web height used in the analytical analysis (frame tripping only) for Designs A & B were changed to 
6.70 & 6.72 inches, respectively. Had the scantlings in Table 4 been used, the analytical solution for frame tripping 






























1.32 5.37 3,292 Not Calculated  Shell Yield
Numerical  1.27 5.28 3,197 4,059  Shell Yield
 
Table 5. Design A analysis results 
 
The numerical results are summarized in Table 5. The *STATIC, GENERAL analysis 
performed at 2,500 feet showed that the maximum stress occurred on a pressure hull shell 
element adjacent to the shell insert near the lower end-cap. The Von Mises stress for this element 
is 58,517 psi. The stress concentration at this location is most likely due to the sharp variation in 
shell thickness inherent to the finite element model. In reality, the shell inserts would be faired to 
the hull, thereby minimizing the effects of such discontinuities. In general, stress contours of the 
pressure hull at 2,500 feet show that the highest stresses occur circumferentially at the base of 
each frame and at shell elements adjacent to the bulkhead. These regions can be seen in Figure 




Figure 39. Design A, Von Mises stress at 2,500 feet (Note: legend in Pascals) 
 
                                                 
49 Von Mises stress ൌ ߪ௒. Because the location of first yield differed in each of the analyses (i.e. analytical and 
numerical), the depths in this column should not be compared directly. The numerical result is located on a shell 
insert (i.e. ݐ௦ ് 0.75. inches), whereas the analytical solution is the “near-frame” result (equation 15) using the 
scantlings in Table 4 (i.e. ݐ௦ ൌ 0.75). 
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Analyses at depths deeper than 2,500 feet showed that first yield will occur at a shell element 
inside the main compartment, adjacent to the bulkhead. The depth at which this element begins 
to yield is 3,197 feet, corresponding to a safety factor of 1.27. This result suggests that the design 
guidelines of section 2.4.5.1 do not adequately suppress local bending stresses when using a 
design safety factor of 1.5 for shell yielding. Although the pressure hull was designed to fail by 
shell yield, first yield was not expected to occur at a shell insert. The analytical analysis assumes 
that the design guidelines of section 2.4.5.1 will preclude failure at the inserts, and that shell 
yielding will occur at a frame bay far from the bulkhead where ݐ௦ ൌ 0.75 inches. Overlooking 
this result, subsequent analyses show that shell elements at the “near-frame” location (i.e. red 
bands in Figure 39) begin to yield at approximately 3,500 feet. 
 
A sectional view of the field output obtained from the *BUCKLE analysis can be seen in 
Figure 40. The results indicate that the primary buckling mode for Design A, with perfect 
geometry, is frame tripping. This result does not agree with that of the FFSOR. Analytical results 
show that the primary mode of buckling, for Design A, is lobar buckling. However, both 
analyses show that the critical depth for each of these buckling modes is relatively close. The 
critical depths for frame tripping and lobar buckling, for Design A, can be seen graphically 
(symbol: ■) in Figure 41. The depth at which frame tripping occurs is 13,200 feet, slightly 
shallower than that predicted analytically (13,426 feet). Considering the depths at which the 




Figure 40. *BUCKLE analysis results (Displacement, U), Mode 1, Design A 
 
Figure 40 lends itself to some interesting discussion. As stated earlier, the loss in circularity 
due to frame failure will cause the pressure hull to fail by general instability. The displacement 
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contour in Figure 40 illustrates this well. The general shape of the overall collapse can be seen as 
the color contour varies over thirteen consecutive frame bays. Another important observation is 
the mode at which frame tripping occurs. Close examination of Figure 40 suggests that frame 
tripping will occur at small mode numbers50. This conclusion is based on the degree of curvature 
present in the frames’ web. The analytical solution shows that mode ݊ ൌ 0 corresponds to the 
lowest buckling pressure for pure tripping. The analytical results for frame tripping can be seen 
in Figure 41. Figure 41(a) shows the critical buckling loads for both frame tripping and lobar 
buckling. It is apparent from this plot that several eigenvalues resulting from the frame tripping 
analysis coincide with those of lobar buckling (i.e. eigenvalue 1: ݊ ൏ 4, and eigenvalue 2: ݊ ൐
3). At these loads, interaction exists between the two modes of buckling, and frame tripping 
occurs in conjunction with lobar buckling. Eigenvalues not corresponding to modes of lobar 
buckling indicate depths at which “pure” frame tripping occurs. Figure 41(b) displays the web 
shapes for the frame tripping modes ݊ ൌ 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10. In agreement with the numerical 





Figure 41. Frame tripping analysis. (a) Critical tripping load, (b) Tripping modes (i.e. web shape) 
 
Results from the *STATIC, RIKS analysis show that Design A will collapse at a depth just 
greater than 4,059 feet. Interestingly, both Method 1 and Method 2 produced the same critical 
collapse depth. However, a complete analysis could only be obtained using Method 1. As 
mentioned earlier, frame tripping is expected to produce unstable post-buckling behavior (i.e. 
general instability). Due to the discontinuous response (bifurcation) at the point of buckling, the 
post buckling response using Method 2 could not be obtained using the ABAQUS/StandardTM 
RIKS method51. Fortunately, the ABAQUSTM results file (*.ODB) retains the incremental 
equilibrium solutions prior to collapse, and a close approximation of the critical load could be 
obtained. Figure 42 graphically displays the results. For each perturbation method, the 
                                                 
50 Mode ݊ ൌ 0 is axisymmetric rotation of the stiffener about its toe. 
51 Several *STATIC, RIKS analyses were attempted using Method 2. In each case, the response curve appeared to 
be retracing the original loading path once a limit was reached. The following modifications were made without 
success: (1) The force residual convergence criteria was tightened. (2) A limit was placed on the maximum 
incremental arc length. (3) Larger imperfections were built into the geometry. 
 displacement 
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Figure 43. ABAQUSTM *BUCKLE analysis results (Displacement, U), Mode 1, Design B (Note: legend in Pascals) 
 
A sectional view of the field output obtained from the *BUCKLE analysis can be seen in 
Figure 43. The results depict a classic example of lobar buckling (mode: ݉ ൌ 1, ݊ ൌ 9). It can be 
seen from the figure that the shell buckling is greatest in the compartment’s middlemost bay, and 
diminishes at bays closer to the king frame and bulkhead. The depth at which this mode of 
buckling occurs is 6,775 feet, and is larger than the depth predicted by the FFSOR (5,800 feet). 
This discrepancy is most likely due to the different boundary conditions used by each analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, equation (22) was derived assuming the cylindrical shell was simply 
supported at each end (SS-SS). This assumption was necessary to obtain a solution based on the 
Donnell stability equations in the uncoupled form. The ABAQUSTM solution however, is based 
on shell elements that are joined at the frame web. This boundary condition is best characterized 
as clamped-clamped (C-C). For a general investigation of cylinder end conditions, including C-
C, the coupled form of the Donnell stability equations must be used. Such an analysis has been 
outlined by Brush [16], where the critical buckling pressures for a cylinder subject to eight sets 
of boundary conditions have been tabulated. Extrapolating these results shows that a cylinder 
with dimensions similar to that of the frame bays in Design B will have a critical buckling load 
2.69 times greater than the applied external hydrostatic pressure53. Like the numerical analysis, 
                                                 
53 The results of reference [41] were extrapolated as follows: The cylinder examined in reference [41] has the 
following dimensions: radius = a, thickness = h and length = L, where a/h = 100 and L/a = 1. The frame bays in 
Design B have dimensions: a/h ≈ 50. For a given value of h, reducing a by one-half doubles the ratio of L/a. Thus, to 
correct the table for a/h = 50, one must enter the table with L/a values twice that of the actual design. Equation (22) 
assumes ݓ ൌ ݓ,௫௫ ൌ ݑ ൌ ௫ܰఏ ൌ 0, whereas the C-C boundary condition assumes ݓ ൌ ݓ,௫௫ ൌ ݑ ൌ ݒ ൌ 0. The 
critical pressures for each of these boundary conditions differ by a factor of 1.16. Thus, the analytical solution for 




the analytical solution for the C-C boundary conditions gives nine circumferential waves (i.e. 
݊ ൌ 9). Thus, the numerical and analytical results for lobar buckling are in agreement for the 
case of perfect geometry. 
 
Results from the *STATIC, RIKS analysis show that Design B will collapse at a depth just 
greater than 3,523 feet. Of the two imperfection shapes considered, the primary buckling mode 
shape (i.e. Method 2) proved to be the most limiting for this design. Figure 44 graphically 
displays the results. Again, the pressure hull’s collapse depth is taken as the deepest depth at 
which an equilibrium solution could be obtained. This value appears as the highest load on each 
of the displacement curves. Introducing the imperfection as an axisymmetric perturbation in the 
shell (i.e. Method 1) resulted in a collapse depth of 3,764 feet, slightly larger than the depth of 
first yield (mid-bay, equation (16)) predicted by the FFSOR (2,500 X 1.5 = 3,750). Figure 44 also 
highlights the significance of the imperfection shape. Close examination of each graph shows 
that the pressure hull can tolerate an axisymmetric imperfection of 1/2 inch (at 2500 feet), 




       
 
Figure 44. OOF effects on collapse depth. (a) Method 1, Design B, (b) Method 2, Design B 
 
 
A visual representation of the Von Mises stress at the collapse depth for Method 2 can be 
seen in Figure 45, where warm colors indicate the regions of higher stress and purple elements 
are actively yielding. As expected, the most highly stressed areas are at mid-bay between each 
frame, and just below the end-cap crowns. Clearly, the influence of the perturbation shape can be 
seen despite the small magnitude used (i.e. Method 2: 1/84 inches). For this reason, perturbations 
of this shape will most likely result in elastic-plastic buckling (Figure 46). However, frame bays 
far from the perturbation exhibit axisymmetric yielding at the shell, mid-bay (See the lower 
portion of Figure 45). In the absence of any imperfections, the pressure hull in these regions will 
likely fail in the classical manner for shell yield. Seeding the imperfection axisymmetrically (i.e. 
Method 1) gave numerical results congruent with this reasoning. A visual representation of the 



















Figure 48. Deformed geometry – Post failure (Method 2, Design B, Note: legend in Pascals) 
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2.4.5.4.3 PRESSURE HULL DESIGN EVALUATION AND COMPARISON 
 
It is behooving to compare the design results produced by the FFSOR with that of other 
optimization programs. A new program being developed by GRC ltd., ParamarineTM54, is well 
suited for such a comparison. ParamarineTM was initially developed in accordance with UK 
MoD standards, and contains a scantling optimization tool that runs the MNSTRL script. 
However, it should be mentioned that the results of the FFSOR and ParamarineTM should not be 
compared directly55. This is because the safety factors recommended by each are unique to the 
equations in which they use (See Table 7). In addition, the two programs optimize based on 
different criteria. While both optimization routines attempt to produce the lowest weight design 
that will satisfy all safety factors, ParamarineTM does so independently of failure mode, whereas 















Table 7. Safety factors 
 
 The ParamarineTM models for both Design A and Design B can be seen in Figures 49 and 50, 
respectively. In each of the two graphics the yellow frames indicate the pressure hull span that 
was optimized, and the green planes highlight the locations in which a bulkhead or king frame 
was placed. The results are tabulated in Tables 8 and 9. The results for both designs show that 
the lightest scantlings are those with the smallest frame spacing (i.e. 12 inches). In general, the 
opposite is true, and weight will increase as the number of frames increases. In this case, the 
dominant parameter is shell thickness. While the shell thickness is reasonably sized for designs 
with small frame spacing, ParamarineTM gives undesirable results when the frame spacing is 
large (i.e. ݐ௦ ൎ 2 െ 3 inches). Without closely examining the optimization programming that 
ParamarineTM uses, it is difficult to determine the factors that are producing these results. 
However, it is reasoned that the large shell thicknesses associated with large frame spacing are 
tied to the calculations for general instability. This conclusion is drawn from the observation that, 
in every case, ParamarineTM has produced an optimal solution that makes general instability the 
                                                 
54 Graphics Research Corporation ltd., ParamarineTM Version 5.0.1. 
55 One method of capturing the true difference between their results is to remove the problem's dependency on safety 
factors and consider a pressure vessel with perfect geometry. This can be done by using the FFSOR and 
ParamarineTM to analyze a predefined design, while matching the safety factors (e.g. 1 = SF1 =  SF2 =  SFn) and 
setting the eccentricities equal to zero. The two results should then correspond to a single design failing in the same 
mode, where the only difference is the depth at which failure occurs. 
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primary mode of failure56. Although this result is not fully understood, the dependency of general 
instability on shell thickness is congruent with GRC documentation. ParamarineTM defines 
general instability as the lesser of two critical pressures; (1) the pressure to cause the onset of 
yielding in the frame flange, and (2) the pressure to cause the onset of yielding in the shell 
plating in way of the frame. For each set of design parameters, the optimal scantlings produced 
by ParamarineTM are limited by the first of these two pressures. According to the GRC 
PRSHUL/MNSTRL Systems Specification Document, the MNSTRL program precludes 
premature failure due to yielding at the frame flange (i.e. general instability) by increasing the 
shell thickness57. 
 
Other contributing factors that may be driving the larger shell thicknesses include: (1) 
excessive eccentricity, and (2) over conservative safety factors. Because the bending stresses 
used to calculate the aforementioned pressures are strong functions of the eccentricity, care needs 
to be taken when choosing a representative OOR. Within MoD standards, the OOR is typically 
set at 0.5% of the radius for pressure hulls with diameters between 23 and 40 feet, and 
approximately 1% for smaller diameter hulls. For the pressure hull in consideration (i.e. Designs 
A & B; Diameter = 83 inches), setting the OOR = 0.5 inches may be too conservative. In 
addition, the ParamarineTM default safety factor for lobar buckling (1.5) appears to be over 
conservative. Unlike the calculations for general instability, ParamarineTM uses an empirical 
design curve to calculate the critical pressure for lobar buckling. This curve assumes 
eccentricities ≤ 0.5% are already present, and is automatically corrected for cases when 
eccentricity exceeds 0.5%. For this reason, applying an additional safety factor of 1.5 may be 
unnecessary given the simplicity of this design (i.e. Design A & B). Reducing the ParamarineTM 
inputs for both eccentricity and the lobar buckling safety factor produced results which were in 
closer agreement with the FFSOR. 
 
                                                 
56 Because general instability is highly susceptible to geometry imperfections, optimizing a design to this mode of 
failure is normally not done.  
57 In general, modifications to shell thickness are less intrusive than modifications to the frame dimensions. This is 
because the frame scantlings, including flange thickness, are constrained by both the frame stability parameters (F1, 
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2.4.5.5 LSRC PRESSURE HULL SELECTION 
 
 The results of this analysis suggest that Design B (i.e. designs utilizing king frames) will be 
the most efficient pressure hull design for the LSRC. The performance of both designs is 
displayed graphically in Figures 51 through 5360. Figure 51is frequently used to illustrate the 
regimes in which a pressure hull’s shell will fail. The graph is composed of three separate curves. 
When combined, Figure 51 may be used to estimate the critical pressure, and mode of shell 
failure, as a function of the unsupported length between frames. This graph assumes that the hull 
diameter and shell thickness remain constant, and that the frames at either end of the frame bay 
take no real load as the frame spacing becomes small (i.e. it is assumed that the frames merely 
maintain hull circularity). When the frame spacing is close, the shell is expected to fail by 
axisymmetric yielding.  The load at which this mode of failure occurs can be estimated by the 
simple hoop stress formula. When the frame spacing is far, the collapse pressure can be 
estimated by Euler’s formula for long thin tubes (i.e. two-lobe manner). Between these two 
extremes, there is a region in which the ratios of ݐ௦/2ܴ௦ and ܮ௙/2ܴ௦ are significant, and the 
values of each will govern the failure by lobar buckling. It is apparent from this graph that the 
lightest structures will fall at the bend where the hoop stress prediction intersects that of the 
Windenburg approximation. At this point the shell is the most fully loaded and the frame spacing 
is greatest. In practice, the precise intersection of these two curves is not known. It is for this 
reason that a safety factor is applied to the shell yield calculations (i.e. FFSOR: ܵܨௌ௒ = 1.5). 
While Design A has a collapse depth slightly deeper than Design B, Design B more fully utilizes 
the strength of the shell material. This difference resulted in a weight savings of approximately 
1,584 lbs. While relatively small in comparison (~4%), this difference will allow for more 
flexibility when ballasting the LSRC for seakeeping characteristics. 
 
A similar graph can be seen in Figure 52, where again, the leftmost curve represents failure 
by shell yield and the curve on the right corresponds to the upper limit for lobar buckling. Here, 
the pressure factor (Ψ) was plotted against the slenderness ratio (ߣሻ for many of the models 
tested at the David Taylor Model Basin (DTMB), as well as most U.S. submarines built from 
1940-1960. This graph is analogous to that of a simply supported beam under axial load, where 
the pressure factor is defined as the ratio of collapse pressure to the shell yield pressure given by 
the simple hoop stress formula (Ψ ൌ ௖ܲ/ሺݐ௦ߪ௒/ܴ௦ሻ), and the slenderness ratio for cylinders is 












Again, Design A stands out as the stronger pressure hull while Design B appears to be slightly 
more efficient. As expected, both designs fall within the shell yield regime. Because the frames 
actually carry a portion of the load, it is possible for the shell to achieve values of  Ψ ൐ 1 (i.e. 
Design A & B). This phenomenon illustrates the gains that can be made by exploiting low values 
of  ߣ. This figure also shows that both Design A and Design B exhibit performance 
characteristics on par with other pressure hulls designed using similar methods. 
 
                                                 
60 Figures 51 through 53 inclusive were developed from data of reference [40]. 
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Figure 53 compares Design A and Design B to virtually all U.S. submarine types constructed 
prior to 1960. This plot is similar to Figure 52, but uses a modified pressure factor ߶ in place of 
Ψ. This parameter was first suggested by Wenk as a means of capturing the contribution made by 















Figure 53 illustrates the increasing trend in pressure hull efficiency for low values of ߣ. Both 















         Figure 53. U.S. submarine pressure hull comparison (Prior to 1960) 
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 In addition to comparing the LSRC designs with historical data, an effort was made to 
validate the designs with current NAVSEA design procedures. The results of this analysis were 
sent to NAVSEA 05P22 (Survivability and Structural Integrity), and were compared to those 
obtained using NAVSEA GAP (General Analysis Procedures) algorithms61. 
 
 While the results of the NAVSEA analysis must remain classified, some general statements 
can be published. Although Design B was selected as the more efficient design, its larger frame 
spacing makes it susceptible to multi-wave failure modes (i.e. failure modes associated with 
multiple modes of instability). Despite the large safety factors used, the NAVSEA analysis 
showed that Design B would fail prematurely at a depth shallower than 2,500 feet by multi-wave 
failure. Multi-wave failure modes were not considered in this paper, and the FFSOR was not 
designed to bar its occurrence. In addition, the NAVSEA analysis assumed an OOR of 1/2 inch 
and an OOF of 1/8 inches. Because neither the FFSOR nor ABAQUSTM model fully captures the 
combined effects of these two imperfections, similar results could not be obtained. Had a more 
detailed model of imperfections been used in the numerical analysis, the onset of multi-wave 
failure may have been observed. Like Design B, the NAVSEA analysis showed that the primary 
mode of failure for Design A was multi-wave failure. However, the collapse of Design A due to 
this mode of failure occurred at a depth slightly deeper than 2,500 feet. 
 
 Elastic analyses performed by NAVSEA were in close agreement with those obtained by the 
FFSOR. Again, due to the classification of the NAVSEA results the actual numbers cannot be 
disclosed. However, a qualitative comparison between the FFSOR results and those obtained by 
NAVSEA can be seen in Table 10. 
 
Analysis 
Design A   ሺ ௖ܲ ௗܲ⁄ ሻ Design B   ሺ ௖ܲ ௗܲ⁄ ሻ 
FFSOR NAVSEA FFSOR NAVSEA 
Shell Yield  1.506 ՝ 1.506 ՝
Lobar Buckling  4.330 ՛ 2.318 ՛
General Instability 8.786 ՛ 8.439 ՛
Frame Yield  1.506 ՛ 1.507 ՝
 
Table 10. FFSOR-NAVSEA qualitative comparison 
 
 Inelastic analyses performed by NAVSEA placed Design A and Design B in category one 
(CAT I)62 for general instability. Both designs were found to have critical pressures for Inelastic 
General Instability (IGI) at depths deeper than 2,500 feet. One area of disagreement between 
NAVSEA and the present analysis is the effects of OOF on collapse pressure. NAVSEA results 
showed that the maximum allowable OOF for Design A and Design B is ~1/7 inches and ~1/16 
inches, respectively. This result suggests that the imperfection shape chosen in the ABAQUSTM 
analysis is not representative of the worst case shape used by NAVSEA. One final observation 
worth mentioning pertains to frame stresses. For both Design A and Design B, the frame stresses 
                                                 
61  Source Code (U.S. Navy DDS-110-2 Design Data Sheet) 
62 Inelastic General Instability (Bond method) categories: 
    CAT I: Collapse between king frames 
    CAT II: Overall compartment collapse, including king frames 
    CAT III: Collapse between king frames, but influenced by non-linear behavior of the king frames 
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obtained using ABAQUSTM are significantly lower than those obtained using analytical 
procedures. Discussions with NAVSEA show similar findings. This discrepancy is common 
among most pressure hull analyses were frame eccentricities are not fully captured in the finite 
element model. 
 
 Based on weight, the results in this paper favor Design B as a valid pressure hull for the 
LSRC. However, in light of the results obtained by NAVSEA Design A was chosen for 
subsequent modeling of the concept design. 
 
2.4.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 In conclusion, both Designs A and B should be improved upon if they are to be considered 
for use in the LSRC. The results obtained by NAVSEA regarding imperfection sensitivity, multi-
wave failure, and shell yield failure suggest that the actual collapse depth of the LSRC may be 
shallower than 2,500 feet when using the scantlings listed in Table 4. Clearly, the design 
procedure used in this analysis has limitations. Although the safety factors used were deemed 
conservative, inelastic behavior in the presence of imperfections confirms the need for a more 
thorough analysis. The results listed in Table 5 and 6 highlight two important outcomes of the 
optimization procedure outlined in this paper. First, the reader will notice that both the analytical 
and numerical results produce shell yield safety factors less than 1.5. Recall that the FFSOR was 
specifically designed to identify pressure hull designs that would not fail shallower than 3,750 
feet (2,500 X 1.5). This outcome is a consequence of using equation (16) to determine the shell 
yield critical pressure. Both the analytical and numerical analyses showed that shell yield would 
first occur at the “near-frame” location (i.e. not at mid-bay). Because equation (16) gives close 
results to that of equation (14), the more limiting condition (i.e. near-frame) was overlooked. For 
those interested in using the procedure outlined in this paper it is suggested that equations (14) 
and (15) be used in place of equation (16). Second, the numerical results for Design A show that 
the actual collapse depth is greater than 3,750 feet (4,059 feet). This result simply implies that 
the pressure hull will retain some structural integrity after first yield.  
 
 Should the LSRC concept be investigated further, the structural analysis should include loads 
other than hydrostatic. Unlike most submersibles, the thin hull of the LSRC will be subject to 
significant loads when it is out of the water, both at rest while standing vertically in the missile 
tube, and during crane operations while being suspended with lead ballast onboard. For this 
reason, it may be necessary to use vertical stringers to alleviate shell loading. 
 
 Finally, a few words on ParamarineTM. It is not without regret that ParamarineTM was not 
used more extensively to analyze the LSRC concept. Although the MNSTRL results proved 
undesirable for the LSRC, the structural analysis suite is perfectly suited for pressure hull design 
at the concept level. The pressure hull geometry is easily defined, and complex arrangements of 
bulkheads and stiffeners can be quickly added. ParamarineTM can be used to perform both elastic 
and inelastic analysis of the pressure hull compartments and end-caps. In addition, 
ParamarineTM version 6.0 (not yet released) is expected to be compatible with ABAQUSTM 
software. While this software is still under development, it is a powerful tool for anyone 
interested in pressure hull design. 
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2.5 STABILITY AND SEAKEEPING 
 
2.5.1 WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION 
 
A great deal of attention was given to accurately calculating the mass distribution of the 
LSRC. To accomplish this, the entire design was modeled in SolidWorks. As each component 
was created, careful attention was given to assigning the correct material type and dimension. 
Components too complicated to model at this stage of design, or equipment planned for COTS 
procurement, were modeled with the appropriate dimensions and given a density that that would 
yield a predetermined weight. For example, the exact design of the submarine-LSRC access 
hatch is not known. Therefore, a model of the hatch was created with enough detail to convey the 
concept and was assigned a density that would allocate 800 pounds for the actual design. Upon 
completing the model, all mass properties, including moments of inertia, were obtained for 
subsequent stability analysis. The results are tabulated below (See Table 11). 
 
 
Ship Characteristic Initial Design Modified Design 
LOA (feet) 43.3 43.3 
Weight (lbm) 92,256 96,595 
Fixed Ballast (lbm) 18,388 23,899 
ܭܩതതതത (feet) 19.6 18 
ܤܩതതതത (inches) 2.6 31.6 
Freeboard to upper hatch (feet) 3.6 1.8 
Draft (feet) 39.2 41.0 
Submerged Buoyancy (lbm) 7,855 3,516 
 
Table 11. LSRC mass distribution data 
 
2.5.2 STATIC STABILITY 
 
 
Ship Characteristic Modified Design
Displacement (∆) (long-ton) 43.1 
Displacement (׏) (feet3) 1,534 
Immersion (lbm/inch) 197 
KM (feet) 21 
KB (feet) 20.9 
GM (inches) 35 
 




Figure 54. Range of surfaced and submerged stability (LSRC modified design) 
 
As expected, the LSRC’s mass distribution results in poor inherent stability. This is evident 
from the low values of ܤܩതതതത, ܩܯതതതതത and ܩܼതതതത shown in Tables 11 and 12, and Figure 54. In general, 
cylindrical spar buoys should have ܭܩതതതത values that are approximately 25% of the draft. Static 
stability can be improved by increasing ܤܩതതതത. As ܤܩതതതത increases, so will the righting moment in 
pitch and roll63. The righting moment can be determined by simply multiplying the righting arm 
(ܩܼതതതത) by the buoyant force (ܨ஻) (Surfaced: ܨ஻ ൌ ∆, Submerged: ܨ஻ ൌ ׏ߩ). In an effort to 
improve the capsule’s stability the following modifications were made to the original LSRC 
design: 
 
(1) Hull insulation was removed. Hull insulation accounts for 1,216 pounds, most of 
which is located above the center of buoyancy. To increase ܤܩതതതത this weight was 
reallocated to fixed ballast64.  
 
(2) Batteries were relocated to the bottom of the capsule, just above the dewatering 
system sump (bilge). Batteries account for 800 pounds of the LSRC’s total weight. In 
an effort to shield the batteries from seawater, this weight was placed at the 
uppermost end of the inner compartment (i.e. dry zone); this weight falls above the 
center of buoyancy. Additional measures should be made to ensure the battery 
remains dry if it is placed at the lower end of the capsule. 
 
                                                 
63 Note: A large value of ܤܩതതതത does not ensure dynamic stability. It can be shown that the pitch and roll motions of a 
slender spar buoy are resonant unless the centers of gravity and buoyancy coincide [25]. 
64 This decision should be revisited. When the 33 survivors of the USS SQUALUS were interviewed following their 
rescue, cold air temperature was identified as one of their greatest hardships. This contrasts with the results obtained 
onboard the USS DALLAS during SURVIVEX 2003 where air temperatures rose nearly 10° F over three days [34]. 





























(3) LOX tanks were relocated to outboard location near the tenth row of seating. These 
tanks were originally placed in the command chamber so that oxygen bleeds could be 
controlled directly by the senior survivor. However, relocating this weight (450 
pounds) to the opposite end of the capsule will improve ܤܩതതതത. 
 
(4) The freeboard to upper hatch was reduced by 50%. This modification allowed for an 
additional 5,511 pounds of fixed ballast. The freeboard reduction will have its 
greatest impact on the LSRC’s ventilation system. Such a low freeboard will preclude 
the crew’s ability to ventilate by opening the upper hatch, and may require that an 
extendable snorkel device be used. 
 
The above modifications improved ܤܩതതതത by 29 inches. This resulted in a final ܤܩതതതത of just under 
three feet. However, this value is still too small to be relied upon for stability. Additional 
improvements could be made by relocating potable water and CO2 absorbents until needed, or by 
reducing crew seating in rows 1-5. Other options include: 
 
(1) Affixing appendages to the outer hull that will improve stability during the accent 
phase and while at the surface. 
 
(2) Install inflatable bags at the upper end of the capsule. This will increase the water 
plane area and would allow for additional weight to be added at the keel. 
 
(3) Design an extension mechanism at the keel that would lock the fixed ballast in a 
lower position upon ejection from the MMT. 
 
In conclusion, the surfaced and submerged static stability characteristics must be improved. It 
will be shown in the next section that such improvements will also result in better seakeeping 
characteristics. At present, these results represent the most significant technical obstacle to 






2.5.3 DYNAMIC STABILITY 
 
Upon reaching the surface, the LSRC will be subject to the relentless motions of the sea. Like 
all sea fairing vessels, the dynamic stability of the LSRC should be understood. This is especially 
true for floating structures that are not under power. Good “seakeeping” characteristics are 
necessary to ensure that the vessel will operate as intended, and that the crew will perform as 
expected without injury. The geometry of the LSRC is typically referred to as a “vertical spar 
buoy”. Axisymmetric bodies such as the spar buoy will exhibit a resonance response that is 
inversely proportional to the exciting force. For this reason, spar buoys will experience large 
resonant responses, in a highly-tuned manner [25]. The seakeeping analysis presented in this 
paper is aimed at assessing the LSRC’s free response to sea states three and four. No appendages 
will be added to mitigate undesirable responses, and any such modifications are left for follow-
on designs. 
 
The first step in understanding how a vessel will respond in the open ocean is to characterize 
the environment. Because the ocean’s surface is irregular, and apparently completely random in 
nature, the forces imposed on the LSRC can never be fully predicted. However, the ocean’s 
surface does not behave without its own natural limits. For this reason, oceanographers have 
found that wave statistics are suitable for predicting the environment in which a vessel will 
operate. In addition, it has been observed that the linear superposition of regular waves having 
different lengths, directions and amplitudes can be used to model the ocean’s irregular surface 
with reasonable accuracy. This concept is illustrated in Figure 55. Although these two statements 
greatly over-simplify the assumptions made in linear wave theory, they form the foundation upon 




Figure 55. Wave superposition, and the frequency-domain time-domain relationship 





Before the power of statistical mathematics can be employed, the LSRC’s response to a 
single waveform must be understood. Assuming that the waveform is sinusoidal in nature, the 
wave elevation (ߟ) (i.e. distance along the z – coordinate. See Figure 65) at any point along the x 
– axis is given by: 
 
ߟሺݔ, ݐሻ ൌ ܽ sinሺ߱ݐ െ ݇ݔሻ                                                       ሺ54ሻ 
 
 
where ܽ is the wave amplitude, ߱ is the angular frequency, ݐ is time and ݇ is the wave number 
ሺ݇ ൌ 2ߨ/ߣሻ. Equation (54) defines a simple harmonic progressive wave moving in the positive x 
– direction, where the wave elevation ߟ is constant in ݕ. Assuming that the water has zero 
viscosity and is incompressible, the idealized ocean environment can be more fully defined by a 
quantity known as the velocity potential (Φூ)65. In addition to defining the wave profile, the 
velocity potential can be used to calculate the pressure, velocity and acceleration of water 
particles at any point below the free surface. The velocity potential function for the 
aforementioned waveform, in deep water, is given by: 
 
 
Φூሺݔ, ݖ, ݐሻ ൌ
ܽ߱
݇
݁௞௭ cosሺ߱ݐ െ ݇ݔሻ                                              ሺ55ሻ 
 







݁௞௭ sinሺ߱ݐ െ ݇ݔሻ                                                  ሺ56ሻ 
   
 
In the next section, equations (55) and (56) will be used to define the excitation forces (i.e. 
forcing functions) that the LSRC would experience in a regular seaway. These forces, along with 
the equations of motion, will be used to solve for the system’s transfer functions66. Because the 
system under consideration is linear and time invariant, the transfer functions (ܪ) can be used to 
calculate the system’s response (ܺ) to a given input ( ߟ ). This relationship is described 








Figure 56. Properties of a time invariant system 
                                                 
65 The velocity potential is defined as a function whose negative derivative in any direction yields the velocity 
component of the fluid in the same direction [29]. 
66 The transfer function ܪሺ߱ሻ is the Fourier transform of the system’s impulse response (݄ሺݐሻ). The impulse 
response is simply the response of the system to a unit impulse input. The transfer function is synonymous to the 




ߟሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ sinሺ߱ݐሻ ܺሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ|ܪሺ߱ሻ| sinሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ுሻ 




2.5.3.1 EQUATIONS OF MOTION 
 
In general, a ship floating in a train of regular waves will move in six degrees of freedom. 
These motions are composed of three translational components (surge, sway and heave), and 
three rotational components (roll, pitch and yaw) (See Figure 57). Consequently, the equations of 
motion will consist of six nonlinear equations having six unknowns. Applying linear theory to 
the ship’s motions, these equations can be decoupled into two sets of three linear equations. The 
first set involving surge, heave and pitch, and the second; sway, roll and yaw. In the case of the 
LSRC, the motions of pitch and roll are equivalent, as are surge and sway. In addition, symmetry 
suggests that motions in heave will be decoupled from surge and pitch, and yaw can be 
neglected. In conclusion, the response characteristics of the LSRC can be evaluated based on 
evaluating three equations of motion: heave (uncoupled), and surge and pitch (coupled). The 




















Figure 57. Sign convention for translatory and angular displacement 
2.5.3.1.1 HEAVE 
 
The LSRC can be modeled as a mass subject to an inertia force, a damping force, and a 






























where,   ܯଷଷ = LSRC mass, ܣଷଷ = LSRC’s added mass in heave, ܤଷଷ = heave damping 
coefficient, and ܥଷଷ = hydrostatic restoring coefficient in heave. For the velocity field defined 
above (equation (55) ) the excitation force becomes; 
  
 
௭݂ሺݐሻ ؠ ܨଷሺݐሻ ൌ |ܨଷ| sinሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ிଷሻ ൌ ܴ݁൛െ|ܨଷ|݅݁௜ሺఠ௧ାటಷయሻൟ                      (58) 
 
 
where |ܨଷ| is the force magnitude, ߰ிଷ is phase shift between the incident waves and the 
excitation force, and ݅ is the imaginary number √െ1. Since the system is linear and time 
invariant, the resulting displacement will be of the form; 
 
 
ݖሺݐሻ ؠ ܺଷሺݐሻ ൌ |ܺଷ| sinሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ுଷሻ ൌ ܴ݁൛െ|ܺଷ|݅݁௜ሺఠ௧ାటಹయሻൟ                      ሺ59ሻ 
 
 
where |ܺଷ| is the heave displacement magnitude, and ߰ுଷ is the phase shift between the incident 
waves and the heave motion (i.e. the transfer function (ܪଷ) phase angle). Substituting equations 
(58) and (59) into equation (57) and defining  ܨ෠ଷ ؠ |ܨଷ|݁௜ሺటಷయሻ, and ෠ܺଷ ؠ |ܺଷ|݁௜ሺటಹయሻ gives: 
 
 
ܴ݁൛െൣെ߱ଶሺܯଷଷ ൅ ܣଷଷሻ ෠ܺଷ ൅ ݅߱ܤଷଷ ෠ܺଷ ൅ ܥଷଷ ෠ܺଷ൧݅݁௜ఠ௧ൟ ൌ ܴ݁൛െܨ෠ଷ݅݁௜ఠ௧ൟ              ሺ60ሻ 
 
 
Combining like terms gives: 
 
 
ܴ݁൛െൣെ߱ଶሺܯଷଷ ൅ ܣଷଷሻ ෠ܺଷ ൅ ݅߱ܤଷଷ ෠ܺଷ ൅ ܥଷଷ ෠ܺଷ െ ܨ෠ଷ൧݅݁௜ఠ௧ൟ ൌ 0                     ሺ61ሻ 
 
 
Equation (61) is always true if: 
 
 
ሾെ߱ଶሺܯଷଷ ൅ ܣଷଷሻ ൅ ݅߱ܤଷଷ ൅ ܥଷଷሿ ෠ܺଷ ൌ ܨ෠ଷ                                        ሺ62ሻ 
 
 
Rewriting the above equation in the form below gives the familiar non-dimensionalized transfer 














In order to solve for the heave response complex amplitude ෠ܺଷ, the excitation force and 
motion coefficients must first be determined. For the problem at hand, it is valid to assume that 
the cylinder diameter (ܦ௢) is sufficiently small compared to the wavelength ሺߣሻ of the incident 
waves. It is further assumed that the geometry of the cylinder will not produce waves of any 
significance in the heave motion. Therefore, the effects of diffraction and radiation can be 
ignored. Under these circumstances, the excitation force in the heave direction can then be 









where ρ is the density of saltwater, S  is the surface upon which the forces are acting, ࢑෡ is the unit 
vector in the z – direction and ො݊௦ is a unit vector normal to surface S. In essence, equation (64) 
integrates the pressure effects due to the incident wave system over the surface of interest. When 
applied to the LSRC’s lower end-cap, the excitation force in the z - direction (ܨଷ) can be 
obtained. Due to the small variation in pressure between the dome’s pole and equator, it may be 
assumed that the LSRC’s lower end-cap is a disk (i.e. Figure (29a)). Thus, the pressure does not 
change along the y – axis, and the product  ࢑෡ · ො݊௦ ൌ 1. For ߣ ب ܦ௢, it may also be assumed that 
the pressure is constant along the x – axis near ݔ ൌ 0. Under the aforementioned assumptions 









Substituting equation (56) into equation (65) gives: 
 
 
ܨଷௗ௜௦௞ሺݐሻ ൌ ܽߩ݃ߨܴଶ݁ି௞௅ sinሺ߱ݐሻ ൌ ܴ݁൛ሺܽߩ݃ߨܴଶ݁ି௞௅ሻ൫െ݅݁௜ఠ௧൯ൟ                 ሺ66ሻ 
 
 
where the deep water relation ߱ଶ ݇ ൌ ݃⁄  was used67. Notice that in the equation above, ܨ෠ଷௗ௜௦௞ ൌ
หܨଷௗ௜௦௞ห ൌ ሺܽߩ݃ߨܴଶ݁ି௞௅ሻ. A slightly more accurate solution may be obtained by assuming the 
LSRC’s lower end-cap is a dish with a depth equal to that of the ellipsoid’s semiminor axis (e.g. 
for ܾ/ܽ ൌ 0.7 ՜ ܴ௢ ൎ 3.7 feet). Using spherical coordinates and relocating the origin a distance 
(d ) below the surface (See Figure 65), equation (64) becomes: 
 
  
                                                 
67 The deep water assumption is considered valid when the ratio of water depth to wave length is greater than 0.5. 
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ݖ ൌ ܴ௢ cos߶ െ ݀,   ݔ ൌ ܴ௢  sin߶ cos ߠ,  ࢑෡ · ො݊௦ ൌ cos ߶,  ݀ݏ ൌ ܴ௢ଶ sin߶ ݀ߠ݀߶ 
 
 
Using the trigonometric identity sinሺܽ െ ܾሻ ൌ sinሺܽሻ cosሺܾሻ െ cosሺܽሻ sin ሺܾሻ, we can rewrite 
the above equation as:  
 




ܣ ؠ න න ݁௞ሺோ೚ ୡ୭ୱథିௗሻ
ଶగ
଴






ܤ ؠ න න ݁௞ሺோ೚ ୡ୭ୱథିௗሻ
ଶగ
଴






Because the constants A and B are known quantities, equation (68) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
ܨଷௗ௜௦௛ሺݐሻ ൌ ܴ௢ଶܽߩ݃ ሺAଶ ൅ Bଶሻଵ/ଶsinሺ߱ݐ െ ߰ௗሻ 
 














2.5.3.1.2 SURGE AND PITCH 
 
Like the motion of the LSRC in the z – direction, the surge (x – direction) and pitch (rotation 
about the y – axis), can be derived from Newton’s Law. However, these motions are coupled and 




























൅ ܥହହ߶ ൅ ܥହଵݔ ൌ థ݂ሺݐሻ     ሺ75ሻ 
 
Assuming rotation occurs about the cylinder’s center of gravity, and referencing all moments 
accordingly, ܯଵହ ൌ ܯହଵ ൌ 0 and ܫହହ is the mass moment of inertia in pitch about the LSRC’s 
center of gravity. Due to the LSRC’s geometry it can also be shown that ܥଵଵ ൌ ܥଵହ ൌ ܥହଵ ൌ 0. 
For a vertical cylinder floating in deep water the surge and pitch excitations are given by 
equations (76) and (77) [26]. The wavelength is assumed to be larger than five times the 
diameter so that the buoy does not generate any waves of significance. 
 
 
௫݂ሺݐሻ ൌ ܨଵሺݐሻ ൌ 2ߩ݃ܽܣௐ௉ሺ1 െ ݁ି௞௅ሻcos ሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ிଵሻ                              ሺ76ሻ 
 
 
థ݂ሺݐሻ ൌ ܨହሺݐሻ ൌ 2ߩ݃ܽܣௐ௉ሺܥ ൅ ܦሻ݁ି௞௅cos ሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ிହሻ                            ሺ77ሻ 
 
 
where థ݂ is the force moment about the y – axis through the center of gravity, ܮ is the draft, and 




















Where ܤܩതതതത is the distance between the buoy’s center of gravity and center of buoyancy (positive 
value), and ܮ is the draft of the cylindrical section (See Figure 65). For simplicity, equations (76) 
and (77) can be re-written as: 
 
 





ܨହሺݐሻ ൌ |ܨହ| cosሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ிହሻ ൌ ܴ݁൛|ܨହ|݁௜ሺఠ௧ାటಷఱሻൟ                                ሺ81ሻ 
 
 
where |ܨଵ| is the magnitude of the surge excitation force and |ܨହ| is the magnitude of the force 
moment in pitch. Since the system is linear and time invariant, the resulting displacements will 
be of the form; 
 
 




߶ሺݐሻ ؠ ܺହሺݐሻ ൌ |ܺହ| sinሺ߱ݐ ൅ ߰ுହሻ ൌ ܴ݁൛െ|ܺହ|݅݁௜ሺఠ௧ାటಹఱሻൟ                      ሺ83ሻ 
 
 
where | ଵܺ| and |ܺହ| are the surge and pitch displacement magnitudes, and ߰ுଵ and ߰ுହ are the 
phase shifts between the incident waves and their respective motions. After substituting 
equations (80) through (83) into equations (74) and (75), and defining the following complex 
magnitudes (equations (84) through (87)), the equations of motion can be rewritten as equations 
(88) and (89). 
 
 
ܨ෠ଵ ؠ 2ߩ݃ܽܣௐ௉ሺ1 െ ݁ି௞௅ሻ݁௜ሺటಷభሻ                                                 ሺ84ሻ 
 
 






















Equations (88) and (89) can be solved simultaneously by making the following substitutions: 
 
 
ܲ ؠ ݅߱ଶሺ݉ ൅ ܣଵଵሻ ൅ ߱ܤଵଵ                                                   ሺ90ሻ 
 
 
ܳ ؠ ݅߱ଶܣଵହ ൅ ߱ܤଵହ                                                          ሺ91ሻ 
 
 
ܴ ؠ ݅߱ଶܣହଵ ൅ ߱ܤହଵ                                                          ሺ92ሻ 
 
 


































2.5.3.1.3 HYDRODYNAMIC COEFFICIENTS 
 
For most marine structures, determining the hydrodynamic coefficients to be used in the 
equations of motion is the most difficult aspect of the seakeeping analysis. For many structures 
these coefficients can only be obtained through model testing, or numerical approximations. 
Fortunately, the geometry of the LSRC (i.e. a cylinder) is simple enough that the hydrodynamic 
impedance coefficients (ܣ௜௝, ܤ௜௝) and the hydrostatic restoring coefficients (ܥ௜௝) can be 
approximated with good accuracy using analytical methods. The most widely used method for 
approximating the hydrodynamic properties of long slender objects is strip theory. In strip 
theory, the flow at each cross-section is assumed to be locally two-dimensional. The theory 
suggests that the hydrodynamic properties of three-dimensional objects (i.e. ܣ௜௝ and ܤ௜௝) can then 
obtained by simply integrating the two-dimensional properties (i.e. ܽ௜௝ and ܾ௜௝) along the length 
of the structure. Without further explanation, the formulation of the coefficients obtained from 
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strip theory can be seen below (ܣଵଵ, ܣଵହ, ܣହଵ, ܣହହ, ܤଵହ and ܤହଵ). Notice that each of these 
coefficients is associated with flow moving across the cylinder’s length. Contributions to the 
added mass with respect to flow across the lower end-cap (i.e. ܣଵ௝ and ܣହ௝). were neglected. 
However, ܣଷଷ should not be neglected, and was obtained by using half
68 the added mass of an 
ellipsoid of revolution with dimensions (ܾ/ܽ ൌ 0.7). In three dimensions, ellipsoids are the most 
general bodies where comparable analytical results are available. For this analysis, the analytical 




Figure 58. Added mass of an ellipsoid of revolution (Courtesy of J.N. Newman, The MIT Press [25]) 
  
Another useful method for determining the hydrodynamic coefficients is given by the 
Haskind relations. These relations can be used to express the damping coefficients in terms of the 
exciting forces, and require no assumptions regarding the wavelength or body geometry [25]. 
The relationships state that the damping coefficient will be proportional to the square of the 
exciting force, and that the resonant response will be inversely proportional to the exciting force. 
The Haskind relations can be used to approximate the wave damping if the resonant frequencies 
of oscillation are low, and at low frequencies where the heave force can be estimated by its 
hydrostatic limit. In the case of the LSRC however, the Haskind relations alone are not 
sufficient. Unlike conventional ship designs, the LSRC’s  frictional damping is significant when 
compared to the damping which results from “wave making”. Thus, the damping coefficients 
must also include the effects of drag forces. However, because forces due to drag are nonlinear 
(Drag ן ݒଶ), it is necessary to develop a linear approximation for use in equations (57), (74) and 
(75). The approximation used in this paper assumes that the actual nonlinear drag force and the 
equivalent linear damping force dissipate the same amount of energy per cycle. Equating these 
two energies and solving for the damping coefficient gives70: 
                                                 
68 This is a good assumption when only half of the object is in contact with the water. 
69 Note: The results in Figure 58 pertain to motions along the x – axis. Thus, dimensions ܽ and ܾ in Figure 58 will be 
the opposite of those defined in this paper. 










where, ܥ஽ is the coefficient of damping (ܥ஽ ൌ ݂(Geometry, Reynolds number)), ܣ is the frontal 
area, and |ܺ| is the arbitrary constant amplitude necessary to maintain linearity. In this paper, the 
average amplitude of motion |ܺ|തതതത is used (i.e. |ܺ| ൌ |ܺ|തതതത). The formulation of the hydrodynamic 
damping coefficients obtained using both the Haskind relations and the linear approximation of 
drag can be seen below. The total damping coefficients (i.e. ܤଵଵ, ܤଵହ, ܤଷଷ, ܤହଵ and ܤହହ) are then 
obtained by simply adding the two. 
 
 
ADDED MASS COEFFICIENTS 
 
 
ܣଵଵ ൌ െන ܽଵଵ
ି௅
଴
















ܣହହ ൌ െܽଵଵ ቈെන ℓଶ
஼ீ
଴
݀ℓ െ න ℓଶ
௄ீ
଴






ܣଵହ ൌ ܣହଵ ൌ െܽଵଵ ቈන ℓ
௄ீ
଴
݀ℓ െ න ℓ
஼ீ
଴
݀ℓ቉ ൌ ߩߨܴଶܮܤܩതതതത 
 
 






















































ܤଵହ ൌ ܤହଵ ൌ െܾଵଵ ቈන ℓ
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଴
݀ℓ െ න ℓ
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HYDROSTATIC RESTORING COEFFICIENTS 
 
 
ܥଷଷ ൌ ߩ݃ܣௐ௉ ൌ ߩ݃ ߨܴଶ 
 
 
ܥହହ ൌ ߩ݃׏ሾݖ஼ீ െ ݖ஼஻ሿ ൅ ߩ݃ ඵݔଶ
஺ௐ௉






ܥଵଵ ൌ ܥଵଷ ൌ ܥଷଵ ൌ ܥଵହ ൌ ܥହଵ ൌ ܥଷହ ൌ ܥହଷ ൌ 0 
 
 
2.5.3.2 SYSTEM RESPONSE 
 
 Once the transfer functions have been determined, everything about the system’s response is 
known. As discussed earlier, the total wave system describing the sea is assumed to be the 
summation of many (theoretically an infinite number) independent components. This can be 






sin൫ ௝߱ݐ െ ௝݇ݔ ൅ ߰௝൯                                               ሺ99ሻ 
 
 
Where ߰௝ is the random phase angle associated with wave component ݆. For linear time-
invariant systems, this property of superposition also holds true for the response. If the input to 
the system is the seaway described by equation (99), then the response will be of the form: 
 
 
ܺሺݐሻ ൌ෍ ௝ܽหܪሺ ௝߱ሻห
ே
௝ୀଵ
sin ቀ ௝߱ݐ െ ௝݇ݔ ൅ ߰௝ ൅ ߰ுሺఠೕሻቁ                             ሺ100ሻ 
 
 
However, this result is only useful if all the wave components are known. In practice, tabulating 
the individual wave components for a particular sea system is not practical. Instead, it is more 
convenient to describe the sea state by a wave spectrum. The wave spectrum (ܵሺ߱ሻ), also known 
as a variance spectrum or “energy spectrum71”, and can be viewed as a distributed amplitude, or 
“probability density72” of amplitudes, indicating the energy of the system [27], See Figure 55. 
                                                 
71  Note: The wave spectrum is not actually an energy spectrum. More accurately, it is a power spectrum. 
72 Note: This description is loosely applied. The modal frequency is not the most probable frequency. Point 
spectrum’s, such as the Bretschneider spectrum, are not probability density functions.  
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Said another way, the wave spectrum is a function that provides all the component amplitudes 
and frequencies desired to evaluate expressions like equation (99). If the wave spectrum is 
subdivided into equally spaced frequency components (∆߱), each with frequency ( ௝߱) and 
spectrum amplitude (ܵ൫ ௝߱൯) (See Figure 55), then the wave amplitude ( ௝ܽ) can be expressed by: 
 
 
௝ܽ ൌ ට2 ܵ൫ ௝߱൯∆߱                                                             ሺ101ሻ 
  
 
and equations (99) and (100) can be readily evaluated73. Through the use of weather ship stations 
and satellite data, ocean wave spectra have been developed for various regions of the world. One 
of the most common wave spectrums, which is also the current International Towing Tank 















where ߱௠ is the spectrum’s modal frequency (i.e. frequency corresponding to the spectrum’s 
peak amplitude), and ܪଵ ଷ⁄  is the ocean’s (local) significant wave height. The significant wave 
height is the expected value of any wave, given that it is greater than 66. 6ത% of all observed 
waves. Said another way, it is the average height of the top 33. 3ത% of all observed waves. This 
definition also applies to wave heights denoted with different numerical subscripts (i.e. ܪଵ ே⁄ ). 
Although the modal frequency may be selected at will, it is not uncommon to use a modal 








If the selected modal frequency satisfies equation (103), the Bretschneider spectrum reduces to 
the Pierson-Moskowitz spectrum for fully developed seas. Although developing and decaying 
seas can often prove to be more limiting, the Pierson-Moskowitz spectrum will be used in this 
analysis.  
 
The concept of spectra is not limited to defining the ocean surface. Mathematically, a 
spectrum can be defined for any random process that is stationary and ergodic. For linear time-
invariant systems, and if the input is a stationary and ergodic random process, then the response 
is also stationary and ergodic. In addition, it can be shown that the response spectrum is related 
to the input spectrum by the transfer functions derived above. Defining the input spectrum as the 
                                                 
73 Strictly speaking, this interpretation of the sea spectrum is only valid for the limiting case ߜ߱ ՜ 0 and when the 
number of components ՜ ∞. 
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Bretschneider sea spectrum, and the output spectrum as one of the LSRCs motions (i.e. surge, 
heave or pitch); the following relationship is true. 
 
 
ܺሺ߱ሻ ൌ |ܪሺ߱ሻ|ଶ ܵሺ߱ሻ                                                        ሺ104ሻ 
 
 
Equation (104) is commonly known as the Wiener-Khinchine relation. ܺሺݐሻ can now be obtained 
by taking the inverse Fourier Transform of ܺሺ߱ሻ. An added benefit to solving for the system’s 
response spectrum is the ability to obtain statistical information about the response. Because the 
system’s response is a stationary and ergodic random process, the response will have statistics 
(expected values) that are equal to the time averages. Thus, useful information, such as, the 
probability of pitch exceeding a specified value, or the LSRC’s average vertical acceleration in a 
sea state four, to name a few, can be easily obtained from the system’s response spectrum. 
 
 
2.5.3.3 SEA STATISTICS 
 
 In ocean engineering, knowing the system’s response to a given input is often not enough. 
Because the ocean environment (input) is never fully known, a description of the system’s 
response (output) must be also accompanied by a level of confidence. It thus becomes necessary 
to apply statistics to both the ocean environment as well as the system’s response. Fortunately, 
the statistics used to describe the sea can also be used to calculate the response statistics. The 
method used in this paper is described below. 
 
While spectra can be characterized by their shape and modal frequency, it is often more 
meaningful to describe a spectrum with frequency parameters known as moments. These 
moments depend on the spectrum’s shape, and can be used to calculate the statistics of interest. 
Without further explanation, three particularly useful moments are defined below. 
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Another parameter that is used to describe the shape of a spectrum is the spectral broadness 
parameter (ߝ). The bandwidth of a spectrum will always be a value between zero and one, and 
describes how “wide” the spectrum is. Typical values for the ocean are between 0.6 and 0.8. The 
bandwidth is defined as: 
 
  





A typical record of waves observed 
(See Figure 
water level is a zero






uncommon to observe two consecutive wave minima above the still water level, or two 
consecutive wave maxima below the still water level. Because the maxima and minima a








55). It is thus reasonable to assume that the sea elevation above (or below) the still 
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where, ߬ is a dummy variable of integration, and ηכ is the non-dimensional elevation of wave 









where ߟ௠ is the elevation (dimensional) of wave maxima (or minima). In a real ocean, ߟ௠ 
loosely corresponds to an individual wave’s amplitude. In an ocean perfectly described by the 
linear superposition of sinusoidal waveforms, ߟ௠ ൌ ܽ. For broad banded spectrums (ߝ ՜ 1) 
where the minima consistently fall above the still water level (or the maxima consistently fall 
below the still water level), the probability density function of wave elevation will approach that 
of a Gaussian distribution. Plugging ߝ ൌ 1 into equation (110) gives the non-dimensional form 
of equation (109). In general, however, sea spectrums are narrow banded74. Thus, it is more 
appropriate to characterize the wave maxima with probability distributions that correspond to 












The result defined by equation (112) is commonly known as the Rayleigh density function (See 
Figure 59(b)). Although equation (112) was obtained by assuming a bandwidth of zero (i.e. 
“perfectly” narrow, ߝ ൌ 0), research has shown that the Rayleigh density function accurately 
describes the narrow banded seaways most frequently encountered by ships [29]. Thus, the 
Rayleigh density function will be used to approximate the statistics of the Bretschneider sea 
spectrum described above. Substituting equation (111) into equation (112), gives the probability 











      0 ൏ ܽ ൏ ∞                                  ሺ113ሻ 
 
 
From this relationship, it can be shown that the expected value of particular wave heights (ܪଵ/ே) 
and maxima (ܪ௠௔௫) are proportional to the root mean square wave height (ܪଵ/ே ן ܪோெௌ ൌ
ඥܯ଴). The most common of these statistics are defined below [29]. 
 
  
                                                 
74 Although the ocean typically exhibits bandwidths ሺߝሻ ൎ 0.6, it is still considered “narrow” overall. As a 




                                                              ܪ௠௙ ൌ 0.707ඥܯ଴     (most frequent wave height)   ሺ114ሻ 
 
ܪଵ/ଵ ൌ 2.5ඥܯ଴       (average wave height
75)          ሺ115ሻ 
 
ܪଵ/ଷ ൌ 4.0ඥܯ଴       (significant wave height)        ሺ116ሻ 
 
ܪଵ/ଵ଴ ൌ 5.1ඥܯ଴                                                             ሺ117ሻ 
 
 
Highest expected wave heights in ܰ successive waves: 
 
 
ܪேୀଵ଴଴௠௔௫ ൌ 6.5ඥܯ଴                                                            ሺ118ሻ 
 
ܪேୀଵ,଴଴଴௠௔௫ ൌ 7.7ඥܯ଴                                                           ሺ119ሻ 
 
ܪேୀଵ଴,଴଴଴௠௔௫ ൌ 8.9ඥܯ଴                                                          ሺ120ሻ 
 
 
Conveniently, the proportionality constants listed above can also be applied to the LSRC’s 
response. This assumption is valid so long as the wave process is Gaussian and the response is 
linear.  Moreover, because the response spectra are generally narrower than the wave spectra, the 
narrow-banded assumption used to derive these relationships is, in general, more appropriate 
when applied to the response. For spectra with bandwidths less than 0.6, the error committed is 
typically less than 10% [29]. When applying the above relations to a system’s response, it is 
often more useful to evaluate the system’s response amplitudes vice the double amplitudes or 
“heights”. This transformation can be made by simply multiplying the proportionality constants 
in equations (114) through (120) by a factor of 1/2. 
 
 In addition to the wave statistics, it is also useful to know the probabilities associated with 
the expected response amplitudes. Using an approximation based on the Rayleigh distribution 
presented above, the probability that the wave amplitude (ܽ) will exceed a particular value (ܽ଴) 
is given by: 
 
 
݌ሺܽ ൒ ܽ଴ሻ ؆ ቆ
2√1 െ ߝଶ










                                                 
75 This relationship, after being modified for the response amplitude, is used calculate the constant average 
amplitudes |ܺ| present in the frictional damping coefficients.  
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Likewise, equation (121) can be used to calculate the probability that the response will exceed a 
specified limit by simply replacing the amplitude (ܽ) with the response of interest (i.e. |ܺ|, |ܸ| or 
|ܣ|), and using the appropriate moment.  
 
 
2.5.3.4 ASSESSING THE LSRC’s SEAKEEPING PERFORMANCE 
 
With the exception of pitch, the displacement response (ܺሺ߱ሻ) of the LSRC is not nearly as 
important as the system’s response in acceleration76. Conveniently, the Wiener-Khinchine 
relation can also be used to determine the system’s response in both velocity and acceleration. It 
can be shown that the velocity (ܸሺ߱ሻ) and acceleration (ܣሺ߱ሻ) spectrums are given by: 
 
 
ܸሺ߱ሻ ൌ ߱ଶ|ܪሺ߱ሻ|ଶ ܵሺ߱ሻ                                                     ሺ122ሻ 
and 
 
ܣሺ߱ሻ ൌ ߱ସ|ܪሺ߱ሻ|ଶ ܵሺ߱ሻ                                                     ሺ123ሻ 
 
 
Equations (105) through (121) can then be used to determine all the same statistics as previously 
discussed for the wave heights. 
 
For the LSRC, the seakeeping characteristics of interest will be those that most directly affect 
the wellbeing of the crew. Because the crew is not expected to perform any significant tasks 
while waiting to be rescued, it will be sufficient to ensure the crew is comfortable and safe. For 
this reason the responses of interest will include the LSRCs rotation in pitch, and the 
accelerations in each of the three motions; surge, heave and pitch. For this analysis, these results 
will be compared to the U.S. Navy operability criteria (NATO STANAG 4154). These limits are 
based on numerous studies [30], and are intended to give guidance during ship design. Meeting 
these criteria will minimize the likelihood of motion sickness, and ensure that will the crew can 




Motion Sickness Incidence ሺMSIሻ 20% of Crew in 4 hours 
Motion Incidence Interruption ሺMIIሻ 1 tip per minute 
Roll Amplitude 4.0° RMS
Pitch Amplitude 1.5° RMS
Vertical Acceleration 0.2 g RMS
Lateral Acceleration 0.1 g RMS
 
Table 13. NATO STANAG 4154 (U.S. Navy) operability criteria 
 
                                                 
76 To a large extent the position and velocity of the LSRC will be transparent to the crew. However, accelerations 
will produce forces that will be felt only too well. 
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Compliance with Table 13 does not guarantee good seakeeping characteristics; however, 
ships that meet these requirements have been found to perform well. Because the guidelines were 
developed for ships, it is unclear how effective they will be for sailors occupying a “buoy”. In 
general, the acceleration limits listed above are older criteria that attribute sea sickness, to a large 
extent, on vertical motions. The more modern MSI and MII criteria replaces the limit for vertical 
acceleration and takes into account the human sensitivity to different frequencies of motion; 
however, it does not take into account the habituation associated with spending time at sea [30]. 
Although the LSRC should be made as seaworthy as possible, the limits listed in Table 13 should 
not be viewed as criteria for failure. Given the circumstances, it may be necessary to sacrifice 





2.5.3.5 SEAKEEPING RESULTS 
 
The seakeeping analysis was performed using the program in Appendix VIII. The LSRC 
demonstrates good seakeeping characteristics in sea states one and two. The results for sea states 
three and four can be found in Appendix IX, and are summarized in Table 14 below.  
 
 
CHARACTERISTIC SEA STATE 3 SEA STATE 4
Pitch ሺdegreesሻ  4.6 RMS 23.7 RMS 






Table 14. Seakeeping results 
 
Despite the low value of  ܤܩതതതത, the LSRC performs well in sea state three; however, the results 
suggest that the buoy will most likely exceed the STANAG limits for pitch and lateral 
acceleration77. The response in sea state four has similar results with larger violations. This is 
attributed to the larger RAO amplitudes in acceleration and pitch. For sea states one through 
three, the resonant frequencies for heave and pitch fall to the left of the sea spectrum modal 
frequency and are not a concern. The natural frequencies can be observed graphically in Figures 
60 and 61, and are given by the equations below: 
 
 
                                                









When using the Pierson-Moskowitz spectrum the modal frequency is expected to decrease 
with higher sea states, and will eventually converge with the resonant frequency in heave; thus is 
the case for sea state four. However, despite the overlap in modal frequencies, the probability of 
exceeding the vertical acceleration limit due to heave alone in only 29%. Finally, developing 
seas are not expected to exacerbate the response. Because the capsule’s resonant frequencies fall 
to the left of the sea spectrum’s modal frequency (i.e. along the frequency axis), developing seas 
will only drive the spectrum peaks farther apart. 
                                                 
77 It is common practice to combine the lateral acceleration contributions from both surge and pitch, thereby 
obtaining a single value for comparison with seakeeping criteria. In the case of the LSRC, the contribution from 




































































































































































































































A detailed cost analysis was not performed for the LSRC. However, some general statements 
can be made. Restructuring the submarine SAR strategy in such a way that SRCs are relied upon 
as the primary means of rescue would require approximately 145 capsules similar in size to that 
of the LSRC. This assumes a U.S. Submarine fleet of 71, each being outfitted with two LSRCs 
and three ready spares. Assuming a budget similar to that of the SRDRS program (i.e. R&D: 
$180M and OMN: ~$5M per year [31]), each capsule would have to be produced for no more 
than $1.2M. If the concept were introduced during new construction (e.g. SSBN(X)), MMT 
design and fabrication could capitalize on synergies with similar systems using SCN dollars. 
Because the LSRC will be little more than an oversized, over structured SNDL, this cost target 
may be feasible. In addition, the large quantity of capsules required will most likely result in 
substantial learning-curve savings. Finally, the small size and scope of this project will allow for 
relatively accurate cost estimates. Thus, the program should be able to keep cost over-runs within 













(INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
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3 CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
 
Group-assisted rescue methods, such as the SRDRS, are too slow to be used as a primary 
means of rescue. Further, although the SEIE suit can be used for “prompt” escape, the depth 
limitations and risk of injury preclude its use as a primary means of rescue. The operational 
regime of the SRC fills the capability gap that currently exists in the U.S. Navy submarine SAR 
program (See Figure 8). Therefore, a sound rescue strategy will rely upon group-independent 
escape methods (i.e. SRCs, RRGs, SRGs and SCs) as the primary means of rescue, and will 
maintain group-assisted rescue methods (i.e. SRVs and submarine rescue chambers) and 
individual-escape methods (i.e. buoyant/hooded ascent and ascent with SEIE) as a contingency. 
 
Seventy personnel can fit inside a single SRC the size of a Trident II D-5 missile. In the full 
load condition, the capsule will displace 43.1 long-tons and have a submerged buoyancy of 3,516 
lbm. Mass distribution calculations indicate that the LSRC will exhibit poor stability 
characteristics due to small values of  ܤܩതതതത (31.6 inches) (See Tables 11 and 12). Holding the 
freeboard at 1.8 feet, the LSRC is weight limited and any additional ballast must be compensated 
for. For this reason, reductions in load will be necessary to improve ܤܩതതതത. Conservatively, a 
weight margin of 10% was evenly applied to all weight groups (with the exception of fixed 
ballast). Given the small size of the LSRC, it may be possible to reduce the weight margin for 
improved ܤܩതതതത. These results stress the importance of optimizing the LSRC structure based on 
weight rather than other parameters. 
 
The LSRC will exhibit good seakeeping characteristics in sea states one and two, but will 
exceed the STANAG pitch and lateral acceleration limits in sea states three and four. With the 
exception of heave in sea state four, the RAO modal frequencies are much lower than that of the 
sea spectrum. However, it is expected that improvements in ܤܩതതതത will have the net effect of 
bringing the pitch RAO closer to sea spectrum; albeit, the RAO magnitude will decrease. For this 
reason, improvements in ܤܩതതതത will help reduce pitch amplitude and resonance will only be a 
concern in high sea states. 
 
Structural analysis suggests that pressure hull designs utilizing king frames will produce the 
lightest structures. The scantling optimization routine used in this analysis identified numerous 
scantling arrangements that could be used in designing the pressure hull; however, the lightest 
designs maintained shell thickness at 0.75 inches and utilized frames with cross-sectional areas 
of about 5.2 square inches. Using these members, the optimal frame spacing was determined to 
be 14 inches for hulls without king frames and 23 inches for hulls with king frames. FEA 
performed on each structure revealed that the optimal designs for both small frame only pressure 
hulls and pressure hulls utilizing king frames would fail by shell yield at the “near-frame” 
location with a safety factor of 1.40 and 1.24, respectively. Modifying the FE model to 
incorporate imperfections in shape of axisymmetric shell yield revealed that the optimal designs 
could tolerate imperfections up to 0.5 inches. A similar analysis in which perturbations were 
introduced in the shape of the most susceptible buckling mode revealed that imperfections of 
only 0.125 inches could be tolerated before the structure failed prematurely. Results obtained by 
NAVSEA 05P22 revealed that both designs would fail by multi-wave failure, and only the small 
frame design used in this paper would meet the objective collapse depth of 2,500 feet. Because 
this paper did not consider multi-wave failure modes, these finding were not expected. 
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Consequently, the small frame design was used for the remainder of this analysis. In general, the 
analytical and numerical results showed good agreement; however, the numerical results proved 
less conservative. This result was somewhat unexpected since the FFSOR assumed an OOR of 
0.5 inches, and the ring stiffeners in the FE model were designed with perfect circularity. The 





4 FUTURE WORK 
 
4.1 EJECTION PHASE AND ACCENT PHASE 
 
Although the Germans may have been the first to conceive the SRC concept, it was the 
Russians that perfected its use; or at the very least, fully embraced the concept. Over the last four 
decades Russia has conducted more tests, and built more models (SRCs) than any other nation. 
And although difficult to obtain, several documents detailing designs and test results have been 
published. One such document [32] identifies the major problems encountered in developing 
SRCs. They are: 
 
• Jamming in the extraction chamber during separation from the submarine 
• Excessive rolling of the SRC during ascent 
 
The first problem may arise during separation from the submarine due to, (1) structural 
deformation resulting from explosive shock or collision, (2) excessive submarine trim and heel, 
and (3) bottom currents. The second problem results from SRC geometry/mass properties and 
hydrodynamic phenomena. Models tested by Russian engineers were found to exhibit large 
angular oscillations, and in many cases, overturning. To overcome these challenges, researchers 
at the Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute have relied almost entirely on model testing. 
This is clearly an area for future work. As it pertains to the ejection phase, the survivors must not 
be placed in a situation in which they are trapped in the capsule due to system failure. A number 
of ejection systems should be tested for reliability, and each should undergo shock trials to 
ensure survivability. As for the ascent phase, simulations should be performed to identify 
instabilities. To test the many loading conditions that may arise during use, recent advances in 
computational hydrodynamics should be exploited, and scaled model tests should be performed 
on the most limiting cases. 
 
In addition to the problems identified above, work should be done to assess the dynamics 
during surface-breaking. Depending on the submerged buoyancy and hydrodynamic drag, the 
capsule may develop excessive velocities. For the LSRC, the submerged buoyancy is directly 
related to the freeboard. With a free board of only 1.8 feet, the modified LSRC design presented 
above has a positive buoyancy of 3,516 lbm (fully submerged). This is significantly greater than 
that of the Gabler sphere which has a positive buoyancy of only ~661 lbm. In addition, because 
the LSRC is more streamline in shape designers may need to consider adding breaking 
appendages such as water streamers and dampening plates. 
 
In 1970, the Office of Naval Research contracted CADCOM Inc. to study the ascent 
characteristics of a modular escape capsule released from a submerged submarine [33]. This 
work resulted in a computer program (MODSEC) that could be used to study the real-time 
motion characteristics of a capsule during ascent. MODSEC was specifically designed to 
investigate the hydrodynamic behavior of a truncated ellipsoid of revolution (i.e. separable 
compartment (SC), See Figure 1). However, the software was developed in such a way that the 
equations of motion or the capsule geometry could be easily changed. Reference [33] is available 
through the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service (NTIS). 
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Although MODSEC was developed on legacy machines78, the report gives several logic-
flowcharts that could be used to reconstruct the work in a modern computer language. Because 
analytical derivations are also presented, this paper may be a good starting point for someone 
interested in studying the ascent characteristics of the LSRC. 
 
 
4.2 MISSILE TUBE SYSTEMS AND INTERFACE 
 
This paper assumes that missile tube systems and interfaces can be designed with relatively 
little impact on ship performance. By design, the MMT(s) and standard SLBM tubes will have 
many common features; however, from an engineering perspective the tubes will be significantly 
different. Because the MMT(s) and associated systems must be designed for collapse depth, and 
be shock grade A certified, they will be considerably heavier, and may have a significant impact 
on the submarine’s equilibrium polygon. In addition, the submarine-LSRC access hatch will 
present a considerable design challenge, and may dictate that the tube is unsuitable for other 
payloads. Finally, additional work should be done to assess the feasibility of using an actual 
missile tube to house the LSRC. Given the political sensitivity of nuclear weapon systems, the 
marriage of the two may not be possible. In this case, the LSRC support systems would have to 
be designed separately; however, existing synergies could still be exploited. 
 
 
4.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS (CLAUSTROPHOBIA) 
 
Finally, no consideration was given to the human psyche when designing the LSRC. When 
fully manned, the submariners will experience confinement in the extreme. If these conditions 
must be tolerated for an extended period, the men may become claustrophobic and behave 
irrationally.  Research performed by NASA may prove useful in this area. Moreover, 





As discussed in chapter 2, the decision to remove hull insulation was based purely on 
improving stability. However, data collected during SURVIVEX 2003 and SURVIVEX 2004 
suggests that heat exhaustion may be a real concern for survivors occupying the LSRC [34]79. In 
light of this data, NSMRL’s final report on SURVIVEX (not yet released) should be reviewed 






                                                 
78 MODSEC was developed for a time-shared PDP-10 computer. 
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ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASNE American Society of Naval Engineers 
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare 
AUWS Assessment/Underwater Work System 
BASEC British Admiralty Submarine Escape Committee 
CASPA Carbon Dioxide Self-Powered Absorber 
DCS Decompression Sickness (i.e. the “Bends”) 
DISSUB Distressed (Disabled) Submarine 
DSRV Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle 
DTMB David Taylor Model Basin 
ECCS European Convention for Constructional Steelwork  
FEA Finite Element Analysis 
FFSOR Full Factorial Scantling Optimization Routine 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System  
HDW Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft  
IC Internal Communications 
IGI Inelastic General Instability  
IKL Ingenieur-Kontor Lübeck  
IMO International Maritime Organization  
ITTC International Towing Tank Conference 
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
LET Logistics Escape Trunk 
LRIT Long Range Identification and Tracking 
MAC Multiple All-up-round Canister 
MMT Multi-mission Tube 
MRE Meals Ready-to-Eat 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NEDU Naval Experimental Diving Unit 
NSMRL  Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory 
NTIS National Technical Information Service 
OMN Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
OOF Out of Fairness 
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OOR Out of Roundness 
PACU Portable Atmosphere Control Unit 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
PNA Principles of Naval Architecture 
PRMS Pressurized Rescue Module System 
R&D Research and Development 
RAO Response Amplitude Operator 
RGS Rescue/Recovery Gear Ship 
ROK Republic of Korea 
ROW Rest of World 
RRG Reusable Rescue Gear (single man retractable SRC) 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SC Separable Compartments (typically the bow) 
SCN Ship Construction New 
SCOG Self Contained Oxygen Generator  
SDS Submarine Decompression System 
SEAREX Automated Senior Survivor Guidance Program 
SECT Submarine Emergency Communications Transmitter Buoy 
SEIE Submarine Escape and Immersion Equipment 
SEPIRB  Submarine Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon 
SHT Special Hull Treatment 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLCDAU Soda Lime Carbon Dioxide Absorption Unit  
SMERAT Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team 
SNDL Standard Double Lock Recompression Chamber 
SOF Special Operations Forces  
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea 
SRC Surfacing Rescue Container (NOTE: SRC should not be confused with the Submarine 
Rescue Chamber, which will always be spelled out when referenced in this paper) 
SRDRS Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System 
SRG Surfacing Rescue Gear (group retractable SRC) 
SRV Submarine Rescue Vehicle 
SSBN Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSGN Guided Missile Submarines 
SSK  Hunter-Killer/ASW Submarine 
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SSN Nuclear Attack Submarine 
STANAG NATO Standardization Agreement 
SUBOPAUTH Submarine Operating Authority 
SWBS Ship Work Breakdown Structure 
TPI Tons Per inch Immersion  
TTFR Time to First Rescue 
TUP Transfer Under Pressure 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
UMO Undersea Medical Officer 
UMO Undersea Medical Officers 
UTS Ultimate Tensile Strength 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicles  
VOC Volatile Organic Compounds  














(INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
143 
 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS) 
 
ܣ   Constant [non-dimensional] 
ܣ௘௙௙  Effective frame area [length
2] 
ܣ௙   Frame area [length
2] 
ܽ   Frame deflection parameter [non-dimensional] 
ܽ   Semimajor axis [length] 
 
ܤ   Constant [non-dimensional] 
ܾ   Semiminor axis [length] 
 
ܥ   Axial (extensional) stiffness parameter [mass/time2] 
 
ܦ   Bending stiffness parameter [massڄlength2/time2] 
ܦ௢   Outer diameter of cylindrical shell (i.e. hull) [length] 
ܦ௪   Design collapse depth [length] 
 
ܧ   Young’s Modulus (HY80: ܧ ൎ 29,500,000 psi) [mass/lengthڄtime2] 
ܧ1   First frame parameter, ECCS (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
ܧ2   Second frame parameter, ECCS (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
ܧ3   Third frame parameter, ECCS (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
݁   Frame eccentricity (OOR) [length] 
݁௪   Frame web eccentricity [length] 
 
ܨ   Constant [length] 
ܨଵ   First transcendental function [non-dimensional] 
ܨଶ   Second transcendental function [non-dimensional] 
ܨଷ   Third transcendental function [non-dimensional] 
ܨସ   Fourth transcendental function [non-dimensional] 
ܨ1   First frame parameter, SSP74 (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
ܨ2   Second frame parameter, SSP74 (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
ܨ3   Third frame parameter, SSP74 (measure of frame stability) [non-dimensional] 
 
ܩ   Constant [non-dimensional] 
݃   Gravitational acceleration [length/time2] 
 
݄௙௟   Flange breadth [length] 
݄௪   Web height [length] 
 
ܫ    Moment of inertia of a single frame including a length (ܮ௙) of shell plating [length
4] 
ܫ௘௙௙   Moment of inertia of a single frame including a length (ܮ௘௙௙) of shell plating [length
4] 
ܫ௥௘௤  Required moment of inertia for king frames [length
4] 
 
ܮ   Clear length enclosed by stiffeners (ܮ௙ െ ݐ௪ሻ [length] 
ܮ௕   Length between bulkheads [length] 
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ܮ஽ Largest spacing between an adjacent bulkhead and a deep frame or between adjacent 
deep frames [length] 
ܮ௕௘௙௙  Effective bulkhead spacing [length] 
ܮ௘௙௙  Effective frame spacing [length] 
ܮ௙   Frame spacing [length] 
 
݉   Number of half sine waves in the axial direction [non-dimensional] 
ഥ݉    Dimensionless wave number along the axis of the cylinder [non-dimensional] 
 
ఏܰ   Dome circumferential force [massڄlength/time
2] 
ఝܰ   Dome meridional force [massڄlength/time
2] 
݊   Number of complete sine waves in the circumferential direction [non-dimensional] 
݊௖ீூ   Critical buckling mode for shell general instability [non-dimensional] 
 
݌   External hydrostatic pressure [mass/lengthڄtime2] 
݌௖௒   Critical pressure for shell yielding [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌௖௒௘  Critical pressure for end-cap yielding [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌௖஻௘  Critical pressure for end-cap buckling [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌෤௖஻௘  Critical pressure for end-cap buckling (empirical) [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌௖௅஻  Critical pressure for shell lobar buckling (interframe collapse) [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌௖ீூ   Critical pressure for shell general instability (overall collapse) [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
݌௖ீூכ  Critical pressure for shell general instability (ܮ ൌ ܮ௕௘௙௙) [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
 
ݍ   Total radial load acting on a ring frame per inch of circumference [mass/time2] 
 
ܴ   Outer radius of shell [length] 
ܴ௖   Outer crown radius of the torispherical shell [length] 
௙ܴ   Radius to the centroid of the frame cross-section [length] 
ܴ௞   Outer knuckle radius of the torispherical shell [length] 
ܴே஺  Radius to neutral axis of shell-frame composite [length] 
ܴ௢   Outer radius of sphere [length] 
ܴ௦   Radius to midplane of shell [length] 
ܴଵ   Radius to the frame toe [length] 
ݎ௢   Radius from the axis of revolution to the parallel circle [length] 
ݎଵ   Principle radii of curvature at point one on the dome surface [length] 
ݎଶ   Principle radii of curvature at point two on the dome surface [length] 
 
ܵܨி௒  Frame yield safety factor [non-dimensional] 
ܵܨிூ  Frame instability safety factor [non-dimensional] 
ܵீܨ ூ  Shell general instability yield safety factor [non-dimensional] 
ܵܨ௅஻  Shell lobar buckling safety factor [non-dimensional] 
ܵܨௌ௒  Shell yield safety factor [non-dimensional] 
 
ݐ௙௟   Flange thickness [length] 
ݐ௦   Shell thickness [length] 
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ݐ௪   Web thickness [length] 
 
ܷ   Degree of flexibility provided by frame [non-dimensional] 
 
ܸ Ratio of shell area under the frame faying flange, to the total frame area plus shell 
area under frame faying flange [non-dimensional] 
 
ߙ   Ratio of effective frame area to shell area [non-dimensional] 
 
ߚ   Ratio of faying width to frame spacing [non-dimensional] 
 
ߛ   Beam column effect [non-dimensional] 
 
ߟଵ   First non-dimensional parameter [non-dimensional] 
ߟଶ   Second non-dimensional parameter [non-dimensional] 
 
ߠ   Slenderness parameter [non-dimensional] 
ߠ   Circumferential angle [degrees] 
 
ߣ   Slenderness ratio [non-dimensional] 
 
ߥ   Poisson’s ratio (HY80: ߥ ൎ 0.3) [non-dimensional] 
 
ߩ   Saltwater density (ߩ ൎ 1.999 slugs/feet3) [mass/length3] 
 
ߪത   Von Mises stress [mass/lengthڄtime2] 
ߪ௕௘௡ௗ௜௡௚ Frame bending stress [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪ௛௢௢௣  Frame hoop (direct) stress [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪ௒   Yield stress (HY80: ߪ௒ ൎ 80,000 psi) [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪఏఏெ஻  Circumferential hoop stress, mid-bay [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪ௫௫ெ஻  Longitudinal (axial) stress, mid-bay [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪఏఏேி  Circumferential hoop stress, near-frame [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
ߪ௫௫ேி  Longitudinal (axial) stress, near-frame [mass/lengthڄtime
2] 
 
߮   Meridional angle [degrees] 
 
߶   Modified pressure factor [non-dimensional] 
 







݁   End-cap 

































TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (SEAKEEPING ANALYSIS) 
 
ܣ௜௝   Added mass in i when accelerated in j [mass] 
ܽ   Wave amplitude [length] 
ܽ   Semimajor axis [length] 
ܽ଴   Particular wave amplitude [length] 
 
ܤܩതതതത   Distance between center of buoyancy and center of gravity [length] 
ܤ௜௝   Damping coefficient in i with speed in j [mass/time] 
ܾ   Semiminor axis [length] 
 
ܥ஽   Coefficient of damping [non-dimensional] 
ܥ௜௝   Hydrostatic restoring coefficient in i when displaced in j [mass/time2] 
 
ܦ௢   Cylinder diameter [length] 
݀   Dished end-cap radius center offset from origin [length] (See Figure 65) 
 
ܨ, ݂  Force [massڄlength/time2] 
 
ܩܯതതതതത  Vertical distance between center of gravity and metacenter [length] 
݃   Gravitational acceleration [length/time2] 
 
ܪሺ߱ሻ  Transfer function (aka. Response Amplitude Operator (RAO)) [non-dimensional] 
ܪ௠௙  Most frequent wave height [length] 
ܪଵ/ே  Average height of top 1 ܰ⁄  percent of all observed waves [length] 
 
ܫ   Moment of Inertia [mass·length2] 
݅   √െ1 [non-dimensional] 
|݅|   Magnitude of i [units of i] 
ଓ̂   Complex magnitude of i [units of i] 
 
ܭܩതതതത   Distance from keel to center of gravity [length] 
݇   Wave number [1/length] 
 
ܮ   Draft of cylindrical section [length] (See Figure 65) 
ℓ   Variable of integration [non-dimensional] (See Figure 65) 
 
ܯ   Mass [mass] 
ܯ଴   Zeroth moment of a spectrum [length
2] 
ܯଶ   Second moment of a spectrum [length
2/time2] 
ܯସ   Fourth moment of a spectrum [length
2/time4] 
 
݌   Probability or probability density 
 




ܴ௢   Outer radius of sphere [length] (See Figure 65) 
 
ܵҧ   Surface of integration 
ܵሺ߱ሻ  Wave spectrum (i.e. sea spectrum) [time·length2] 
 
ݔ   x – axis coordinate [length] 
ଵܺ   Surge [length] 
ܺଶ   Sway [length] 
ܺଷ   Heave [length] 
ܺସ   Roll [radians] 
ܺହ   Pitch [radians] 
ܺ଺   Yaw [radians] 
 
ݕ   y – axis coordinate [length] 
 
ݖ   z – axis coordinate [length] 
 
ߚ    Dished end-cap arc angle [radians] (See Figure 65) 
 
∆   Displacement [mass] 
 
ߝ   Spectrum bandwidth [non-dimensional] 
 
ߟ   Wave elevation [length] 
 
ߠ   Circumferential angle [radians] 
 
ߣ   Wave length [length] 
 
ߩ   Density [mass/length3] 
 
ߪ   Standard deviation [length] 
 
߬   Dummy variable of integration 
 
Φூ   Velocity potential function [length
2/time] 
߶   Pitch angle [radians] 
 
߰௜   Phase angle of i [1/time] 
 
߱   Wave frequency [1/time] 
߱௠   Modal frequency [radians/time] 
 






݀݅ݏ݄  Dish type end-cap (See Figure 65) 
݀݅ݏ݇  Disk type end-cap (See Figure 65) 
݉   Maxima 
݉ܽݔ  Maximum 
ܨܭ   Froude-Krylov 
ܫ   Incident 
ܴܯܵ  Root mean square 
ܵ   Surface 
*   Non-dimensional 
 
ݔ, ݕ, ݖ  Cartesian coordinate direction 
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Typhoon class SRC. (removed for maintenance) [35] 
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APPENDIX II. Historical Submarine Escape and Rescue Data 
 
INSTANCE YEAR FLAG DISSUB DEPTH (FEET) TTFR (HRS) 
      
1 1851 Germany Brandtaucher 53 6.5 
2 1901 French Farfadet <100 NA 
3 1903 Germany U-3 50 1.5 
4 1910 Japan IJNS No. 6 60 NA 
5 1915 Germany UB-57 129 Promptly 
6 1916 Britain HMS E-41 45 2 
7 1916 Germany U-51 90 6 
8 1916 Britain E-41 45 Promptly 
9 1916 Danish Dykkeren 28 Promptly 
10 1917 Britain HMS K-13 200 10 
11 1917 Germany UB-84 <100 NA 
12 1919 Chile Rucumilla (H-3) 56 7 
13 1920 USA USS S-5 (SS-110) 197 51 
14 1921 USA USS S-48 (SS-159) 60 Uncertain 
15 1923 USA USS O-5 (SS-66) 50 31 
16 1927 USA USS S-4 (SS-109) 110 NA 
17 1931 Britain HMS Poseidon (P-99) 130 2.5 
18 1939 Britain HMS Thetis (N-25) 140 16.5 
19 1939 USA USS Squalus (SS-192) 242 28 
20 1939 Germany U-40 115 1.5 
21 1940 Germany U-64 131 Promptly 
22 1940 Britain HMS H-49 70 Promptly 
23 1941 Britain HMS Umpire (N-82) 60 Promptly 
24 1941 Britain HMS P-32 210 Promptly 
25 1941 Britain HMS Perseus (N-36) 170 1 
26 1942 Germany U-512 164 Promptly 
27 1942 Germany U-701 100 Promptly 
28 1942 Italy Iride <50 2.5 
29 1943 Germany U-533 367 Promptly 
30 1943 Germany U-526 30 NA 
31 1943 Britain HMS Untamed (P-58) 160 NA 
32 1943 Britain HMS X-3 114 Promptly 
33 1944 Germany U-413 89 <1 
34 1944 Germany U-550 318 Uncertain 
35 1944 USA USS Tang (SS-306) 180 7.5 
36 1944 Britain Wellman X 186 0.5 
37 1944 Germany U-741 190 Promptly 
38 1944 Germany U-767 <250 0 
39 1944 Britain HMS Stratagem (P-234) <200 Promptly 
40 1944 Germany U-859 160 Promptly 
41 1945 Germany U-1195 98 Promptly 
42 1945 Germany U-1199 240 Promptly 
43 1945 Britain XE11 215 0 
44 1945 Germany U-399 190 <0.5 
45 1950 Britain HMS Truculent (P-315) 80 Promptly 
46 1981 Soviet Union С-178 (S-178) 131 31.2 
47 1983 Soviet Union Ckam (K-429) 128 7 
48 1988 Peru BAP Pacocha (SS-48) 140 15.5 
49 1989 Soviet Union Komsomolets (K-278) 5500 0 




INSTANCE METHOD OF ESCAPE/RESCUE 
  
1 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
2 Condemned 
3 Dry exit through torpedo tube 
4 Condemned 
5 Free ascent, some with individual escape gear 
6 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
7 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
8 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
9 3 Ascent without individual escape gear, 5 Dry exit through hatch 
10 2 Free ascent without individual escape gear, 47 Dry exit through torpedo tube 
11 Condemned 
12 Dry exit through hatch 
13 Dry exit through hole cut in pressure hull 
14 Dry exit through torpedo tube 
15 Dry exit through hatch 
16 Condemned 
17 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
18 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
19 Submarine Rescue Chamber 
20 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
21 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
22 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
23 Free ascent, most with individual escape gear 
24 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
25 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
26 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
27 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
28 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
29 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
30 Condemned 
31 Condemned 
32 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
33 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
34 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
35 2 Free ascent without individual escape gear, 7 with individual escape gear 
36 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
37 Free ascent with individual escape gear 
38 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
39 Free ascent, some with individual escape gear 
40 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
41 Free ascent from torpedo tube and tower,  some with individual escape gear 
42 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
43 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
44 Free ascent without individual escape gear 
45 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
46 Free ascent from torpedo tube,  some with individual escape gear 
47 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 
48 Free ascent from torpedo tube using individual escape gear 








1 3 escaped and survived 
2 All 14 died awaiting rescue. Hull tapping stopped after 32 hours 
3 28 were rescued, 3 died waiting to be saved 
4 All 16 died awaiting rescue 
5 6  survived, several men died during ascent 
6 All 7 survived 
7 5 escaped, 2 died during ascent 
8 1 escaped and survived 
9 3 escaped, 5 were rescued, 1 died in conning tower 
10 2 escaped after 10 hours, 1 died attempting escape, 47 were rescued after 57 hours 
11 All 7 died awaiting rescue. Hull tapping stopped after 30 hours 
12 All 25 survived 
13 Entire crew survived 
14 All 41 survived 
15 All 2 survived 
16 All 34 died awaiting rescue. Hull tapping stopped after 2 hours 
17 7 escaped (2 after 2.5 hours and 5 after 6 hours), 1 died during ascent, some had DCS 
18 4 escaped, 99 died waiting to be rescued 
19 33 men rescued 
20 9 escaped, 7 died of hypothermia 
21 All 8 survived 
22 1 escaped and survived 
23 21 escaped, 5 were never found 
24 3 escaped, 1 died during ascent, 21 died contemplating escape 
25 4 escaped, 3 were never found 
26 3 escaped, 2 died during ascent 
27 18 escaped, 7 survived 
28 7 escaped, 2 died during ascent, 2 died waiting to be rescued  
29 3 escaped, 1 died during ascent, and 1 died at surface an hour later 
30 12 abandoned ship prior to sinking 
31 All 33 died attempting escape. Survivors were alive for at least 4 hours 
32 3 escaped and survived 
33 1 escaped and survived 
34 At least 3 men escaped, all died adrift 
35 13 attempted escape, 4 did not succeed 
36 1 escaped and survived 
37 2 escaped, 1 died after ascent 
38 1 escaped and survived 
39 10 escaped, 2 died during ascent, some had DCS 
40 20 escaped and survived 
41 18 survived 
42 1 escaped and survived 
43 2 escaped and survived 
44 1 escaped and survived 
45 60 escaped, 50 were never found 
46 4 died trapped in submarine, 26 escaped, 3 died on surface, 3 were never found 
47 120 escaped, 16 died during ascent 
48 21 escaped, 1 died during ascent, 1 suffered brain damage and some DCS 
49 4 escaped, 3 died during/after ascent 
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STRESS ሺPSIሻ  STRAIN ሺIN/INሻ  STRESS ሺPSIሻ STRAIN ሺIN/INሻ STRESS ሺPSIሻ  STRAIN ሺIN/INሻ
0  0  0 0 0 0 
22303.41  0.000743447  21600.55 0.000720018 21123.43  0.000704114
26845.04  0.000900000  26816.24 0.000900000 26717.24  0.000900000
35359.50  0.001200000  35326.30 0.001200000 34849.52  0.001200000
43340.62  0.001500000  43283.74 0.001500000 42387.45  0.001500000
50408.30  0.001800000  50239.76 0.001800000 49264.99  0.001800000
56723.14  0.002100000  56546.60 0.002100000 55547.32  0.002100000
62347.33  0.002400000  62168.45 0.002400000 61167.25  0.002400000
67226.63  0.002700000  67045.50 0.002700000 66033.36  0.002700000
71171.16  0.003000000  70987.94 0.003000000 69964.80  0.003000000
74459.45  0.003300000  74278.71 0.003300000 73268.09  0.003300000
77051.44  0.003600000  76892.68 0.003600000 75903.58  0.003600000
78664.53  0.003900000  78615.84 0.003900000 77898.73  0.003900000
79565.81  0.004200000  79526.48 0.004200000 79214.06  0.004200000
80052.30  0.004500000  80042.05 0.004500000 79982.89  0.004500000
80201.19  0.004800000  80196.91 0.004800000 80167.45  0.004800000
80297.84  0.005100000  80295.18 0.005100000 80276.75  0.005100000
80369.94  0.005400000  80368.13 0.005400000 80355.44  0.005400000
80426.91  0.005700000  80425.57 0.005700000 80416.35  0.005700000
80473.49  0.006000000  80472.48 0.006000000 80465.49  0.006000000
80512.51  0.006300000  80511.71 0.006300000 80506.27  0.006300000
80545.77  0.006599999  80545.14 0.006599999 80540.79  0.006599999
80574.54  0.006899999  80574.02 0.006899999 80570.48  0.006899999
80599.71  0.007199999  80599.29 0.007199999 80596.38  0.007199999
80621.94  0.007499999  80621.59 0.007499999 80619.15  0.007499999
80641.74  0.007799999  80641.45 0.007799999 80639.39  0.007799999
80659.52  0.008099999  80659.25 0.008099999 80657.49  0.008099999
80675.54  0.008400000  80675.33 0.008400000 80673.81  0.008400000
80690.11  0.008700000  80689.89 0.008700000 80688.59  0.008700000
80703.37  0.009000001  80703.20 0.009000001 80702.05  0.009000001
80715.52  0.009300001  80715.37 0.009300001 80714.37  0.009300001
80726.70  0.009600001  80726.56 0.009600001 80725.66  0.009600001
80737.02  0.009900002  80736.89 0.009900002 80736.10  0.009900002
80746.55  0.010200002  80746.45 0.010200002 80745.73  0.010200002
80755.43  0.010500003  80755.34 0.010500003 80754.70  0.010500003
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80763.69  0.010800003  80763.61 0.010800003 80763.03  0.010800003
80771.40  0.011100003  80771.33 0.011100003 80770.81  0.011100003
80778.62  0.011400004  80778.56 0.011400004 80778.09  0.011400004
80785.39  0.011700004  80785.31 0.011700004 80784.90  0.011700004
80791.76  0.012000005  80791.69 0.012000005 80791.31  0.012000005
80797.73  0.012300005  80797.69 0.012300005 80797.34  0.012300005
80803.41  0.012600006  80803.36 0.012600006 80803.02  0.012600006
80808.73  0.012900006  80808.70 0.012900006 80808.40  0.012900006
80813.80  0.013200006  80813.74 0.013200006 80813.48  0.013200006
80818.59  0.013500007  80818.55 0.013500007 80818.30  0.013500007
80823.15  0.013800007  80823.11 0.013800007 80822.88  0.013800007
80827.46  0.014100008  80827.45 0.014100008 80827.23  0.014100008
80831.60  0.014400008  80831.57 0.014400008 80831.36  0.014400008
80835.52  0.014700009  80835.48 0.014700009 80835.30  0.014700009
80839.25  0.015000009  80839.23 0.015000009 80839.06  0.015000009
80842.84  0.015300009  80842.82 0.015300009 80842.66  0.015300009
80846.26  0.015600010  80846.23 0.015600010 80846.09  0.015600010
80849.54  0.015900010  80849.52 0.015900010 80849.38  0.015900010
80852.66  0.016200010  80852.64 0.016200010 80852.52  0.016200010
80855.69  0.016500009  80855.66 0.016500009 80855.54  0.016500009
80858.56  0.016800009  80858.55 0.016800009 80858.43  0.016800009
80861.34  0.017100008  80861.32 0.017100008 80861.21  0.017100008
80864.02  0.017400008  80863.98 0.017400008 80863.89  0.017400008
80866.56  0.017700007  80866.55 0.017700007 80866.46  0.017700007
80869.04  0.018000007  80869.02 0.018000007 80868.94  0.018000007
80876.91  0.018300006  80876.90 0.018300006 80882.31  0.018300006
80884.64  0.018600006  80884.61 0.018600006 80889.96  0.018600006
80892.16  0.018900005  80892.13 0.018900005 80897.39  0.018900005
80910.48  0.019200005  80910.41 0.019200005 80910.16  0.019200005
80917.52  0.019500004  80917.46 0.019500004 80922.73  0.019500004
80929.88  0.019800004  80929.83 0.019800004 80929.57  0.019800004
80947.59  0.020100003  80947.53 0.020100003 80941.75  0.020100003
80953.98  0.020400003  80953.93 0.020400003 80953.69  0.020400003
80965.75  0.020700002  80965.70 0.020700002 80965.47  0.020700002
80971.81  0.021000002  80971.77 0.021000002 80971.55  0.021000002
80988.72  0.021300001  80988.71 0.021300001 80977.48  0.021300001
80994.40  0.021600001  80994.39 0.021600001 80988.80  0.021600001



















Note:  HY80 reaches UTS above 90,000 PSI. If necessary, the stress strain data in this Appendix can be 















(INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
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APPENDIX IV. Full Factorial Scantling Optimization Routine (FFSOR) 
 
 
% Program:                             Full Factorial Scantling Optimization Routine (FFSOR) - Small Frame 
% Language:                        MATLAB Script (M-file) 
% Author:                              LCDR Joshua LaPenna 
% Date:                                June, 2009 
% Units:                               English 
  
% Function:                            This program calculates the failure pressure of a cylindrical 
%                                          pressure vessel by 5 different failure modes (Yield, General 
%                                          instability, Lobar Buckling, Frame Yield, & Frame Instability) 
%                                          for numerous combinations of structural dimensions. The program 
%                                          gives the user control of 7 parameters (Frame Spacing, Shell 
%                                          Thickness, Web Height, Web Thickness, Flange Height, Flange 
%                                          Thickness, & Length between bulkheads). The program then tests 
%                                          every combination of the given dimensions to arrive at the most 





%User Input Parameters 
g = 32.174;                               %Gravity (ft/sec^2) 
R = 83/2;                                     %Outer Radius of Cylinder (inches) 
OD = 2*R;                                 %Outer Diameter of Cylinder (inches) 
b = 29;                                       %Minor Semiaxes of Oblate Spheroid – End-cap Height (inches) 
v = 0.3;                                      %Poisson's Ratio (Steel) 
E = 29500000;                             %Young's Modulus (steel)(lb/in^2) 
sigmaY = 80000;                          %Yield Strength (steel)(lb/in^2) 
rhow = 1.999;                             %Density of salt water (slugs/ft^3) 
rhost = 15.134;                           %Density of steel (slugs/ft^3) 
Dw = 2500;                                %Designed collapse pressure (feet) 
SFy = 1.5;                                    %Safety Factor for Yield 
SFlb = 2.25;                              %Safety Factor for Lobar Buckling 
SFgi = 3.75;                              %Safety Factor for General Instability 
SFfy = 1.5;                                   %Safety Factor for Frame Yield 
SFfi = 1.8;                                   %Safety Factor for Frame Instability 
e = 0.5;                                      %Eccentricity (inches) 
SGTEST=1;                                 %Enter 1 to check solutions against scantling guidelines 
  
% Design A [Minimum Value : Increment : Maximum Value] 
% Note: LB = (Compartment length) 407" + (Dome Height) 29"(0.4) 
  
LB = [34.885*12];                         %Bulkhead Spacing (inches)            
LF = [8:1:36];                            %Frame Spacing (inches) 
TS = [24/32:1/32:1.25];               %Shell Thickness (inches) 
HW = [3:0.25:6];                          %Web Height (inches) 
TW = [1/4:1/32:3/4];                     %Web Thickness (inches) 
HFL = [2:1/4:7];                          %Flange Width (inches) 
TFL = [1/2:1/32:1.25];                   %Flange Thickness (inches) 
  
% Selected Scantlings for Design A 
% "Hide" line 245 & 255 when running these scantlings (i.e. SG6 does not apply) 
% LB = [34.885*12];                     %Bulkhead Spacing (inches)            
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% LF = [14];                              %Frame Spacing (inches) 
% TS = [0.75];                            %Shell Thickness (inches) 
% HW = [6];                               %Web Height (inches) 
% TW = [0.34375];                        %Web Thickness (inches) 
% HFL = [4.75];                           %Flange Width (inches) 
% TFL = [0.65625];                       %Flange Thickness (inches) 
  
% Design B [Minimum Value : Increment : Maximum Value] 
% Note: SSP74 recommends increasing LB by 5%-10% when using king frames. 
% For this analysis, 7.5% is used. 
  
% LB = [12*1.075*12];                 %Bulkhead Spacing (inches)            
% LF = [12:1:32];                         %Frame Spacing (inches) 
% TS = [24/32:1/32:1.25];            %Shell Thickness (inches) 
% HW = [3:0.25:6.25];                 %Web Height (inches) 
% TW = [1/4:1/32:3/4];                %Web Thickness (inches) 
% HFL = [2:1/4:7];                        %Flange Width (inches) 
% TFL = [1/2:1/32:1];                    %Flange Thickness (inches) 
  
% Selected Scantlings for Design B 
% LB = [12*1.075*12];                 %Bulkhead Spacing (inches)            
% LF = [23];                              %Frame Spacing (inches) 
% TS = [0.75];                            %Shell Thickness (inches) 
% HW = [6];                               %Web Height (inches) 
% TW = [0.34375];                        %Web Thickness (inches) 
% HFL = [4.75];                           %Flange Width (inches) 
% TFL = [0.6875];                        %Flange Thickness (inches) 
  







%Sizes matrices for output plots 
Best=[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
Poor=[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
Random=[0 0]; 
  
%Optimization Loop Begins 
for j1=1:length(LF) 
    for j2=1:length(TS) 
        for j3=1:length(HW) 
            for j4=1:length(TW) 
                for j5=1:length(HFL) 
                    for j6=1:length(TFL) 
                        for j7=1:length(LB) 
                            combinations=combinations+1; 
                            status=status+1; 
                            tic; 
                            Lf=LF(1,j1); 
                            ts=TS(1,j2); 
                            hw=HW(1,j3); 
                            tw=TW(1,j4); 
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                            hfl=HFL(1,j5); 
                            tfl=TFL(1,j6); 
                            Lb=LB(1,j7); 
                         
%Derived Parameters 
Input=[Lf ts hw tw hfl tfl]; 
Rs=-(ts/2)+R; 
theta=Lf*((3*(1-(v^2))/((Rs*ts)^2))^0.25); 










ynaf=Afl*((hw+tfl)/2)/(Af); %Distance from web center to frame NA (toward flange is positive) 
Rf=R-ts-(hw/2)-ynaf; %Radius to the centroid of the frame cross-section 





















RNA=R-ts-(hw/2)-ynaLf; %Radius to the centroid of the frame-plate (Lf) composite cross-section 
  









    PCYold=PCY; 
    iter=iter+1; 
    gamma=(PCY/(2*E))*((abs(Rs/ts))^2)*sqrt(3*(1-v^2)); 
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    n1=0.5*sqrt(1-gamma); 
    n2=0.5*sqrt(1+gamma); 




    F3=sqrt(3/(1-v^2))*abs((((cos(n2*theta)*sin(n2*theta))/n2)-
((cosh(n1*theta)*sinh(n1*theta))/n1))/(((cosh(n1*theta)*sinh(n1*theta))/n1)+((cos(n2*theta)*sin(n2*theta))/
n2))); 
    F4=sqrt(3/(1-v^2))*abs((((cosh(n1*theta)*sin(n2*theta))/n2)-
((sinh(n1*theta)*cos(n2*theta))/n1))/(((cosh(n1*theta)*sinh(n1*theta))/n1)+((cos(n2*theta)*sin(n2*theta))/n
2))); 
    A=(alpha*((1-v)/2))/(alpha+beta+(1-beta)*F1); 
    B=(F2^2)+(F2*F4*(1-2*v)*sqrt(0.91/(1-v^2)))+(F4^2)*(1-v+v^2)*(0.91/(1-v^2)); 
    G=1.5*(F2-(v*F4*sqrt(0.91/(1-v^2)))); 
    a=(1-(v/2))/(1+(tw*ts/Aeff)+(Lf*ts*F1/Aeff)); 
    sigmattMB=(p*R/ts)*(1-a*(F2+v*F4)); 
    sigmaxxMB=(p*R/ts)*(0.5+a*F4); 
    sigmattNF=(p*R/ts)*(1-a*(1-v*F3)); 
    sigmaxxNF=(p*R/ts)*(0.5-a*F3); 
    sigmaMB=sqrt((sigmattMB^2)-(sigmattMB*sigmaxxMB)+(sigmaxxMB^2)); 
    sigmaNF=sqrt((sigmattNF^2)-(sigmattNF*sigmaxxNF)+(sigmaxxNF^2)); 
    sigmatY=[sigmaMB sigmaNF]; 
    sigmaTY=max(sigmatY); 
    PCY=(sigmaY*ts/Rs)/(sqrt(0.75+((A^2)*B)-(A*G))); 
    Error=abs((PCY-PCYold)/PCY)*100; 
    if Error<=0.001,break,end 
    if iter==1000 
       fprintf('\nERROR 01: Shell Yield pressure not found. Try increasing iterations (Line: 183)\n') 
       FLAG01=1;,break,end 
end 
if FLAG01==1 
    break, break, break, break, break, break, break, end 
GammaY=PCY/p; %<1 indicates failure 
pCY=p; 
  
%Shell Lobar Buckling Calculation (Windenburg Approximation) 
p=rhow*g*Dw*SFlb/144; 
PCLBW=(2.42*E*((ts/(2*Rs))^2.5))/(((1-v^2)^.75)*(((Lf-tw)/(2*Rs))-(0.45*((ts/(2*Rs))^0.5)))); 
GammaLBW=PCLBW/p; %<1 indicates failure 
  




    PCGIp(1,n)=n; 





GammaGI=PCGI/p; %<1 indicates failure 
  







GammaFY=sigmaY/sigmaTf; %<1 indicates failure 
pFY=p; 
  
%Frame Instability Calculations 
p=rhow*g*Dw*SFfi/144; 
PCFI=25*E*I/(((2*RNA)^3)*Lf); 
GammaFI=PCFI/p; %<1 indicates failure 
pFI=p; 
  
%Compiles Loop Results 
GammaAve = (GammaY+GammaLBW+GammaGI+GammaFY+GammaFI)/5; 
q = [GammaY GammaLBW GammaGI GammaFY GammaFI]; 
qq = [q GammaAve BR nCGI PCY PCLBW PCGI sigmaTf PCFI Input Weight sigmaTY]; 
[sg,sgm]=min(q); 
  








%Stores the best 1000 Results (i.e. highest BRs) in matrix Best (Applies scantling guidelines) 
if SGTEST==1 %SG Loop Begins 
if (q>1)&(sgm==1) 
    solcount=solcount+1; 
    if (SG1>=0.7)&(SG1<=0.9) 
        if (SG2<18) 
            if (SG3>=0.7)&(SG3<=0.8) 
                if (SG4>=0.75)&(SG4<=1.0) 
                    if (SG5>=0.3)&(SG5<=0.6) 
                        if (SG6>=1.5)&(SG6<=2.0) %(Note: Not used for Design A) 
                            sizeBest=size(Best); 
                            if sizeBest(1,1)==1001 
                               [br,sr]=min(Best(:,7)); 
                               if qq(1,7)>br 
                                  Best(sr,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
                               end 
                            else 
                                Best(sizeBest(1,1)+1,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
else %SG Loop 
%Stores the best 100 Results (i.e. highest BRs) in matrix Best (Ignores scantling guidelines) 
if (q>1)&(sgm==1) %Ensures the scantlings will fail by shell yield first 
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    solcount=solcount+1; 
    sizeBest=size(Best); 
    if sizeBest(1,1)==101 
        [br,sr]=min(Best(:,7)); 
        if qq(1,7)>br 
            Best(sr,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
        end 
    else 
        Best(sizeBest(1,1)+1,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
    end 
end 
end %SG Loop ends 
  
%Stores Worst 100 Results (i.e. lowest BRs) in Matrix Poor 
if (q>1)&(sgm==1) 
    sizePoor=size(Poor); 
    if sizePoor(1,1)==101 
        [br,sr]=max(Poor(:,7)); 
        if qq(1,7)<br 
            Poor(sr,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
        end 
    else 
        Poor(sizePoor(1,1)+1,:)=[qq sgm Lb]; 
    end 
end 
  
%Stores Random solutions in matrix Random to generate solution space 
fracsol=solcount/2000; %(Note: Change denominator to control plot density) 
roundfracsol=round(fracsol); 
if (q>1)&(sgm==1)&(fracsol==roundfracsol) 
    sizeRandom=size(Random); 
    Random(sizeRandom(1,1)+1,:)=[qq(1,1) qq(1,7)]; 
end 
  




%Prints analysis status in command window 
if status==50000 
    DTG=clock; 
    fprintf('\n***PLEASE DO NOT DISTURB COMPUTER. PROGRAM RUNNING***'); 
    fprintf('\nDate: %g/%g/%g  Time: %g:%g\n',DTG(1,2),DTG(1,3),DTG(1,1),DTG(1,4),DTG(1,5)); 
    fprintf('%g combinations complete (%g percent)\n',combinations,(combinations/TC)*100); 
    fprintf('Elapsed time: %g  hours\n',ET/3600); 
    fprintf('Approximately %g hours remaining\n\n\n',(TC-combinations)*(ET/combinations)/3600); 
    status=0; 
end 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 




%Informs user if matrix Best is empty 
if FLAG01~=1 % FLAG01 Loop Begins 
if nnz(Best)==0 %Output Loop Begins 
   fprintf('\nAll scantling combinations:\n'); 
   fprintf('(1) Fail prior to %g feet (and/or)\n',Dw); 
   fprintf('(2) Fail first by modes other than shell yield (and/or)\n'); 
   if SGTEST==1 
       fprintf('(3) Do not meet scantling guidelines\n'); 
   end 
else 
     
%Deletes zero vector in Best 
Bestsort = sortrows(Best,7); 
Bestflip=flipud(Bestsort); 
Bestflip(end,:)=[]; 
%Matrix Bestflip now has 100 rows which are all valid solutions 
%Deletes zero vector in Poor 
Poorsort = sortrows(Poor,7); 
Poorflip=flipud(Poorsort); 
Poorflip(end,:)=[]; 
%Matrix Poorflip now has 100 rows which are all valid solutions 
%Deletes zero vector in Random 
if nnz(Random)~=0 
    Randomsort = sortrows(Random,2); 
    Randomflip=flipud(Randomsort); 
    Randomflip(end,:)=[]; 
end 
  




     
%Stores Best 1000 Results in txt file "Best1000Results.txt" 
dlmwrite('Best1000Results.txt', Bestout, 'delimiter', '\t', 'precision', 6); 
     
%Combines Best and Poor 
Results=[Bestflip;Poorflip]; 
     
%Stores solution with best BR in Output 
[br,sr]=max(Bestflip(:,7)); 
Output=[Bestflip(sr,:)]; 
%Output=[GammaY GammaLBW GammaGI GammaFY GammaFI GammaAve BR nCGI PCY PCLBW 
PCGI sigmaTf PCFI Lf ts hw tw hfl tfl Weight sigmaTY sgm Lb] 
  





for n=1:20 %Assumes convergence in 20 iterations 
    PCLBp(1,n)=n; 
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GammaLB=PCLB/p; %<1 indicates failure 
  




ynaf=Afl*((Output(1,16)+Output(1,19))/2)/(Af); %Distance from web center to frame NA (toward flange is 
positive) 




















%Calculates the pressure at which frame yielding will occur for the scantlings in Output 
iter=0; 
while (1) 
    iter=iter+1; 
    p=p+0.1; 
    sigmahoopf=((p*Rf*Output(1,17)*(1-(v/2)))/(Af+(Output(1,17)*Output(1,15))))*(1+(((alpha/beta)*(1-
beta)*F1)/(alpha+beta+(1-beta)*F1))); 
    sigmabendf=((p)/(Output(1,11)-p))*((E*e*((Output(1,8)^2)-
1)*((Output(1,15)/2)+Output(1,16)+Output(1,19)))/(Rs^2)); 
    sigmaTfy=sigmahoopf+sigmabendf; 
    Error=abs((sigmaY-sigmaTfy)/sigmaY)*100; 
    if Error<=0.005,break,end 
    if iter==10000 
       fprintf('\nERROR 02: Frame Yield pressure not found. Try increasing iterations (Line: 
412)\n'),break,end 
end 




fprintf('Outer Radius of Cylinder (inches):                             %g\n',R); 
fprintf('Length Between Bulkheads (feet):                               %g\n',Output(1,23)/12); 
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fprintf('Design Collapse Depth (feet):                                  %g\n',Dw); 
fprintf('Total Number of Combinations:                                  %g\n',TC); 
  
fprintf('\n*************************************Optimum Scantlings*************************************\n\n'); 
fprintf('Frame Spacing (inches):                                        %g\n',Output(1,14)); 
fprintf('Shell Thickness (inches):                                      %g\n',Output(1,15)); 
fprintf('Web Height (inches):                                           %g\n',Output(1,16)); 
fprintf('Web Thickness (inches):                                        %g\n',Output(1,17)); 
fprintf('Flange Width (inches):                                         %g\n',Output(1,18)); 
fprintf('Flange Thickness (inches):                                     %g\n',Output(1,19)); 
  
fprintf('\n*********************************Optimum Scantling Results**********************************\n\n'); 
fprintf('Shell Yield Pressure:                                          %g psi  (%g 
feet)\n',ceil(Output(1,9)),ceil((Output(1,9)*144)/(rhow*g))); 
fprintf('Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (mode = %g):                      %g psi  (%g 
feet)\n',nCLB,ceil(PCLB),ceil((PCLB*144)/(rhow*g))); 
fprintf('Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (Windenburg):                    %g psi  (%g 
feet)\n',ceil(Output(1,10)),ceil((Output(1,10)*144)/(rhow*g))); 
fprintf('General Instability (Bryant) Buckling Pressure (mode = %g):     %g  psi  (%g 
feet)\n',Output(1,8),ceil(Output(1,11)),ceil((Output(1,11)*144)/(rhow*g))); 
if iter==10000 
    fprintf('Frame Yield Pressure:                                          No result. See ERROR message above.\n'); 
else 
    fprintf('Frame Yield Pressure:                                          %g psi  (%g 
feet)\n',ceil(pFY),ceil((pFY*144)/(rhow*g))); 
end 
fprintf('Frame Von Mises Stress at %g feet (Yield Strength):          %g psi  (%g 
psi)\n',Dw,ceil(sigmaTf),sigmaY); 
fprintf('Frame Instability Buckling Pressure:                           %g psi  (%g 
feet)\n\n',ceil(Output(1,13)),ceil((Output(1,13)*144)/(rhow*g))); 
fprintf('Safety Factors - Actual (Desired)\n'); 
fprintf('Shell Yield:                                                   %g  (%g)\n',Output(1,9)/pDDD,SFy); 
fprintf('Shell Lobar Buckling:                                          %g  (%g)\n',PCLB/pDDD,SFlb); 
fprintf('General Instability (Bryant):                                  %g  (%g)\n',Output(1,11)/pDDD,SFgi); 
if iter==10000 
    fprintf('General Instability:                                           No result. See ERROR message above.\n'); 
else 
    fprintf('Frame Yield:                                                   %g  (%g)\n',pFY/pDDD,SFfy); 
end 
fprintf('Frame Instability:                                             %g  (%g)\n',Output(1,13)/pDDD,SFfi); 
  
fprintf('\n***********************************Scantling Guidelines*************************************\n\n'); 
fprintf('ts*sigmaY/pR:                                                  %g  (0.7 - 0.9)\n',Output(1,15)*sigmaY/(pCY*(R-
(Output(1,15)/2)))); 
fprintf('hw/tw:                                                         %g   (15 - 20)\n',Output(1,16)/Output(1,17)); 
fprintf('hfl/hw:                                                        %g  (0.7 - 0.8)\n',Output(1,18)/Output(1,16)); 
fprintf('Lf/2R:                                                         %g  (0.07 - 0.10)\n',Output(1,14)/(2*R)); 
fprintf('tfl/ts:                                                        %g  (0.75 - 1.0)\n',Output(1,19)/Output(1,15)); 
fprintf('Af/Lf*ts:                                                      %g  (0.3 - 
0.6)\n',((Output(1,16)*Output(1,17))+(Output(1,18)*Output(1,19)))/(Output(1,14)*Output(1,15))); 
fprintf('Lb/2R:                                                         %g   (1.5 - 2.0)\n',Output(1,23)/(2*R)); 
fprintf('Lf:                                                            %g        (R/6 = %g)\n',Output(1,14),R/6); 
fprintf('(hw+tfl)/R:                                                    %g  (0.05 - 0.1)\n',(Output(1,16)+Output(1,19))/R); 
  






axis([0 1 0 1]); 
xlabel('WEIGHT / BUOYANCY'); 
ylabel('( P / P_C )'); 






%Calculate Slenderness Ratio & Sai 
%Taylor Model Basin Data (Arentzen & Mandel,1960) - Ships with Pc from Experimental Data 
ModelsY=[1.25 0.7 0.91 0.8 0.49 0.59 0.69 0.81 0.58 0.59 0.71 1.305 0.89 0.605 0.67 0.655 0.49 0.51 
0.508 0.415 0.41 0.48 0.38 0.3 0.23 0.35]; 
ModelsX=[0.58 0.86 0.885 0.89 0.99 0.977 0.982 0.985 1.08 1.18 1.225 0.96 1.21 1.39 1.4 1.44 1.46 1.59 
1.615 1.7 1.8 1.81 1.9 1.925 1.96 2.0];              
%Taylor U.S. Submarine Data (Arentzen & Mandel,1960) - Ships with Pc from Equation 92a (Von 
Sanden and Gunther) 
ShipsY=[1.12 1.09 1.045 1.045 1.09 1.01 1.03 1.21 0.98 1.045]; 
ShipsX=[0.622 0.62 0.635 0.68 0.685 0.725 0.77 0.78 0.89 1.06]; 
lamda=(((Output(1,14)/(2*R-Output(1,15)))/((Output(1,15)/(2*R-Output(1,15)))^1.5))*(sigmaY/E))^0.5; 






%Plots Shell Segment Performance for lightest solution 
figure2 = figure; 
axes1 = axes('Parent',figure2); 
axis(axes1,[0.4 2 0 2]); 
box(axes1,'on'); 
hold(axes1,'all'); 
plot1 = plot(lamda,Sai,'LineStyle','none','Marker','.','color','k','MarkerSize',17,'Parent',axes1); 
plot2 = plot(ModelsX,ModelsY,'LineStyle','none','Marker','+','MarkerSize',5,'color','k','Parent',axes1); 
plot3 = plot(ShipsX,ShipsY,'LineStyle','none','Marker','o','color','k','MarkerSize',5,'MarkerFaceColor',[1 1 
1],'Parent',axes1); 
legend1 = legend(axes1,{'FFSOR RESULT WITH P_C FROM EQUATION (16)','MODELS WITH P_C 
FROM EXPERIMENT','SUBS WITH P_C FROM VON SANDEN & GUNTHER 
(92a)'},'Location','NorthWest'); 
annotation1 = annotation(figure2,'textbox','Position',[0.6036 0.3476 0.2161 
0.169],'LineStyle','none','FontSize',12,'String',{'\psi = 1.30 / \lambda^2'},'FitHeightToText','on'); 
box(legend1,'off'); 
xlabel('SLENDERNESS RATIO, \lambda'); 
ylabel('PRESSURE FACTOR, \psi'); 





end %Output Loop Ends 
end %FLAG01 Loop End 
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Outer Radius of Cylinder (inches):                                  41.5 
Length Between Bulkheads (feet):                                   34.885 
Design Collapse Depth (feet):                                       2500 




Frame Spacing (inches):                                             14 
Shell Thickness (inches):                                           0.75 
Web Height (inches):                                                 6 
Web Thickness (inches):                                             0.34375 
Flange Width (inches):                                               4.75 
Flange Thickness (inches):                                          0.65625 
 
*******************************************Optimum Scantling Results*************************************** 
 
Shell Yield Pressure:                                                1682   psi  (3765 feet) 
Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (mode = 10):                         4835   psi  (10825 feet) 
Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (Windenburg):                       4944   psi  (11069 feet) 
General Instability (Bryant) Buckling Pressure (mode = 2):       9811   psi  (21966 feet) 
Frame Yield Pressure:                                               1682   psi  (3766 feet) 
Frame Von Mises Stress at 2500 feet (Yield Strength):             51463 psi  (80000 psi) 
Frame Instability Buckling Pressure:                               13063 psi  (29248 feet) 
 
Safety Factors - Actual (Desired) 
Shell Yield:                                                          1.50592  (1.5) 
Shell Lobar Buckling:                                                4.32995  (2.25) 
General Instability (Bryant):                                       8.786      (3.75) 
Frame Yield:                                                         1.50636  (1.5) 




ts*sigmaY/pR:                                                        0.871081  (0.7 - 0.9) 
hw/tw:                                                                17.4545    (15 - 20) 
hfl/hw:                                                               0.791667  (0.7 - 0.8) 
Lf/2R:                                                                0.168675  (0.07 - 0.10) 
tfl/ts:                                                                0.875        (0.75 - 1.0) 
Af/Lf*ts:                                                             0.493304  (0.3 - 0.6) 
Lb/2R:                                                                5.04361    (1.5 - 2.0) 
Lf:                                                                    14             (R/6 = 6.91667) 
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Outer Radius of Cylinder (inches):                                  41.5 
Length Between Bulkheads (feet):                                   12.9 
Design Collapse Depth (feet):                                       2500 




Frame Spacing (inches):                                             23 
Shell Thickness (inches):                                           0.75 
Web Height (inches):                                                 6 
Web Thickness (inches):                                             0.34375 
Flange Width (inches):                                               4.75 
Flange Thickness (inches):                                          0.6875 
 
*******************************************Optimum Scantling Results*************************************** 
 
Shell Yield Pressure:                                                1682   psi  (3765 feet) 
Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (mode = 9):                          2589   psi  (5796 feet) 
Shell Lobar Buckling Pressure (Windenburg):                       2617   psi  (5859 feet) 
General Instability (Bryant) Buckling Pressure (mode = 2):       9454   psi  (21166 feet) 
Frame Yield Pressure:                                               1699   psi  (3803 feet) 
Frame Von Mises Stress at 2500 feet (Yield Strength):             50733 psi  (80000 psi) 
Frame Instability Buckling Pressure:                               8937   psi  (20008 feet) 
 
Safety Factors - Actual (Desired) 
Shell Yield:                                                          1.50599  (1.5) 
Shell Lobar Buckling:                                                2.31832  (2.25) 
General Instability (Bryant):                                       8.46637  (3.75) 
Frame Yield:                                                         1.52114  (1.5) 




ts*sigmaY/pR:                                                        0.871081  (0.7 - 0.9) 
hw/tw:                                                                17.4545    (15 - 20) 
hfl/hw:                                                               0.791667  (0.7 - 0.8) 
Lf/2R:                                                                0.277108  (0.07 - 0.10) 
tfl/ts:                                                                0.916667  (0.75 - 1.0) 
Af/Lf*ts:                                                             0.308877  (0.3 - 0.6) 
Lb/2R:                                                                1.86506    (1.5 - 2.0) 
Lf:                                                                    23             (R/6 = 6.91667) 
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Outer Radius of Cylinder (inches):                                  41.5 
Length Between Bulkheads (feet):                                   36 
Design Collapse Depth (feet):                                       2500 




King Frame Web Height (inches):                   10 
King Frame Web Thickness (inches):                0.59375 
King Frame Flange Width (inches):                 8 
King Frame Flange Thickness (inches):             0.96875 
King Frame Insert Width (inches):                  9.2 
King Frame Insert Thickness (inches):             0.225 
 
*******************************************Optimum Scantling Results*************************************** 
 
General Instability (3T-Bryant) Buckling Pressure (mode = 2):       13107   psi  (29345 feet) 
King Frame Yield Pressure:                                       1677     psi  (3755 feet) 
King Frame Von Mises Stress at 2500 feet (Yield Strength):               51426  psi  (80000 psi) 
King Frame Instability Buckling Pressure:                                  7593     psi  (16999 feet) 
Total Weight of One King Frame:                                           936  lbf 
 
Safety Factors - Actual (Desired) 
General Instability (3T-Bryant):                       11.7379  (3.75) 
King Frame Yield:                                1.50206  (1.5) 




hw/tw:                              16.8421        (15 - 20) 
hfl/hw:                             0.8                (0.7 - 0.8) 
tfl/ts:                              0.99359        (0.75 - 1.0) 
Lb/2R:                              1.73494        (1.5 - 2.0) 
E1:                               16.8421        (<=21.1232) 
E2:                             8.25806        (<=19.2029) 
E3:                                0.00923236   (>=0.00271186) 
 
Required moment of inertia for King Frame plus Leff:                     452.466  in^4 
Calculated moment of inertia for King Frame plus Leff:                   540.953  in^4 
King Frame moment of inertia / Small Frame moment of inertia:      13.3323  (~10) 
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APPENDIX VIII. Seakeeping Solver for Cylindrical Spar Buoys 
 
 
% Program:       Seakeeping Solver for Cylindrical Spar Buoys 
% Language:     MATLAB Script (M-file) 
% Author:        LCDR Joshua LaPenna 
% Date:          June, 2009 
% Units:         Metric 
  
% Function:      This program analyzes the motion of a cylindrical spar buoy 
%                 in regular waves. The user has control of buoy mass, Iyy 
%                 center of gravity and end-cap geometry (i.e. a/b), as well as 
%                 sea state and performance criteria. For each motion, surge, heave 
%                 and pitch, the program outputs the displacement, velocity and 
%                 acceleration spectrums, natural frequencies, and typical 
%                 seakeeping statistics. The program can be easily modified to 






rho=1025;                          %Seawater density (kilograms/meter^3) 
g=9.81456;                         %Gravity (meters/sec^2)                       
  
%Input Parameters 
%Obtained from Final LSRC Design (Solid Works Output) 
Le=461*0.0254;                     %Length between end-caps (meters) (i.e. cylinder length) 
R=41.5*0.0254;                     %Cylinder outer radius (meters) 
b=0.7*R;                            %End-cap semiminor axis (b) (meters) 
Mass=96595*0.45359237;    %LSRC full load (occupied) Mass (kilograms) 
Iyy=833680.1;                      %LSRC mass moment of inertia about y-axis through CG 
KG=5.5;                             %Distance between the keel and CG (meters) 
Endcap=1;                          %To calculate F3hat for disk only, set to 1. For disk and dish, set to 0 
VAL=0.2*g;                         %Vertical acceleration limit (meters/second^2) 
LAL=0.1*g;                         %Lateral acceleration limit (meters/second^2) 
Pitchmax=4;                        %Maximum recommended pitch/roll amplitude (degrees) RMS value 
Sea=4;                              %Sea state of interest (1-9) 
Cd1=1.2;                           %Damping coefficient of cylinder in surge (for Le/2R=5, Cd=0.75) 
Cd3=0.4;                           %Damping coefficient of end-cap in heave 
Cd5=1.2;                           %Damping coefficient of cylinder in pitch 
  
%Derived Parameters 
Disp=Mass/rho;                     %Volume displaced by LSRC (meters^3) 
Dispe=0.5*(4/3)*pi*b*(R^2);   %Volume displaced by lower end-cap (meters^3) 
L=(Disp-Dispe)/(pi*(R^2));     %Draft of cylindrical section (meters) 
FB=Le-L+(23*0.0254);           %Freeboard to hatch opening (meters) 
Awp=pi*(R^2);                      %Waterplane area (Stillwater) (meters^2) 
 
%LSRC center of buoyancy (distance from surface) (meters) 
CB=((Dispe*(L+((4/3)*(b/pi))))+((L*Awp)*(L/2)))/(Disp); 
 
CG=L+b-KG;                         %LSRC center of gravity (distance from surface) (meters) 
BG=CG-CB;                          %Distance between CG and CB (meters)      




%Dished End-cap Parameters               
Ro=((R^2)+(b^2))/(2*b);           %Sphere radius (meters) 
d=L-sqrt((Ro^2)-(R^2));           %Distance from surface to sphere center (meters)  
beta=asin(R/Ro);                   %Dished end-cap arc angle (radians) 
  
%Define Ocean Environment 
%World Meteorological Organization Sea State Codes 1-9 
%Mean Significant Wave Height (meters) 
H13=[0.05 0.3 0.875 1.875 3.25 5.0 7.5 11.5 14]; 
  
wmin=0.001;                        %Minimum frequency (radians) 
wmax=2;                            %Maximum frequency (radians) 
dw=0.001;                          %Frequency increment (radians) 
Omega=[wmin:dw:wmax];            %Frequency range (radians/second) 
K=(Omega.^2)./g;                   %Wave number range (radians^2/meter^2) 
  
%Calculates Bretscneider Sea Spectrum (S) 
wm=0.4*sqrt(g/H13(Sea)); 
Sw=(1.25/4).*(wm^4./Omega.^5).*(H13(Sea)^2).*exp(-1.25.*((wm./Omega).^4)); 
Sw=Sw+(1E-315);      %Ensures Sw has all non-zero elements 
Awi=(2.*Sw.*dw).^0.5;     %Calculates Vector of Wave Amplitudes A(wi) 
 











%Calculates Damping Force Coefficients (B) 
























%Calculate Forcing Functions (i.e. Forces - F1hat, F3hat & F5hat) 
%Calculate Heave Force Complex Amplitude (F3hat) 
F3hat_disk=(Awi.*(rho*g*Awp)).*exp(-K.*L); %Equation (66) Note: F3hat = |F3| 
if Endcap==0 
    step=0; 
    for omega=wmin:dw:wmax 
        step=step+1; 
        k=(omega^2)/g; 
        Function=['exp(' num2str(k) '*(' num2str(Ro) '*cos(phi)-' num2str(d) '))*cos(' num2str(k) '*' 
num2str(Ro) '*sin(phi)*cos(theta))*cos(phi)*(sin(phi))']; 
        Integrand=inline(Function,'theta','phi'); 
        A=dblquad(Integrand,0,2*pi,pi-beta,pi); %Equation (69)         
        A_matrix(1,step)=A; 
    end 
    step=0; 
    for omega=wmin:dw:wmax 
        step=step+1; 
        k=(omega^2)/g; 
        Function=['exp(' num2str(k) '*(' num2str(Ro) '*cos(phi)-' num2str(d) '))*sin(' num2str(k) '*' 
num2str(Ro) '*sin(phi)*cos(theta))*cos(phi)*(sin(phi))']; 
        Integrand=inline(Function,'theta','phi'); 
        B=dblquad(Integrand,0,2*pi,pi-beta,pi); %Equation (70) 
        B_matrix(1,step)=B; 
    end 
    Psid=atan(B_matrix./A_matrix); 
    F3hat_dish=(sqrt((A_matrix.^2)+(B_matrix.^2))).*(Awi.*((Ro^2)*rho*g)).*exp(i.*(-Psid)); %Equation (73) 
    % Plots F3hat_disk and F3hat_dish for comparison 
    figure(102) 
    plotyy(Omega,abs(F3hat_disk),Omega,abs(F3hat_dish)) 
end 
  
%Calculate Surge and Pitch Complex Amplitudes (F1hat & F5hat) 







X3ave=2; %Initial Guess: average heave amplitude 
iter=0; 
B33H=((Omega.*K)./(2*rho)).*(((abs(F3hat_disk))./g).^2); %Haskind relation 
while (1) 
    X3ave_old=X3ave; 
    iter=iter+1; 
     
    %Calculates Damping Force Coefficient (B) 
    B33=B33H+(((4/(3*pi))*rho*Cd3*Awp*X3ave).*Omega); 
     
    %Calculate Heave Transfer Function (H3) 
    X3hat=(F3hat_disk)./(-(Omega.^2).*(Mass+A33)+(i.*Omega.*B33)+C33); 
    H3=X3hat./Awi; %Non-dimensional 
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    %Calculate Heave Response Spectrum (displacement) 
    SX3=(abs(H3).^2).*Sw; 
     
    %Calculates Moments of the Response Spectrum 
    MoSX3=trapz(Omega,SX3); 
     
    %Calculates the Average Heave Amplitude 
    X3_11=1.25*sqrt(MoSX3); 
    X3ave=X3_11; 
    Error3=abs((X3ave-X3ave_old)/X3ave)*100; 
    if Error3<=0.01,break,end 
    if iter==100 
    fprintf('\nB33 did not converge. Try increasing iterations\n'),break,end 
end 
[max3,row3]=max(abs(H3)); 
wn3=Omega(row3); %Natural frequency in heave (graphically) 
wn3E=(C33/(Mass+A33))^0.5; %Natural frequency in heave (analytical) 
  
%Surge and Pitch Analysis 
X1ave=0.3; %Initial Guess: average surge amplitude 
X5ave=0.5; %Initial Guess: average pitch amplitude 
iter=0; 
B11H=((Omega.*K)./(4*rho)).*(((abs(F1hat))./g).^2); %Haskind relation 
B15H=(Omega./rho).*(((abs(F1hat))./(L*g)).^2).*(L*BG); %Haskind relation 
B51H=B15H; 
B55H=((Omega.*K)./(4*rho)).*(((abs(F5hat))./g).^2); %Haskind relation 
while (1) 
    X1ave_old=X1ave; 
    X5ave_old=X5ave; 
    iter=iter+1; 
     
    %Calculates Damping Force Coefficients (B) 
    B11=B11H+(((8/(3*pi))*rho*Cd1*R*L*X1ave).*Omega); 
    B55=B55H+(((2/(3*pi))*rho*Cd5*R*X5ave*((CG^4)+(KG^4))).*Omega); 
    B15=B15H-(((2/(3*pi))*rho*Cd5*R*X5ave*((KG^4)-(CG^4))).*Omega); 
    B51=B51H-(((4/(3*pi))*rho*Cd1*R*X1ave*((KG^2)-(CG^2))).*Omega); 
     
    %Calculates functions P, Q, R & S (Coupled Pitch and Surge) 
    PP=(((i).*Omega.^2).*(Mass+A11))+(Omega.*B11)-(i*C11); 
    QQ=(((i).*Omega.^2).*(M15+A15))+(Omega.*B15)-(i*C15); 
    RR=(((i).*Omega.^2).*(M51+A51))+(Omega.*B51)-(i*C51); 
    SS=(((i).*Omega.^2).*(I55+A55))+(Omega.*B55)-(i*C55); 
  
    %Seakeeping Analysis 
    %Calculate Surge Transfer Function (H1) 
    X1hat=((F1hat.*SS)-(F5hat.*QQ))./((PP.*SS)-(QQ.*RR)); 
    H1=X1hat./Awi; %Non-dimensional 
     
    %Calculate Pitch Transfer Function (H5) 
    X5hat=((F5hat.*PP)-(F1hat.*RR))./((PP.*SS)-(QQ.*RR)); 
    H5=X5hat./(Awi.*K); %Non-dimensional 
     
    %Calculates Surge and Pitch Response Spectrums (displacement) 
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    SX1=(abs(H1).^2).*Sw; 
    SX5=(abs(H5).^2).*Sw; 
     
    %Calculates Moments of the Response Spectrums 
    MoSX1=trapz(Omega,SX1); 
    MoSX5=trapz(Omega,SX5); 
    M2SX5=trapz(Omega,(SX5.*(Omega.^2))); 
    M4SX5=trapz(Omega,(SX5.*(Omega.^4))); 
     
    %Calculates Bandwidths of the Response Spectrums 
    EpsilonSX5=sqrt(1-((M2SX5^2)/(MoSX5*M4SX5))); 
     
    %Calculates the Average Surge and Pitch Amplitudes 
    X1_11=1.25*sqrt(MoSX1); 
    X5_11=1.25*sqrt(MoSX5); 
    X1ave=X1_11; 
    X5ave=X5_11; 
    Error1=abs((X1ave-X1ave_old)/X1ave)*100; 
    Error5=abs((X5ave-X5ave_old)/X5ave)*100; 
    if (Error1<=0.01)&(Error5<=0.01),break,end 
    if iter==100 
    fprintf('\nB11 or B55 did not converge. Try increasing iterations\n'),break,end 
end 
[max5,row5]=max(abs(H5)); 
wn5=Omega(row5); %Natural frequency in pitch (graphically) 
wn5E=((C55)/((I55+A55)-(0.5*Mass*(BG^2))))^0.5; %Natural frequency in pitch (analytical) 
  


























%Calculates the Significant Response Amplitudes 
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%These are the average amplitude of all maxima above a13. Said another 
%way, it is the expected value of the response, given that the response 




















fprintf('\n************************ RESULTS ************************\n'); 
fprintf('\nSea State = %g\n',Sea); 
fprintf('Significant Wave Height (H13) = %g meters\n',H13(Sea)); 
fprintf('Sea Spectrum Modal Frequency = %-2.3f 1/seconds\n\n',wm); 
fprintf('Heave Spectrum Modal Frequency = %-2.3f 1/seconds\n',wn3); 
fprintf('Pitch Spectrum Modal Frequency = %-2.3f 1/seconds\n',wn5); 
fprintf('\nAverage Accelerations in Sea State %g :\n',Sea); 
fprintf('Surge = %-2.1f m/s2\n',A1_11); 
fprintf('Heave = %-2.1f m/s2\n',A3_11); 
fprintf('Pitch = %-2.1f deg/s2\n',A5_11*(180/pi)); 
fprintf('\nSignificant Accelerations in Sea State %g :\n',Sea); 
fprintf('Surge = %-2.1f m/s2\n',A1_13); 
fprintf('Heave = %-2.1f m/s2\n',A3_13); 
fprintf('Pitch = %-2.1f deg/s2\n\n',A5_13*(180/pi)); 
fprintf('                                     NATO STANAG 4154       LSRC PERFORMANCE         PROBABILITY 
OF\n'); 
fprintf('                                          LIMIT              IN SEA STATE %g          EXCEEDING LIMIT\n\n',Sea); 
fprintf('Pitch:                               %-2.1f deg (RMS)           %-2.1f deg (RMS)           %-2.1f 
percent\n\n',Pitchmax,sqrt(MoSX5)*(180/pi),ProbX5_Pitchmax*100); 
fprintf('Vertical Acceleration (Heave):       %-2.2f m/s2 (RMS)         %-2.1f m/s2 (RMS)           %-2.1f 
percent\n\n',VAL,sqrt(MoSA3),ProbA3_VAL*100); 
fprintf('Lateral Acceleration (Surge):        %-2.2f m/s2 (RMS)         %-2.1f m/s2 (RMS)           %-2.1f 
percent\n\n',LAL,sqrt(MoSA1),ProbA1_LAL*100); 
fprintf('Lateral Acceleration (Pitch):        %-2.2f m/s2 (RMS)         %-2.1f m/s2 (RMS)           %-2.1f 
percent\n\n',LAL,sqrt(MoSA5)*(CG)*cos(X5_11),ProbA5_LAL*100); 
  
%Time Space Simulations 
Seconds=240;                                 %Duration of time simulation 
Psi=rand(1,length(Omega)).*2*pi;   %Vector of random phases 
time=[0:1:Seconds]; 
  
%Calculates Surge Response in Time Space 




    X1ti=Awi.*abs(H1).*sin(Omega.*t+PsiH1+Psi); 
    X1t(t+1)=sum(X1ti); 
end 
  
%Calculates Heave Response in Time Space 
PsiH3=angle(H3);                             %Vector of transfer function phase angles 
for t=0:Seconds 
    X3ti=Awi.*abs(H3).*sin(Omega.*t+PsiH3+Psi); 
    X3t(t+1)=sum(X3ti); 
end 
  
%Calculates Pitch Response in Time Space 
PsiH5=angle(H5);                             %Vector of transfer function phase angles 
for t=0:Seconds 
    X5ti=Awi.*abs(H5).*sin(Omega.*t+PsiH5+Psi); 
    X5t(t+1)=sum(X5ti); 
end 
  
%Plots Bretschneider Spectrum 
figure(1) 
plot(Omega,Sw,'black','linewidth',1.5); 
xlabel('FREQUENCY (RADIANS/SECOND), \omega'); 
ylabel('Sw'); 
title(['BRETSCHNEIDER SPECTRUM, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea)]); 
  
%Plots Surge Transfer Function H1 (RAO) 
figure(2) 
plot(Omega,abs(H1),'black','linewidth',1.5); 
xlabel('FREQUENCY (RADIANS/SECOND), \omega'); 
ylabel('|H1|'); 
title('SURGE TRANSFER FUNCTION'); 
  
%Plots Heave Transfer Function H3 (RAO) 
figure(3) 
plot(Omega,abs(H3),'black','linewidth',1.5); 
xlabel('FREQUENCY (RADIANS/SECOND), \omega'); 
ylabel('|H3|'); 
title('HEAVE TRANSFER FUNCTION'); 
  
%Plots Pitch Transfer Function H5 (RAO) 
figure(4) 
plot(Omega,abs(H5),'black','linewidth',1.5); 
xlabel('FREQUENCY (RADIANS/SECOND), \omega'); 
ylabel('|H5|'); 
title('PITCH TRANSFER FUNCTION'); 
  









title(['WAVE ENERGY SPECTRUM AND NATURAL FREQUENCIES, Sea State = ',num2str(Sea)]); 
xlabel('FREQUENCY (RADIANS/SECOND), \omega') 
ylabel('SPECTRUM') 





%Plots Displacement Spectrums 
figure(6) 
[AX,Hand1,Hand2] = plotyy(Omega,SX1,Omega,SX5.*(180/(pi)),'plot'); 




title(['DISPLACEMENT SPECTRUMS, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea),'    H_1_/_3 = ',num2str(H13(Sea)),', 
meters']); 






%Plots Velocities Spectrums 
figure(7) 
[AX,Hand1,Hand2] = plotyy(Omega,SV1,Omega,SV5.*(180/(pi)),'plot'); 




title(['VELOCITY SPECTRUMS, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea),'    H_1_/_3 = ',num2str(H13(Sea)),', 
meters']); 






%Plots Accelerations Spectrums 
figure(8) 
[AX,Hand1,Hand2] = plotyy(Omega,SA1,Omega,SA5.*(180/(pi)),'plot'); 




title(['ACCELERATION SPECTRUMS, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea),'    H_1_/_3 = ',num2str(H13(Sea)),', 
meters']); 













title(['Surge Response, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea),'    H_1_/_3 = ',num2str(H13(Sea)),', meters']); 
  





title(['Heave Response, SEA STATE = ',num2str(Sea),'    H_1_/_3 = ',num2str(H13(Sea)),', meters']); 
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APPENDIX IX. Seakeeping Results 
 
****************************************** RESULTS ***************************************** 
Sea State = 3 
Significant Wave Height (H13) = 0.875 meters 
Sea Spectrum Modal Frequency = 1.340 1/seconds 
 
Heave Spectrum Modal Frequency = 0.882 1/seconds 
Pitch Spectrum Modal Frequency = 0.535 1/seconds 
Average Accelerations in Sea State 3 : 
Surge = 0.2 m/s2 
Heave = 0.3 m/s2 
Pitch = 9.6 deg/s2 
Significant Accelerations in Sea State 3 : 
Surge = 0.3 m/s2 
Heave = 0.5 m/s2 
Pitch = 15.4 deg/s2     
 NATO STANAG 4154 LSRC PERFORMANCE PROBABILITY OF
 LIMIT IN SEA STATE 3 EXCEEDING LIMIT 
    
Pitch:                                       4.0 deg (RMS) 4.6 deg (RMS) 65.9 percent 
    
Vertical Acceleration (Heave):   1.96 m/s2 (RMS) 0.2 m/s2 (RMS 0.0 percent 
    
Lateral Acceleration (Surge):     0.98 m/s2 (RMS) 0.1 m/s2 (RMS) 0.0 percent 
    
Lateral Acceleration (Pitch):      0.98 m/s2 (RMS) 0.9 m/s2 (RMS) 55.9 percent 
 
 
****************************************** RESULTS ***************************************** 
Sea State = 4 
Significant Wave Height (H13) = 1.875 meters 
Sea Spectrum Modal Frequency = 0.915 1/seconds 
 
Heave Spectrum Modal Frequency = 0.881 1/seconds 
Pitch Spectrum Modal Frequency = 0.520 1/seconds 
Average Accelerations in Sea State 4 : 
Surge = 0.3 m/s2 
Heave = 1.6 m/s2 
Pitch = 24.4 deg/s2 
Significant Accelerations in Sea State 4 : 
Surge = 0.5 m/s2 
Heave = 2.5 m/s2 
Pitch = 39.0 deg/s2 
 NATO STANAG 4154 LSRC PERFORMANCE PROBABILITY OF
 LIMIT IN SEA STATE 3 EXCEEDING LIMIT 
    
Pitch:                                       4.0 deg (RMS) 23.7 deg (RMS) 93.7 percent 
    
Vertical Acceleration (Heave):   1.96 m/s2 (RMS) 1.2 m/s2 (RMS) 28.6 percent 
    
Lateral Acceleration (Surge):     0.98 m/s2 (RMS) 0.2 m/s2 (RMS) 0.0 percent 
    
Lateral Acceleration (Pitch):      0.98 m/s2 (RMS) 2.1 m/s2 (RMS) 83.4 percent 
 
